Thompson v. Skipper

• Decision Date: 25 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-1779,19-1779
• Citation: 981 F.3d 476
• Parties: Corey Leron THOMPSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gregory SKIPPER, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

981 F.3d 476

Corey Leron THOMPSON, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Gregory SKIPPER, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 19-1779

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 22, 2020

Decided and Filed: November 25, 2020

COOK, Circuit Judge.

Corey Leron Thompson appeals the district court's denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his Michigan jury lacked sufficient evidence to find that he constructively possessed a gun. Because Thompson fails to surmount the two levels of deference that steer our review, we AFFIRM.

I.

In 2013, Thompson sold heroin to a confidential informant in two controlled buys. After the second controlled buy, police obtained a warrant to search the apartment where the transactions took place. On their way to execute the warrant, police encountered Thompson and a passenger driving away from the apartment in an SUV. The police pulled the vehicle over and arrested Thompson.

During their initial search of the vehicle, officers found multiple bags of heroin and cocaine in the center console and sunroof. Officers later discovered a loaded handgun secreted under the back seat's folding mechanism. The police did not find Thompson's fingerprints on the gun.

Thompson proceeded to trial, where a Michigan jury convicted him of three drug crimes and four gun crimes. Thompson challenged the gun convictions on appeal, arguing that his mere proximity to the gun in the SUV failed to provide sufficient evidence of possession. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Thompson's claim on the merits, concluding that a rational jury could infer he constructively possessed the gun. As the court explained, the evidence demonstrated that Thompson "was a drug dealer and that he had sold drugs on the night the gun was found in the vehicle he was driving." (R. 9-9 at 841.) Citing the "well-known relationship between drug dealing and the use of firearms as protection," the court found that the gun's proximity to both Thompson and the drugs sufficed to create a jury question as to Thompson's possession. (Id. ) The Michigan Supreme Court denied review.

This habeas petition followed, with Thompson renewing his insufficient-evidence claim plus bringing various others including ineffective assistance and the denial of an impartial jury. In denying the insufficient-evidence claim, the district court reasoned "[t]he jury could have inferred that [Thompson] knew about the gun, had access to it, and also had the power and intent to control the gun to protect himself, if the need arose, before, during, and after his drug transactions." (R. 12 at 1145.) Acknowledging that "there was no evidence that [Thompson] actually used or even handled the gun," the court noted that: (1) "it was close to both him and the controlled substances at the time of his arrest" and (2) "the informant saw a gun in the back of the vehicle when she went with [Thompson] to make a drug delivery about a week earlier." (Id. at 1144–45.) The court denied the petition in full and granted a certificate of appealability on the insufficient-evidence claim only.

II.

We review the denial of a habeas petition de novo. Allen v. Mitchell , 953 F.3d 858, 863 (6th Cir. 2020). To evaluate a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Smith v. Nagy , 962 F.3d 192, 205 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). This standard "must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Id. (quoting Jackson , 443 U.S. at 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ).

Thompson's gun offenses required proof that he possessed a firearm. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.224f(1), 750.227b. Under Michigan law, possession may be either actual or constructive. People v. Hill , 433 Mich. 464, 446 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1989). A person constructively possesses a firearm when he "knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over [it]." Id. (citation omitted).

Because the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Thompson's claim on the merits, we accord deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As relevant here, habeas relief is available only if the Michigan Court of Appeals's decision "involved an unreasonable application of" Jackson ’s standard for insufficient-evidence claims. § 2254(d)(1). The state court's application "must be ‘objectively unreasonable,’ not merely wrong; even ‘clear error’ will not suffice." Nagy , 962 F.3d at 199 (quoting White v. Woodall , 572 U.S. 415, 419, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014) ). In other words, "relief is available under § 2254(d)(1) ’s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question." Woodall , 572 U.S. at 427, 134 S.Ct. 1697 (quoting Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ).

Together, Jackson and AEDPA's two layers of deference dictate that "a federal court's ‘review of a state-court conviction for sufficiency of the evidence is very limited.’ " Tackett v. Trierweiler , 956 F.3d 358, 367 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thomas v. Stephenson , 898 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2018) ). "First, on direct appeal, it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial." Id. (quoting Coleman v. Johnson , 566 U.S. 650, 651, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012) (per curiam)). "And second, on habeas review, a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court." Id. (quoting Coleman , 566 U.S. at 651, 132 S.Ct. 2060 ). To prevail, Thompson must overcome both of these layers of deference.

III.

Proximity alone cannot establish constructive possession of a gun. People v. Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 441 Mich. 1201, 489 N.W.2d 748, 757 (1992) ; accord United States v. Campbell , 549 F.3d 364, 374 (6th Cir. 2008). But a rational jury can convict a defendant of constructive possession based on "proximity to the article together with indicia of control." Hill , 446 N.W.2d at 143 ; see Campbell , 549 F.3d at 374 ("[E]vidence of some other factor—including connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise—coupled with proximity may suffice." (citation omitted)). Here, the parties dispute whether such an "additional connection" supported Thompson's convictions for constructively possessing the nearby gun. Wolfe , 489 N.W.2d at 754.

A.

In denying Thompson's petition, the district court relied on the testimony of an informant who "saw a gun in the back of the vehicle when she went with [Thompson] to make a drug delivery about a week earlier." The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, declined to rely on this testimony when rejecting Thompson's insufficient-evidence claim. On appeal, Thompson contends that the district court's consideration of the informant's testimony warrants a remand because, under AEDPA, a habeas court must "train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims." Wilson v. Sellers , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191–92, 200 L.Ed.2d 530 (2018) (citation omitted).

Hewing to Wilson , this court recently explained that AEDPA requires a habeas court "to review the actual grounds on which the state court relied." Coleman v. Bradshaw , 974 F.3d 710, 719 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Wilson , 138 S. Ct. at 1192 ).¹ As the State notes, however, the district court's legal reasoning "is ... not strictly relevant." (Appellee Br. at 15.) On de novo review, this court independently "reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable." Wilson , 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

Thompson resists this conclusion by emphasizing "the parties’ right under our judicial system to have the issues in their suit considered by both a district judge and an appellate court." (Reply Br. at 7 (quoting Friendly Farms v. Reliance Ins. Co. , 79 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 1996) ).) But whatever the scope of that right, this court "may affirm on any grounds ... even if different from the reasons of the district court." Hogan v. Jacobson , 823 F.3d 872, 884 n.2 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , Harris v. Stovall , 212 F.3d 940, 943–45 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming despite finding that "the district court erroneously applied the AEDPA"). As a result, we need not remand if the Michigan Court of Appeals's "specific reasons" for rejecting Thompson's Jackson claim "are reasonable." Wilson , 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

B.

In concluding that sufficient evidence supported Thompson's gun convictions, the Michigan Court of Appeals cited evidence that he "was a drug dealer and that he had sold drugs on the night the gun was found in the vehicle he was driving." (R. 9-9 at 841.) Relying on the "well-known relationship between drug dealing and the use of firearms as protection," the court explained that Thompson's presence near the gun and the drugs provided enough evidence for the jury to convict. ( Id . ; see People v. LaFountain , 495 Mich. 968, 844 N.W.2d 5, 6 (2014).) It reasonably determined that this drug-dealing evidence provided an "additional connection" between Thompson's proximity to the gun and his constructive possession of it. Wolfe , 489 N.W.2d at 754.

Thompson claims that the drug-dealing evidence cannot support his convictions because LaFountain referred to the relationship between drugs and guns "after constructive...