People v. Laczny

• Decision Date: 25 October 1965
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 49972
• Citation: 211 N.E.2d 438,63 Ill.App.2d 324
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Grorge R. LACZNY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 438

211 N.E.2d 438

63 Ill.App.2d 324

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Grorge R. LACZNY, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 49972.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Oct. 25, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 15, 1965.

Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Elmer C. Kissane, Lawrence L. Genesen, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel.

Bellows, Bellows & Magidson, Chicago, for appellant-defendant.

BURMAN, Presiding Justice.

The defendant, George R. Laczny, a Justice of the Peace of Thornton Township, was assigned to sit in the City of Country Club Hills, Illinois. In October of 1963, he was indicted on charges relating to money collected by him as a fine in a case which was heard by him on August 31, 1963. The indictment was in three counts. The first count charged official misconduct in that the defendant intentionally failed to perform a mandatory duty to turn over to the Treasurer of Country Club Hills $400.00 which he had received in his official capacity. Count two charged official misconduct in that he performed an act in excess of his lawful authority with the intent to obtain a personal advantage in that he concealed $400.00 which he had received in his official capacity. The third count charged that he committed the crime of theft in that he knowingly exerted unauthorized control over $400.00 with intent to deprive the owner, the City of Country Club Hills, permanently of the use and benefit of said property. At the close of the case, the State moved to dismiss count two, which was allowed. The jury found the defendant guilty of counts one and three, charging official misconduct and theft of the amount of $400.00. After overruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, the Court sentenced the defendant to a term of not less than one and not more than two years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

The defendant brings this appeal contending that count one of the indictment is void because it fails to allege certain indispensable facts; that the defendant is not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of either official misconduct or theft; that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give an instruction relating to defendant's theory of the case; and that comments made by the trial judge and by the Assistant State's Attorney prevented defendant from receiving a fair trial.

From the record, it appears that a motorist was arrested in Country Club Hills, Illinois, on August 4, 1963, on a charge of driving while intoxicated. He posted bond of $500.00 in cash, and on August 31 appeared before the defendant, who was presiding as a Justice of the Peace at the Country Club Hills City Hall. Defendant informed him that the statutes authorized a sentence of a year in fail and a fine of $1,000. After a plea of guilty was entered, the defendant imposed a fine of $495.00 and $5.00 costs. The motorist asked whether his cash bond of $500.00 could be accepted in payment of his fine, and defendant agreed. Natalie Felber, a police matron, put the money in an envelope, and at the motorist's request gave him a receipt for $500.00. Mrs. Felber was acting as temporary clerk because the defendant's regular clerk was unable to come to court that day. She did not enter any orders on the court sheets, and at the close of the proceedings turned over to the defendant both the envelope and the court sheets.

On September 4th, the defendant instructed Helen Banik, his regular clerk, to enter on the court sheets the dispositions of the August 31st cases, and at his direction she entered the following opposite the motorist's name. Under the heading 'Fines Paid' she entered '95.00'; under 'Costs Paid' she entered '5.00.' In the column headed 'Disposition,' she wrote: 'red to neg driving.' The posting of these items was made on the original court sheet with five copies. The original went to the magistrate, two copies went to the City of Country Club Hills, and the auditor received two or three copies.

On September 11th, the defendant discussed his disposition of the case with Max Atkin, the Chief of Police of Country Club Hills and gave him a check in the sum of $565.00 which represented the fines collected for August and which included the sum of $95.00 plus $5.00 costs for the involved motorist's fine. Atkin testified that the defendant said a lawyer had called him about the case, and that defendant had suspended another $400.00 of the fine. Defendant denied making this comment to Atkin. Atkin and Mrs. Banik testified that Atkin told the defendant that the disposition was incorrectly entered on the court sheets, and that the defendant then directed Mrs. Banik to make the following entry on one of the copies of the court sheet: '900.00 Suspended. 1 yr. C. Jail Suspended.' The entry appears on the court sheet, but the defendant denied that he so directed Mrs. Banik.

On September 12th, the City Clerk received from Atkin the defendant's check for $565.00 for the August fines, wherein $100.00 was designated as a remittance of the fine in the case in question.

On October 10th, the defendant had a telephone conversation with Donald J. Segin, the Mayor of Country Club Hills. Segin testified that he told the defendant that he was mailing a letter to him requesting the September fines, and that in that conversation he said: '* * * we did have a receipt in our file for $500.00 that was paid by [the motorist]. Judge Laczny then said to me 'Mayor, I was just trying to be a good fellow and I think I did a good job in Country Club Hills.' He said, 'would you call [the motorist] for me and ask him to withhold any information regarding this case at this time.' I said 'No, sir, I cannot do that, and I don't think that it is right for you to ask me to do that.'' Segin also said that he told the defendant that a representative of the State's Attorney's office was coming to Country Club Hills the next day to inquire about the case. Segin further testified that the defendant called him the next day and requested Segin to call the motorist and ask him to tear up his receipt, which Segin refused to do. The defendant denied asking Segin to make such a call, denied that Segin told him about the impending investigation by the State's Attorney's office, and testified that he did not discuss that motorist's case with Segin.

On October 11th, the defendant told Mrs. Banik that there was a clerical error in the original entry of $95.00 and $5.00 costs and that it should have read $495.00 and $5.00 costs, as it appeared on his copy of the court sheet. The defendant admitted that he placed the figure '4' before the item '95' on his sheet. On October 14th, the defendant mailed a check to the Village Treasurer of Country Club Hills in the amount of $1,227.00, which constituted his remittance of the September fines and of an additional $400.00 from the case in question.

The defendant contends that the first count of the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to charge that the $400.00 was the property of the City of Country Club Hills, or that he received it while acting as Justice of the Peace for that city, or to state facts which show the nature of the duty which required him to turn over to that city the sum of $400.00. Count one of the indictment accuses the defendant of committing the offense of official misconduct,

* * * in that he, a public officer, a Justice of the Peace of Thorton Township, Illinois, in his official capacity, intentionally failed to perform a mandatory duty as required by law in that he failed to turn over to the Treasurer of the City of Country Club Hills, Illinois, the sum of Four Hundred Dollars which he has received in his official capacity.

Under the Illinois Constitution, the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled, '* * * to demand the nature and the cause of the accusation,' Iil. Const. art. 2 § 9, S.H.A. The cases which have interpreted this language, some of which are cited by the defendant, have held that the indictment must be sufficiently specific to enable a defendant fully to prepare his defense, and to plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. People v. White, 24 Ill.App.2d 324, 164 N.E.2d 823, 80 A.L.R.2d 1060; People v. Peters, 10 Ill.2d 577, 141 N.E.2d 9; People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278, 115 A.L.R. 348. In our opinion, the indictment in this case adequately satisfies these standards. There can be little doubt that this defendant knew, at the time he was indicted if not earlier, exactly what charges were being made against him, and that he was not hindered in preparing his defense by any vagueness in the indictment. Furthermore, it is clear that the indictment in this case, taken in conjunction with the record, would constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same offense arising out of the same incident. City of Chicago v. Lambert, 47 Ill.App.2d 151, 197 N.E.2d 448. For these reasons, we find this indictment sufficient to support the conviction.

The defendant next contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of either official misconduct or theft. He places great reliance upon his claim that he deposited the entire amount received from this motorist in a...