People v. Lander
| Decision Date | 03 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 98433.,98433. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Donald A. LANDER, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Donna K. Kelly, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Sheldon R. Sobol, State's Attorney, Morris (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
In this appeal, we consider whether: (1) defendant Donald A. Lander's court-appointed attorneys were required to comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill.2d R. 651(c)), when his pro se postconviction petition was not timely filed; and (2) the allegations in defendant's pleadings were sufficient to establish the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence. We hold that defendant's attorneys were required to comply with Rule 651(c) in these circumstances, and defendant failed to establish he was not culpably negligent in the late filing. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments below and remand to the circuit court for further postconviction proceedings.
Defendant Donald A. Lander was convicted of aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West 1994)) and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment. In a decision filed on March 15, 2000, the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Lander, No. 3-98-0698, 312 Ill.App.3d 1222, 264 Ill.Dec. 78, 769 N.E.2d 580 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On August 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial and on direct appeal. Defendant's postconviction petition was accompanied by a motion for leave to file a late petition.
In his motion, defendant alleged he spoke with a law clerk employed by the prison and several "jailhouse lawyers" when he arrived at Western Illinois Correctional Center (Western) in 1997. Defendant was informed by these various individuals that he was allowed three years after the date of the last court decision to file a postconviction petition. The law clerk and jailhouse lawyers also allegedly informed defendant that he could file affidavits with the court and they would be treated as a postconviction petition. Defendant alleged he filed affidavits in the trial court in December 1998 and March 1999, believing they would be treated as a postconviction petition.
Defendant further alleged he was transferred to Taylorville Correctional Center (Taylorville) in May 2000. When he arrived, defendant spoke with a staff member in the law library who stated law clerks had not been available at the prison for the past six months. Defendant then informed the prison librarian of the advice he had received from the law clerk and jailhouse lawyers at Western. The prison librarian confirmed defendant was allowed three years after the date of the appellate court decision to file his postconviction petition and that the affidavits he filed would be treated as a postconviction petition. Defendant alleged he was unaware of the deadline for filing a postconviction petition due to his lack of legal knowledge.
At the first stage of the proceedings, the trial court found defendant's pro se petition was not frivolous or patently without merit (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2000)). The court appointed two attorneys to represent defendant. Defendant's appointed counsel then filed an amended motion for leave to file a postconviction petition, asserting defendant's pro se petition was in fact timely filed. In a subsequently filed second amended motion prepared by defendant's attorneys, defendant sought to withdraw his amended motion and restated more specifically the allegations in his previous pro se motion for leave to file a late petition. In particular, defendant alleged that in October 1997, he spoke with a law clerk at Western who stated the time for filing a postconviction petition did not expire until three years after the last court rendered a decision. Defendant identified Harold Anderson as an "inmate and jailhouse lawyer" at Western who stated defendant could file affidavits that would be treated by the court as a postconviction petition. Defendant alleged Kimberly Wells, Sherry Wells, and Lori Ann Lander filed affidavits on his behalf in December 1998 and March 1999, asserting someone other than defendant was responsible for the victim's injuries.
The second amended motion also identified Dwayne Purble as the "librarian or paralegal" in the Taylorville law library who advised him that he had three years after the appellate court decision was issued to file his petition and that the affidavits filed with the trial court would be treated as a postconviction petition. Defendant asserted he was not informed by his trial or appellate counsel of the deadline for filing a postconviction petition, and he relied in good faith on the advice of the only people available with purported knowledge of the law.
No amended postconviction petition was ever filed. The State filed a "motion to dismiss petitioner's second amended motion for leave to file a late petition for postconviction relief." In its motion, the State sought dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition as untimely. Following a hearing, the trial court found the petition was untimely and defendant had failed to establish the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's second amended motion for leave to file a late postconviction petition and granted the State's motion to dismiss defendant's pro se petition.
On appeal, defendant argued he was deprived of his right to reasonable assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to comply with Rule 651(c) and that he alleged sufficient facts to establish the delay in filing his petition was not due to his culpable negligence. The appellate court held the Rule 651(c) consultation requirement did not apply in this case because counsel was required to argue successfully the late filing was not due to defendant's culpable negligence before the merits of the petition could be addressed. Therefore, counsel had no obligation to consult with defendant to ascertain his claims of constitutional deprivation until after the time bar was overcome. The appellate court further noted counsel included specific dates and names in the second amended motion in an effort to show the late filing was not due to defendant's culpable negligence. According to the appellate court, these actions demonstrated that counsel consulted with defendant and made any necessary amendments to his petition as required by Rule 651(c).
In reviewing defendant's claim that he was misinformed by various lay people concerning the filing deadline for his postconviction petition, the appellate court held these allegations were insufficient to demonstrate the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence. The appellate court therefore affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. No. 3-02-0436 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).
In this appeal, defendant contends the untimeliness of his pro se postconviction petition did not excuse his attorneys from fulfilling their duties under Rule 651(c) and that he was denied reasonable assistance of counsel due to their failure to comply with the rule. The State contends defendant's substantive claims could not have been presented until the time bar was overcome and, therefore, his attorneys had no obligation to comply with Rule 651(c) until they were granted leave to file a late petition. The State also asserts the actions of defense counsel were reasonable under the circumstances and fulfilled the requirements of Rule 651(c).
When a postconviction petition is dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 388-89, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). An indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel in postconviction proceedings if the petition is not summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2000). A defendant is entitled only to the level of assistance required by the Act, however, because the right to counsel is wholly statutory and is not mandated by the Constitution. People v. Turner, 187 Ill.2d 406, 410, 241 Ill.Dec. 596, 719 N.E.2d 725 (1999); People v. Williams, 186 Ill.2d 55, 60, 237 Ill.Dec. 112, 708 N.E.2d 1152 (1999). The Act requires postconviction counsel to provide a "reasonable level of assistance" to a defendant. (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Owens, 139 Ill.2d 351, 364, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184 (1990).
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) imposes specific obligations on postconviction counsel to assure the reasonable level of assistance required by the Act. Turner, 187 Ill.2d at 410, 241 Ill.Dec. 596, 719 N.E.2d 725. Rule 651(c) requires that the record show counsel has: (1) consulted with the defendant either by mail or in person to ascertain his claims of deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) examined the record of the trial court proceedings; and (3) made any amendments to the pro se petition necessary for an adequate presentation of the defendant's contentions. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(c). Compliance with the duties set forth in Rule 651(c) is mandatory (People v. Munson, 206 Ill.2d 104, 137, 276 Ill.Dec. 260, 794 N.E.2d 155 (2002)), and may be shown by a certificate filed by postconviction counsel. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(c). The failure to file a certificate showing compliance with Rule 651(c) is harmless error if the record demonstrates that counsel adequately fulfilled the required duties. Williams, 186 Ill.2d at 59 n. 1, 237 Ill.Dec. 112...
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