People v. Koonce

Decision Date11 October 1978
Docket NumberNo. 77-1613,77-1613
Citation65 Ill.App.3d 86,382 N.E.2d 447,22 ILL.DEC. 127
Parties, 22 Ill.Dec. 127 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian Zachary KOONCE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Ralph Ruebner, Deputy Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant; Gordon Berry, Asst. Defender, Chicago, of counsel.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Lee T. Hettinger, Iris E. Sholder, Wendy S. Paul, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel.

McNAMARA, Justice:

Defendant, Brian Zachary Koonce, was charged with the offenses of theft of lost property and use of a stolen credit card. Prior to trial, the parties informed the trial court that they had entered an agreement whereby defendant agreed to plead guilty to the charge of theft of lost property and the State would recommend one year probation and would Nolle prosse the credit card charge. The trial court made no comment on the agreement, accepted defendant's plea of guilty on the theft charge, and placed defendant on one year social service supervision. When the prosecutor remarked that he had agreed to probation, not to supervision, the trial judge asked what the State wished to do. The prosecutor replied that the State would go to trial on the credit card charge. After a trial without a jury, defendant was found guilty of that charge and was placed on probation for one year.

Defendant appeals both findings, contending that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of use of a stolen credit card; that the court's unilateral modification of the plea agreement was improper in that defendant entered a plea of guilty to the theft charge solely in reliance on the dropping of the other charge; and that the trial court erred in failing to substantially comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 402 in accepting defendant's plea of guilty to the theft charge. Defendant finally contends that if his credit card conviction is affirmed, the conviction for theft of lost property must be vacated as a lesser included offense.

The facts pertaining to the credit card charge as adduced by the testimony of the two State's witnesses are as follows. John Pearson testified that on May 5, 1977 he accidentally left his keys in his work locker at R. R. Donnelley. When he returned to his locker, he found that his keys, billfold and credentials, including a Sears, Roebuck and Company credit card, were missing. He identified a Sears credit card, introduced into evidence by the State, as his.

Louis Frazier, a Sears security officer, testified that on May 8, 1977 he was so employed at a Sears store in Chicago. He testified that he was called to the jewelry section concerning "the report of a credit card which had been reported as stolen." Defense counsel's objection to that testimony by Frazier was sustained, and the testimony was stricken. Frazier then testified that he approached defendant at the jewelry section and asked if he had a problem with his account. Defendant replied that it was possible he was overextended because he had missed the last four payments on his account. Frazier identified himself as a security officer and advised defendant he was under arrest for possession of a stolen credit card. Frazier testified that defendant, after being given his Miranda warnings, stated that he came to the store to try to purchase one or two watches with the credit card he found at Donnelley's, his place of employment.

Defendant initially contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of use of the stolen credit card under the Illinois Credit Card Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 1211/2, par. 608.) The statute requires the State to prove that ...

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3 cases
  • A. M., In Interest of
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 18, 1981
    ...absence of an adjudication of guilt. (City of Chicago v. Severini (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 38, 414 N.E.2d 67; PEOPLE V. KOONCE (1978), 65 ILL.APP.3D 86, 22 ILL.DEC. 127, 382 N.E.2D 447;1 People v. Breen (1975), 26 Ill.App.3d 547, 325 N.E.2d 738, rev'd other grounds (1976), 62 Ill.2d 323, 342 N......
  • People v. Gibson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 24, 1981
    ...the conduct prohibited in section 8(ii) pertains to the actual obtaining of goods or property. (See People v. Koonce (1978), 65 Ill.App.3d 86, 87, 22 Ill.Dec. 127, 382 N.E.2d 447.) We point out that section 8 incorporates, albeit in reworded form, the provisions of former section 17-1(e) (1......
  • People v. Tarkowski, 80-374
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 22, 1981
    ...finding or adjudication of the minor as a person described in section 2-1 of that Act. Two years later, in People v. Koonce (1978), 65 Ill.App.3d 86, 22 Ill.Dec. 127, 382 N.E.2d 447, the first district was faced with a case in which the defendant sought review of an order placing him on sup......

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