People v. Lane
| Citation | 56 N.Y.2d 1,451 N.Y.S.2d 6,436 N.E.2d 456 |
| Parties | , 436 N.E.2d 456 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. George Mark LANE, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael WELLS, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1982 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
In order to defeat a motion by the People to consolidate two indictments made on the ground that proof of one offense would be material and admissible upon a trial of the second offense (CPL 200.20, subd. 2, par. subd. 4), a defendant claiming that he wishes to testify as to the first allegedly criminal transaction but not as to the second must make a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one offense and a strong need to refrain from testifying as to the other. In that neither defendant here advanced sufficient information or grounds to satisfy this requirement, the Appellate Division's, 83 A.D.2d 795, 443 N.Y.S.2d 965, orders affirming the judgments of conviction in each case should be affirmed.
Defendants were charged in Indictment No. 1065 with a robbery which occurred on November 29, 1978 and in Indictment No. 1066 with a robbery which occurred on December 2, 1978. The circumstances underlying each charge were remarkably similar. In each instance two young men matching defendants' descriptions were picked up while hitchhiking in downtown Rochester. Once in the vehicle a knife was held on the driver, who was ordered to drive to a location near Driving Park Bridge. There the driver was removed from the car, robbed of his money and locked in the trunk. The car was then driven to and abandoned on a dead-end road near the Genesee River Gorge.
The People filed a pretrial motion for consolidation of the indictments on the ground that proof of the underlying criminal transaction as to one offense would be material and admissible as evidence-in-chief on trial of the other (CPL 200.20, subd. 2, par. subd. 4). Based upon oral arguments the court granted the motion to consolidate.
Defendants thereafter moved for reconsideration and an affidavit of counsel was submitted on behalf of each defendant in opposition to consolidation informing the court that they wished to testify with respect to the events of November 29 but that they desired to remain silent as to the events of December 2. More specifically, as to Indictment No. 1065, each defendant represented an intent to testify that his involvement on November 29 with the victim was for the purpose of engaging in certain sexual acts for money, and that regardless of whether those acts occurred and may have been criminal in nature, no robbery was committed. As to Indictment No. 1066, however, each defendant represented a desire to remain silent in that due to the inability of the victim to identify one of the perpetrators of the alleged December 2 robbery and to the court's suppression of any identification of the other individual involved, he would rest his defense on what he perceived to be the weakness of the People's identification evidence.
Defendants contended that under these circumstances it was error to have ordered consolidation of the indictments. The trial court again rejected defendants' arguments and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Neither defendant took the stand at trial. The jury found both defendants guilty of the November 29 robbery and found defendant Wells guilty of the December 2 robbery but acquitted defendant Lane of that charge. The Appellate Division affirmed all judgments of conviction. We hold that the trial court did not err in consolidating the two indictments and affirm.
As a preliminary matter it is advisable to distinguish between consolidation and severance in the context of a criminal proceeding and briefly examine pertinent legislation in the area. Consolidation is the procedure by which the prosecutor or the defendant attempts to have two or more separate indictments combined for a single trial. To obtain consolidation the applicant must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court not only that the offenses charged in the separate indictments are joinable in accordance with the statutory criteria set forth in CPL 200.20 (subd. 2) but also that combination for a single trial is an appropriate exercise of discretion (CPL 200.20, subd. 4).
By contrast, severance is the converse procedure by which the prosecutor or the defendant attempts to obtain separate trials of two or more counts contained in a single indictment. To effect a severance the applicant must either demonstrate that the counts were not joinable under the statutory criteria (CPL 200.20, subd. 2) or seek a discretionary severance under CPL 200.20 (subd. 3). The latter subdivision applies, however, only with respect to counts which are joinable under paragraph (c) of subdivision 2 of the section (offenses defined by same or similar statutory provisions), and severance will be granted only if he can persuade the court that the severance should be granted "in the interest of justice and for good cause shown".
It is significant that in the last-quoted phrase the Legislature has established a standard for the exercise of discretion on applications for severance in the single category of cases identified. All requests for consolidation, however, are governed under the statute simply by the permissive "may".
Thus it is clear that the decision to consolidate separate indictments under CPL 200.20 (subd. 4) is committed to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge in light of the circumstances of the individual case, and the decision is reviewable on appeal to this court only to the extent that there has been an abuse of that discretion as a matter of law. Trial courts should generally weigh the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy and expensive trials against the defendant's interest in being protected from unfair disadvantage. While the trial courts must be afforded reasonable latitude in exercising discretion in these matters, we emphasize that compromise of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial free of undue prejudice as the quid pro quo for...
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MISSING THE MISJOINDER MARK: IMPROVING CRIMINAL JOINDER OF OFFENSES IN CAPITAL-SENTENCING JURISDICTIONS.
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