People v. Laubscher

• Decision Date: 24 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 83518,83518
• Parties: , 233 Ill.Dec. 639 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Anthony LAUBSCHER, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 489

701 N.E.2d 489

183 Ill.2d 330, 233 Ill.Dec. 639

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Anthony LAUBSCHER, Appellee.

No. 83518.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 1998.

Thomas R. Dodegge, Assistant State's Attorney Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Stephen F. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, State's Attorney Champaign County, Urbana, for the People.

Andrea Georgelos, Lerner & Kirchner, Champaign, for Anthony J. Laubscher.

Chief Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Anthony Laubscher, was found guilty by the circuit court of Champaign County of unlawful use of a weapon and aggravated assault following a dispute on the premises of his residence. Defendant appealed from his conviction for unlawful use of a weapon, and the appellate court reversed, concluding that the State failed to prove that at the time defendant possessed the weapon, he was not either "on his land" or in his "fixed place of business" as provided in the exceptions to the unlawful use of weapons statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 1994)). 288 Ill.App.3d 438, 223 Ill.Dec. 781, 680 N.E.2d 514. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND

The altercation giving rise to this case transpired on September 10, 1995, on the lawn area abutting an apartment building located at 807 South Randolph in Champaign, Illinois. Both defendant and complainant, Chris Darvin, resided in the building. Defendant lived in "unit 3" and Darvin resided in an apartment on the second floor. The State's case consisted of the testimony of Darvin, defendant's friend Amanda Hinkle, and Officer Chase Leonhard. Darvin testified that the two-story apartment building contained eight units, and a balcony that ran the length of the second floor. From the section of the balcony outside his apartment, Darvin could see over bushes onto the lawn area, which also ran the length of the building and extended from the side of the building to the sidewalk. Darvin testified that there was no fence enclosing the lawn area, and that it was commonly used by people to traverse from the street to the apartment building.

At approximately 8:30 on the night of the occurrence, Darvin noticed defendant engaged in an argument with two young males on the lawn area. Darvin testified that he had just moved into the building at that time and had had no prior contact with defendant. Darvin approached defendant and the young males in an effort to break up the fight, but defendant warned him to "stand back and stand fast." As Darvin began backing up towards the building, he saw a gun protruding from the rear waistband of defendant's pants. Darvin testified that although he did not hear the entire argument, he heard defendant yell to the boys, "If you have a problem with it, I got something for you." Darvin believed defendant was intoxicated, so he ran up behind defendant and pulled the gun out of his waistband. Defendant and the two boys then fled in opposite directions, and Darvin went to a nearby first-floor apartment and discussed the occurrence with two female occupants. Darvin testified that after about 30 to 45 seconds, defendant emerged from another apartment with an SKS rifle in his hands and ran towards Darvin. Darvin fled around the building in an effort to outrun defendant, while defendant continued chasing Darvin with the rifle. Darvin eventually succeeded in escaping into his own apartment, where his fiancee telephoned the police. The police arrived and placed hand restraints on defendant and Darvin, who still had defendant's .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol. Darvin testified that when he was on the ground in restraints he noticed that defendant's gun was "cocked back" and loaded. Darvin testified that he had seen defendant around the apartment "complex" since the occurrence, but that at the time of the incident, he was unaware defendant lived in the building.

The State then presented the testimony of Amanda Hinkle, who indicated only that she was present in defendant's apartment at the time of the occurrence, and that defendant lived at the apartment building. Finally, Officer Leonhard indicated that he responded to the call regarding the altercation, and testified regarding his search of defendant's apartment and confiscation of the weapons wielded by defendant. The defense rested without presenting any evidence.

Following arguments, the court found defendant guilty of unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault, sentencing him to 24 months' probation and 150 hours of public service. The appellate court reversed the unlawful use of weapons conviction, finding that the State failed to prove that at the time defendant was observed in possession of the weapon, he was not either "on his land" or in his "fixed place of business" as provided in the exceptions to the unlawful use of weapons statute. 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 1994).

II. ANALYSIS

The State initially asserts that it presented sufficient evidence that defendant was not on his land at the time Darvin observed him with the weapon. Section 24-1(a)(4) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:

"(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * * * * *

SB32[1-3] (4) Carries or possesses * * * concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm * * *." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 1994).

As can be seen, the legislature has included the above-italicized exceptions within the statutory definition of the offense of unlawful use of weapons. When an exception appears as part of the body of a substantive offense, the State bears the burden of disproving the existence of the exception beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction for the offense. Cf. People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 500-01, 160 N.E. 86 (1927); People v. Chmilenko, 44 Ill.App.3d 1060, 1062, 3 Ill.Dec. 562, 358 N.E.2d 1247 (1976); see generally Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). It is well established that, in sustaining this burden, the State may rely upon circumstantial evidence, as long as it provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime charged. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill.2d 363, 379, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992). However, there must be some evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference of defendant's guilt; the State may not leave to conjecture or assumption essential elements of the crime. See In re Whittenburg, 37 Ill.App.3d 793, 795, 347 N.E.2d 103 (1976).

In reversing defendant's conviction, the appellate court noted a complete lack of evidence regarding the nature of defendant's interest in the land encompassing the apartment building. The court concluded that, although it was not unreasonable for the trial court to assume defendant had no ownership interest in the premises, permitting such an inference without any evidentiary basis would effectively shift the burden to defendant to prove that he was on his land or that he otherwise fell within an exception to section 24-1(a)(4). We agree with the appellate court's reasoning. The sole evidence offered by the State regarding defendant's connection with the property was that he "lived in the building." There was no proof of his interest in his unit or the surrounding land, or as to the ownership of the property in general. Although, on one occasion, Darvin loosely referred to occupants of the building as "tenants," this was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's particular interest in the premises.

The State alternatively...