People v. Lafountain

• Decision Date: 28 March 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. 146496.,COA No. 306858.
• Citation: 844 N.W.2d 5,495 Mich. 968
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Suzanne Fay LaFOUNTAIN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

495 Mich. 968

844 N.W.2d 5

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Suzanne Fay LaFOUNTAIN, Defendant–Appellant.

Docket No. 146496.

COA No. 306858.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 28, 2014.

Order

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we AFFIRM the result reached in the November 20, 2012 judgment of the Court of Appeals. “[R]eview[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor,” as we are obligated to do, we conclude that “a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” People v. Smith–Anthony, 494 Mich. 669, 676, 837 N.W.2d 415 (2013), of operating a methamphetamine laboratory involving a firearm. (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) A defendant is guilty of this offense when he or she operates a methamphetamine laboratory and this operation “involves the possession, placement, or use of a firearm or any other device designed or intended to be used to injure another person....” MCL 333.7401c(2)(e). “[A]ctual possession is not required; constructive possession is sufficient.” People v. Minch, 493 Mich. 87, 91, 825 N.W.2d 560 (2012). “ ‘[A] person has constructive possession if he knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons ....’ ” Id. at 92, 825 N.W.2d 560 (citation omitted). In this case, defendant only disputes whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that her operation of a methamphetamine laboratory “involve[d] the possession, placement, or use of a firearm.” The term “involve” means “to include within itself or its scope.” Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2005). See also The Merriam–Webster Dictionary (2005) (“[T]o have as part of itself: INCLUDE [.]”); Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.) (“To include; to contain; imply.”). We rely on this definition of “involve” rather than the dissent's definition of “to relate closely: CONNECT” because the former seems to be more consistently cited in dictionaries than the latter and thus seems to be the most ordinary understanding of the word “involve”; however, we would reach the same result here even had we adopted the latter definition. Given that there was evidence that defendant had lived at the house at issue for five years; that the firearms were found in plain view in the bedroom of defendant's children, a room that defendant admitted she was in on a regular basis; that the firearms had been in this room for some period of time; and that this room was immediately across the hallway from defendant's own bedroom, which also served as the methamphetamine laboratory, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant constructively possessed the firearms and that defendant's operation of the methamphetamine laboratory involved her constructive possession of the firearms. That is, a rational trier of fact could infer from the evidence that defendant knowingly had the power and the intention to exercise dominion or control over the firearms, thus satisfying the constructive possession element. In addition, the evidence, when viewed as a whole, including the close proximity between defendant's constructive possession of the firearms and her operation of the methamphetamine laboratory, and the well-known relationship between drugs and the use of firearms as protection, a rational trier of fact could also infer that defendant's operation of the laboratory involved defendant's constructive possession of the firearms. See People v. Rapley, 483 Mich. 1131, 767 N.W.2d 444 (2009). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, there is absolutely nothing wrong with “conviction[s] built on inferences derived from circumstantial evidence ....” People v. Hardiman, 466 Mich. 417, 430, 646 N.W.2d 158 (2002). Indeed, it is important for appellate courts to remember that “[i]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” Id. at 428, 646 N.W.2d 158. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' holding that “there was sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude that defendant was guilty of operating or maintaining a methamphetamine laboratory involving a firearm.” People v. LaFountain, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 20, 2012 (Docket No. 306858), pp. 2–3, 2012 WL 6913828. However, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the trial court did not err by assessing 10 points for Prior Record Variable (PRV) 7, MCL 777.57. It was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to address this issue because defendant waived it by requesting the trial court to assess 10 points for PRV 7. People v. Jones, 468 Mich. 345, 352 n. 6, 662 N.W.2d 376 (2003) (“Appellate review is precluded because when a party invites the error, he waives his right to seek appellate review, and any error is extinguished.”), citing People v. Carter, 462 Mich. 206, 214–215, 612 N.W.2d 144 (2000).

VIVIANO, J. ( dissenting ).

In this case, defendant was convicted of operating a methamphetamine laboratory “involv[ing] the possession, placement, or use” of a firearm. ¹ Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence that the operation of her methamphetamine laboratory involved firearms. The majority rejects this argument and affirms defendant's conviction. Respectfully, I believe this is error.

I believe that neither the majority nor the Court of Appeals interprets the word “involves” in a way that is consistent with its ordinary meaning. Doing so, I would conclude that there was insufficient evidence that the firearms were involved in the operation of the methamphetamine laboratory.

I. THE MEANING OF “INVOLVES”

MCL 333.7401c(2)(e) applies when a drug-manufacturing violation for owning or using a laboratory also “ involves the possession, placement, or use of a firearm or any other device designed or intended to be used to injure another person ....” ² “When construing a statute, [a] court must presume that every word has some meaning and should avoid any construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” ³ The Legislature did not define “involves” as it is used in this statute. Presumably, then, the Legislature intended for this Court to give the word its plain meaning, ⁴ in accord with the word's “context or setting.” ⁵ “Involve” has many different meanings.⁶The Merriam–Webster Dictionary lists seven definitions,⁷ and defendant, the Court of Appeals, the majority, and the prosecution all interpret this word differently.

Defendant claims that “involve” means “to require as a necessary accompaniment.” ⁸ Under this definition, drug-manufacturing activity would involve the possession, placement, or use of a firearm if a defendant required a firearm to conduct his or her criminal activity as a necessary accompaniment. This cannot be the definition that the Legislature intended because the base offense that defendant was convicted of does not require that firearms be involved in any way.⁹ Instead, firearm involvement is an aggravating factor that raises the maximum sentence upon conviction. Hence, the Legislature has determined that it is possible to violate MCL 333.7401c both with and without firearm involvement, and in this sense, firearms are not necessary for the illegal manufacture of controlled substances. Therefore, “involves” cannot mean “to require as a necessary accompaniment,” as defendant claims.

The Court of Appeals did not expressly state the meaning that it attributed to the word “involve.” However, it appears that the Court of Appeals treated this word as if it described spatial proximity. The Court explained:

There is no question that a methamphetamine lab was being operated inside the house, nor is there any question that firearms were inside the house. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude that defendant was guilty of operating or maintaining a methamphetamine laboratory involving a firearm.¹⁰

Thus, the Court of Appeals seemed to believe that this crime involved the possession, placement, or use of a firearm because a firearm was in the same building where the crime was committed. Similarly, the majority in this Court states that given

the close proximity between defendant's constructive possession of the firearms and her operation of the methamphetamine laboratory, and the well-known relationship between drugs and the use of firearms as protection, a rational trier of fact could also infer that defendant's operation of the laboratory involved defendant's constructive possession of the firearms.

In keeping with its proximity rationale, the majority believes that a different dictionary definition is more fitting, namely, “to include within itself or its scope.”

The problem with the Court of Appeals' interpretation is that the dictionary does not list “spatial proximity” or “location within the same building” as possible definitions for “involve.” Hence, the plain meaning of the word cannot be the meaning that the Court of Appeals ascribed to it. To the extent that the majority's preferred definition suggests that “involves” could describe a spatial relationship, the Legislature clearly knew how to use simpler terms to describe mere presence or proximity: the very same statute prohibits using an area to manufacture controlled substances “ in the presence of a minor” ¹¹ and doing so “ within 500 feet of a residence, business establishment, school property, or church or other house of worship.”¹² In the light of this textual evidence, I do not believe the Legislature intended for the word “involves” to refer to spatial proximity or to mean “include within itself or its...