People v. Lawrence

Decision Date31 December 2020
Docket NumberNo. 1-17-1399,1-17-1399
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario LAWRENCE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Erin Sostock, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Destinee M. Montalvo, and Kathryn A. Schierl, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

PRESIDING JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The trial court found Mario Laurence guilty of home invasion. (Although the State spelled the defendant's name "Lawrence" on the indictment, the defendant clarified in his testimony that he spells his name "Laurence.") In support of his motion for a new trial, Laurence presented a purported lease that listed him as a tenant of the home he allegedly invaded. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, entered an order of protection against Laurence, and assessed certain fines, fees, and costs as part of Laurence's sentence. Laurence argues on appeal that the State did not prove home invasion, the court did not meet the statutory requirements for an order of protection, and the court made mistakes in its assessment of fines, fees, and costs.

¶ 2 We hold that the purported lease constitutes unrefuted admissible evidence that the lease named Laurence as a tenant, but we affirm the conviction for home invasion because the victim had thrown Laurence out of the home. We agree with Laurence that the trial court did not meet the statutory requirements for entry of an order of protection. Illinois Supreme Court rules preclude us from addressing the argument about fines, fees, and costs.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Tasha Arrington married Laurence in 2014, and they shared a house in Sauk Village. In July 2015, Laurence left after a fight with Arrington. Arrington put his clothes outside the house and did not permit him to reenter. On January 5, 2016, Laurence entered Arrington's bedroom and told Arrington's boyfriend, Wardell Williams, to leave. Arrington called police around 3:30 a.m. to report a home invasion in progress. Laurence left before police arrived. Police later arrested Laurence. A grand jury indicted Laurence on charges of home invasion and kidnaping.

¶ 5 At the bench trial, Arrington testified that she changed the locks on the house when she kicked Laurence out in July 2015. They arranged for times for him to see his children. When Arrington picked up the children from a visit on January 4, 2016, she reminded Laurence that they had divorce proceedings scheduled for the following day. She awoke in the middle of the night when Laurence, in her bedroom, told her and Williams to "Get the F up." Laurence said to Williams, "what the F you doing in my house, this my wife, get up before I blow your head off." After Williams left, Laurence punched Arrington in the face, and then on her sides as she curled into a ball and covered her face. The beating stopped, the door slammed, and Arrington looked up to see her 10-year-old daughter crying. Arrington told her daughter to dial 911. Arrington checked the house to make sure all doors were locked and Laurence had gone. The officer who responded to the call checked the house with her and found a window broken in the attached garage and a brick inside the garage under the broken window.

¶ 6 Williams corroborated Arrington's testimony about being awoken by Laurence's threats, and Williams's exit. The parties stipulated that Officer Bugajski would testify that he responded to the 911 call, and he found the broken garage window and the brick under the window. The parties further stipulated that Bugajski would testify that Arrington's face had swollen where Arrington said Laurence hit her.

¶ 7 Laurence testified that he always retained his keys to the house, and Arrington must not have changed the locks because his keys continued to work. Laurence said he lived with relatives, and for a few weeks in October 2015, he stayed in the house in Sauk Village with Arrington. He used his keys to enter the house on January 5, 2016. He did not enter through the attached garage. He did not threaten Williams, and he did not hit Arrington.

¶ 8 The court found Arrington credible and Laurence not credible. The court held that the State did not prove kidnaping, but it proved home invasion.

¶ 9 In a motion for a new trial, Laurence contended that new evidence would show he did not commit home invasion because he had a right to enter the house. The court heard evidence in support of the motion. Lyn Taylor testified that, in November 2014, Arrington and Laurence came to the rental store Taylor managed. For the merchandise Arrington and Laurence sought to rent, they needed to prove residency. They presented to Taylor a copy of a document and told her the document was their lease for their Sauk Village home. The document Taylor identified as the one Arrington used lists both Arrington and Laurence as tenants of that home.

¶ 10 The trial court first said that Taylor apparently could not authenticate the document, then held that even if the lease named Laurence as a tenant, he remained guilty of home invasion because Arrington had thrown him out and changed the locks. The court sentenced Laurence to six years in prison and assessed fines, fees, and costs.

¶ 11 Arrington petitioned for an order of protection, restating the testimony about the incident on January 5, 2016, as grounds for the order. The court heard Arrington's brief testimony in support of the petition and said, "All right. Order of protection is granted." The written order of protection includes no further findings. Laurence now appeals.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, Laurence argues (1) his rights as a tenant preclude a finding that he committed home invasion, (2) the court failed to make the findings necessary for an order of protection, and (3) the court erred in its assessment of fines and fees.

¶ 14 A. Home Invasion

¶ 15 Laurence's appeal raises a question of law as to whether a person can commit a home invasion in violation of section 19-6 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) ( 720 ILCS 5/19-6 (West 2016) ) when the lease for the invaded property lists him as a tenant. Because Laurence raises a question of the interpretation of a statute, we review the issue de novo. People v. McFadden , 2016 IL 117424, ¶ 26, 406 Ill.Dec. 470, 61 N.E.3d 74.

¶ 16 The State contends that Laurence failed to authenticate the lease. Laurence offered the putative lease as evidence that he retained an interest in the house as a tenant. He asks the court to accept the document as proof of that interest. We find that Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(15) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012) governs the document's admissibility. That rule provides:

"The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule ***:
* * *
(15) Statements in Documents Affecting an Interest in Property. A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document have been made inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document." Ill. R. Evid. 803 (eff. Apr. 26, 2012).

¶ 17 We found no case interpreting the rule, and few cases from other jurisdictions interpreting similar rules. Rule 803(15) of the Michigan Rules of Evidence ( Mich. R. Evid. 803(15) (eff. Jan. 2, 2018)) matches the language of Rule 803(15) of the Illinois Rules of Evidence ( Ill. R. Evid. 803(15) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012)). In Botsford General Hospital v. Citizens Insurance Co. , 195 Mich.App. 127, 489 N.W.2d 137, 141-43 (1992), the court found that the rule made documents admissible because of their

"indicia of trustworthiness: (1) the circumstances in which dispositive instruments are made and the financial interests at stake promote reliability; (2) the fact that the recital is in writing eliminates the danger of inaccuracy of transmission; (3) since the statement must be germane to the purpose of the document, a protest would be expected about an untrue fact intrinsic to the transaction; and (4) the exception does not apply if dealings with the property have been inconsistent with the tenor of the document." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

¶ 18 We find a useful application of the rule in Madden v. State , 799 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In Madden , the State sought to prove that Herbert, a murder victim, had owned a gun that Madden sold. The trial court permitted the State to present a list in Herbert's handwriting of the serial numbers of the guns he owned. The appellate court applied Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(15) (eff. 1983), which matches the language of the Illinois rule. Madden , 799 S.W.2d at 698. The Madden court held:

"[R]ecitals contained in documents affecting interests in property are admissible as proof of the matters asserted and are strong evidence concerning such matters. [Citation.] This hearsay exception is based upon the reliability of such documents. [Citation.] *** [T]he court of appeals construed Texas Rule 803(15) to relate to recitals or statements made in deeds, leases, mortgages, and other such documents affecting an interest in property. *** Additionally, this Court has expressed that an exception to the hearsay rule should be liberally construed, but not mechanistically applied. [Citation.]
*** [T]he document is a list of the weapons which Herbert owned and their corresponding serial numbers, thus indicating his interest in the property. Secondly, the document bears more than an adequate indicia of reliability. *** It is reasonable to assume *** that Herbert made this list for his own protection, i.e. insurance purposes, in case of theft or loss of one or all of the weapons, and the recitals
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