People v. Lampley

• Decision Date: 10 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 1–09–0661.,1–09–0661.
• Citation: 345 Ill.Dec. 682,939 N.E.2d 525,405 Ill.App.3d 1
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Bruce LAMPLEY, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

405 Ill.App.3d 1
939 N.E.2d 525
345 Ill.Dec. 682

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Bruce LAMPLEY, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–09–0661.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Nov. 10, 2010.

[939 N.E.2d 527]

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, Jessica Wynne Arizo, Asst. Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner–Appellant.Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney of Cook County (Allen J. Spellberg, Carol L. Gaines, Molly E. Donnelly, Asst. State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Respondent–Appellee.Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the court:

[345 Ill.Dec. 684 , 405 Ill.App.3d 2] Following a jury trial, defendant, Bruce Lampley, was found guilty of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19–1 (West 2006)). Based on his criminal history, and pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–5–3(c) (8) (West 2006)), defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender to 14 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the trial court interfered with his right to testify when it deferred ruling on his motion in limine to bar the introduction of his prior convictions; (2) the trial court failed to properly question potential jurors as to whether they understood and accepted the principles outlined in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill.2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (1984), and Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (177 Ill.2d R. 431(b)); (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing a three-year term of mandatory

[345 Ill.Dec. 685 , 939 N.E.2d 528]

supervised release (MSR) instead of a two-year term as required for Class 2 felonies. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on November 12, 2007, for burglary and possession of burglary tools. Defendant elected to proceed to a jury trial on the charges. The State moved to nol-pros the possession of burglary tools charge and proceeded to trial on the one count of burglary. During jury selection, when the venire was brought into the courtroom, the trial court admonished the entire panel on several concepts and principles of law. In particular, prior to swearing in and questioning the venire, the trial court advised:

“In other words, the expression ‘where there's smoke, there's fire’ has no place in a court of law.

[405 Ill.App.3d 3] In fact, under our law a defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him in the indictment.

This presumption of innocence remains with the defendant throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on a verdict. It must be kept in your mind at all times during the presentation of evidence.

This presumption of innocence is not overcome unless from all of the evidence in the case you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.

The defendant is not required to prove his innocence, nor is he required to testify or present any evidence whatsoever on his behalf.

The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and this burden remains on the State throughout every stage of the trial and during your deliberations on a verdict.”

Following a lunch break, the jury panel was sworn and questioning of the venire began. The trial court immediately proceeded by asking “four questions of all of you at the same time.” The court requested that the prospective jurors stand if their answers to any of the questions were in the affirmative. The trial court asked the venire if they knew any of the parties or attorneys involved and whether they were currently involved in any litigation. After excusing two prospective jurors involved in litigation, the trial court continued to query the venire as follows:

“Folks, the third question is this: As I have previously stated, the defendant is presumed innocent and does not have to offer any evidence on his own behalf but must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the State.

Does anyone here have any problems with those concepts? If so, please stand up?

* * *

Folks, the fourth and final question for you is this: As I have also previously stated, the defendant does not have to testify on his own behalf.

If the defendant decides not to testify, you must not hold that decision against the defendant.

If the defendant decides not to testify, is there anyone here who believes that, regardless of what I have just said, you would hold that decision against the defendant? If so, please stand up.

Let the record reflect that no one has stood up.”

The jury was selected and sent home to return the next day for trial. Before the jury was called, the trial court considered defendant's motion in limine to bar the use of evidence of defendant's five prior [405 Ill.App.3d 4] convictions for burglary to impeach his

[345 Ill.Dec. 686 , 939 N.E.2d 529]

credibility. The trial court stated that it would enter and continue the motion until the close of the State's case, because at that point a prior ruling would be “advisory” and was not warranted.

The State presented the testimony of Sharon Handelsman. Handelsman, a resident physician, testified that on the morning of November 12, 2007, she parked her 1996 Geo Prism in the Rush Presbyterian Hospital parking garage. After parking, she placed her purse in the trunk of her car and closed and locked the trunk and doors of her car before going into the hospital to work her shift. Handelsman testified that she returned to her vehicle at approximately 4:30 p.m. and could not open the trunk of her car with her key. She entered her car, opened the trunk with the latch release inside her car, and retrieved her purse from the trunk. She then discovered that her cell phone and wallet (containing her driver's license, cash and credit cards) were missing.

Handelsman testified that she drove toward the exit and asked the parking attendant to notify the security office that those items were missing from her purse. She spoke with a security officer and parked her vehicle at the side of the parking garage. Handelsman was escorted to the security office, where the officers showed her the items that were stolen. She then left the garage, leaving her car there for security to investigate.

Dennis Garden, a security guard at the parking garage testified that at 4:35 p.m. on November 12, 2007, he saw a man he identified as defendant carrying a backpack and exiting the parking garage. Defendant walked west on West Harrison Street and continued to walk when Garden called for him to stop. Garden called the dispatcher to report defendant's appearance and location.

Edward Altman, another security officer at the parking garage, testified that he saw defendant, who matched the description given by Garden, crossing West Harrison Street. Altman stopped defendant at the northwest corner of the intersection of West Harrison Street and South Wood Street. Altman testified that when he asked to look in defendant's backpack, defendant allowed him to do so. Altman found women's jewelry and a half-open wallet that displayed a white woman's driver's license. Altman testified that other officers arrived on the scene and he then placed defendant in custody and handcuffed him. Altman patted down defendant and discovered a razor knife in his pocket. At the security office, the officers also discovered a camera, a CD player, cellular phone, screwdriver, and CDs in defendant's bag.

Altman testified that the driver's license in the bag belonged to Handelsman. Handelsman arrived later at the security office and [405 Ill.App.3d 5] identified the wallet and cellular phone as hers. She stated that the items had been taken that day from the trunk of her car. Altman testified that the security officers contacted Chicago police.

The State also presented evidence concerning a fingerprint lift taken from the trunk of Handelsman's car on November 12, 2007. The latent fingerprint was compared with a known fingerprint standard of defendant. The ridge details of the two fingerprints were found to be a match. Additionally, a videotape taken from the parking garage video surveillance system was offered into evidence. The video depicted an African–American man wearing a baseball cap and backpack walk toward Handelsman's car, open the trunk, enter the trunk, stand up with his backpack and walk away from the vehicle. Later, the videotape showed a white female approach the vehicle, have difficulty opening the

[345 Ill.Dec. 687 , 939 N.E.2d 530]

trunk, and then pop the trunk from inside the vehicle. Due to the grainy quality of the image, no positive identification could be made with the video.

The State rested and defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion and considered defendant's motion in limine to bar the introduction of prior convictions. The State indicated that, if defendant took the stand, it would seek to introduce evidence of defendant's 2001 conviction for burglary in order for the jury to properly weigh defendant's credibility. The trial court rejected defendant's argument that evidence of the conviction was too prejudicial and denied the motion. The court recognized the prejudicial impact as the prior conviction was for the same kind of crime, but since it occurred within 10 years and had probative value as a crime of dishonesty, the use of proper jury instructions could minimize that prejudice.

Defendant chose to testify. Defendant testified that he was homeless and on November 11, 2007, he had slept at the Rush Presbyterian Hospital parking garage and as he was leaving the garage, defendant found a wallet and cellular telephone on the ground. Defendant put them in his backpack, which already contained DVD movies, CDs, earrings, a Palm Pilot, a Nikon camera, watches and other items. As he left, defendant passed one officer and then another officer. The second officer stopped him and asked to look into his...