People v. Lambrechts
Decision Date | 30 November 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 48980,48980 |
Citation | 372 N.E.2d 641,14 Ill.Dec. 445,69 Ill.2d 544 |
Parties | , 14 Ill.Dec. 445 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jeffrey LAMBRECHTS, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State App. Defender and Alan D. Goldberg, Asst. State App. Defender, Elgin, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield , for the People.
Defendant, Jeffrey Lambrechts, pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Du Page County to a one-count indictment charging him with burglary. The State recommended, as a part of its plea agreement with defendant, a sentence of 18 to 54 months' imprisonment. The court sentenced defendant to a term of 6 to 20 years. The Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed (41 Ill.App.3d 729, 355 N.E.2d 53), and we allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
The State and defendant apparently agree that defense counsel requested a pretrial conference with the trial judge to which the State objected because no tentative plea agreement had then been reached between the parties as contemplated by our Rule 402(d)(2) (58 Ill.2d R. 402(d)(2)). The court apparently declined the requested conference but indicated defense counsel should continue his discussion with the State's Attorney, and that in 90-95% Of the cases the judge followed the recommended dispositions. At the subsequent plea proceedings the court was informed that the State and defendant had arrived at a plea agreement, and the agreement was stated for the record. The indictment was read to defendant, and the court determined that he understood the nature of the charge against him. A detailed statement of the facts which were the basis for the plea was presented, and, after a minor correction, was conceded by defendant to be correct. Defendant expressly admitted he was guilty of the offense. The court informed defendant of the presumption of innocence, the reasonable doubt standard of proof, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The defendant indicated that he understood that he was waiving all of these rights by pleading guilty, and that no promises other than the plea agreement and no threats had been made to him concerning his plea. The court continued to question defendant as follows:
When it comes to sentencing I could give you a sentence of one to 20, three to 20, six to 20, anything between a minimum of one year and a maximum of 20 years with a mandatory three years parole, even though you have gotten this agreement with the State.
Do you understand that?
After finding defendant guilty of burglary, the court, apparently unfamiliar with defendant's past and noting the recommended minimum was greater than the lowest permissible minimum, ordered a presentence report.
That report detailed defendant's history, indicating he was a 26-year-old high school graduate (correspondence school diploma), married more than two years, and the father of a 2 1/2-month-old daughter. The report also indicated defendant's wife was then "on probation in Cook County for a charge of Theft"; that defendant stated he had been hospitalized and treated several times since 1965 in connection with his usage of drugs, including psychological and psychiatric consultation, both public and private, and treatment at both public and private institutions, among them the Elgin State Hospital and the Federal Rehabilitation Center in Kentucky; that he had been an active member of the Methadone Maintenance Institute in Chicago for the last 1 1/2 years. As to his drug problem defendant told the court: Defendant's extensive criminal record was noted, including one year's probation on a 1967 theft charge, reduced from burglary; 90 days in the House of Corrections in 1968 for contributing to the delinquency of a minor; a 1970 burglary charge which was reduced to theft, for which he received two years' probation including 30 days in jail; a grand theft charge shortly afterwards which was reduced to criminal trespass with one year's probation; 10 months in jail for theft of $150 in 1972; a 30-day jail sentence on a fictitious license plate charge; a 1973 burglary charge which was dropped when defendant pleaded guilty to possession of stolen property for which he received five years' probation and a sentence of one to three years for burglary in Kane County which would commence following the sentencing hearing in this case. Defendant said he had been offered a job just prior to the Kane County sentencing, paying $9.56 per hour, more than he had ever earned. Although he had held some six jobs since leaving school, he was unemployed at the time of the report.
The court thoroughly questioned Lambrechts at the sentencing hearing concerning each prior conviction. Defendant explained that he committed these offenses to finance his drug habit, but had had no drug problem for about a year. After defendant had been given an opportunity to offer evidence in mitigation the court stated in imposing sentence:
"If I ever in my life saw a case where a record screamed for more than 18 to 54 months, this is it.
You have shown you have been continually given probation, probation, probation, probation, and you have continually gone back to crime, crime, crime.
The court then imposed the 6- to 20-year sentence which was protested by Lambrechts, who stated he was really innocent, claiming he pleaded guilty only because he expected the same sentence, and he wanted to get things over with. The court reminded him that he had previously admitted committing the crime and that the court had warned him it might not go along with the plea agreement. Defense counsel stated:
The Court indicated in chambers that in 90, 95 per cent of the cases you follow the pre-trial recommendation.
I'm here not only to protect the defendant's rights but the public's rights, too, and the public has as many rights as the defendant has, and I gave the defendant every opportunity to change his plea, withdraw his plea and told him I might not follow the negotiations, I told him that at least twice.
It was my feeling that if I gave him a sentence of 18 months he would be out of jail in 18 months at least; that he would be back here in this courtroom within the year. That was my feeling.
It is based, I think, on pretty good substantial evidence. He has done it over, over, over and over and why suddenly is he going to not go out and commit burglary?
I don't know why I am...
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