People v. Lane

• Decision Date: 11 March 2021
• Docket Number: 105932
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Todd D. LANE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

192 A.D.3d 1262
143 N.Y.S.3d 455

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Todd D. LANE, Appellant.

105932

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 4, 2021
Decided and Entered: March 11, 2021

143 N.Y.S.3d 456

Shane A. Zoni, Public Defender, Hudson (Jessica D. Howser of counsel), for appellant.

David E. Woodin, Special Prosecutor, Catskill, for respondent.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Czajka, J.), rendered January 6, 2010, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree, and (2) from a judgment of said court, rendered January 13, 2010 in Columbia County, which resentenced defendant.

As the result of allegations that he had sexually molested a 10–year–old child on multiple occasions in 2008, defendant was charged in an indictment with rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree. In the midst of a 2009 jury trial on the charges, defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment after being apprised of his sentencing exposure and the fact that no sentencing commitments were being made. County Court thereafter denied youthful offender treatment and imposed sentences that, as adjusted upon resentencing, resulted in a sentence of a total of 10 years in prison and 20 years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, argues that County Court abused its discretion in denying him youthful offender status. Inasmuch as he was convicted of crimes that included rape in the first degree and criminal sexual act in the first degree, and was the sole perpetrator of those crimes, he "was required to demonstrate ‘mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed’ in order to be eligible for" that status ( People v. Williams, 155 A.D.3d 1260, 1260, 64 N.Y.S.3d 747 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1121, 77 N.Y.S.3d 346, 101 N.E.3d 987 [2018], quoting CPL 720.10[3][i] ; see CPL 720.10[2][a] ; People v. Middlebrooks, 25 N.Y.3d 516, 527–528, 14 N.Y.S.3d 296, 35 N.E.3d 464 [2015] ; People v. Robertucci, 172 A.D.3d 1782, 1783, 101 N.Y.S.3d 751 [2019] ). County Court did not determine that issue – instead observing, in general terms, that youthful offender treatment was "not appropriate" – but the record permits us to make the necessary finding of eligibility in the first instance...