People v. Leedom, 89CA0075
| Decision Date | 07 September 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 89CA0075,89CA0075 |
| Citation | 781 P.2d 173 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clyde Ernest LEEDOM, Defendant-Appellee. . IV |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Dist. Atty., Stephen L. Laiche, Deputy Dist. Atty., Grand Junction, for plaintiff-appellant.
No appearance for defendant-appellee.
Opinion by Judge FISCHBACH. *
The People appeal a trial court order granting defendant's Crim.P. 35(c) motion, thereby releasing him from incarceration. We vacate the order.
At issue here is the construction of four statutes, all of which address parole and release eligibility dates for prisoners. Section 16-11-310, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) provides that "an incarcerated person shall be unconditionally released and discharged ... upon the expiration of his sentence, less the deductions authorized" for good time and earned time (repealed as to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1988). Sections 17-22.5-301(2) and 17-22.5-302(3), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) address the accumulation by prisoners of good time and earned time credits, and provide that good time and earned time "shall vest upon being granted and may not be withdrawn." Section 17-22.5-303(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) authorizes the parole board to order the reincarceration of parolees for parole violations.
The defendant was convicted of a Class 4 felony committed in the period between July 1, 1981, and July 1, 1984, and was sentenced to six and one-half years of incarceration and one year of parole. He argued in the trial court that once his good time and earned time had vested, and he had served his original sentence less those good time and earned time credits, the provisions of § 16-11-310 required his "unconditional discharge," and he was therefore not subject to any period of reincarceration for violation of the conditions of his parole. We do not agree.
Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Constructions which defeat the obvious legislative intent should be avoided. And, rules of strict construction of criminal statutes should not be used to defeat the evident intention of the legislature. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986).
We hold, therefore, that the language in § 16-11-310 requiring an inmate to be unconditionally released and discharged "upon the expiration of his sentence, less the deductions authorized," refers to the expiration of both the period of incarceration imposed (minus good and earned time credits) and that period of parole imposed as part of the original sentence.
This interpretation is in accordance with the rules of statutory construction, and with the clear legislative intent that there be an effective system of parole in this state. Defendant's position, however, would effectively abolish parole by removing the ability of the parole board to impose sanctions for non-compliance with its conditions.
We find further support for this interpretation not only in § 17-2-207, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), which provides that offenders on parole are still under legal custody and subject to being returned to a correctional facility, but also in those cases in which it has been held that a prisoner on parole is still in constructive custody of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Grenemyer v. Gunter
...felons remain incarcerated as the result of judicially imposed sentences." Id. at 716 (emphasis added). Similarly, in People v. Leedom, 781 P.2d 173 (Colo.Ct.App.1989), the court rejected the defendant's argument that "once his good time and earned time had vested, and he had served his ori......
-
People v. Espinoza, 98CA1155.
...of a sentence outside the prison walls, while remaining under the supervision of the DOC. See People v. Barth, supra; People v. Leedom, 781 P.2d 173 (Colo.App.1989); see also People v. Hunter, 738 P.2d 20 (Colo.App. 1986), aff'd, 757 P.2d 631 When a plea agreement does not include a stipula......
-
People v. Barth, 98CA0680
...two-year period of mandatory parole was a required part of defendant's original sentence. See People v. Hunter, supra; People v. Leedom, 781 P.2d 173 (Colo.App.1989). We recognize that the mittimus does not reference a mandatory period of parole. This appears to be a common problem resultin......
-
People v. Johnson, 97CA2141.
...App.1989). Accordingly, a "sentence" consists of both the period of incarceration and the period of required parole. People v. Leedom, 781 P.2d 173 (Colo.App.1989). According to the plain language of § 17-27-105(1)(e), a trial court may not, upon resentencing an offender sentenced directly ......
-
Coming to terms with strict and liberal construction.
...People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 922 (Colo. 1986)). Sometimes a court will use both "obvious" and "evident." See People v. Leedom, 781 P.2d 173, 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) ("Constructions which defeat the obvious legislative intent should be avoided. And, rules of strict construction ......