People v. Lenix

• Decision Date: 24 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. S148029.,S148029.
• Citation: 44 Cal.4th 602,80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98,187 P.3d 946
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur Lourdes LENIX, Defendant and Appellant.

187 P.3d 946

80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98

44 Cal.4th 602

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur Lourdes LENIX, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S148029.

Supreme Court of California.

July 24, 2008.

A.M. Weisman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Diamond Bar, for Defendant and Appellant.

Cliff Gardner; Lawrence A. Gibbs; and Elisabeth Semel for California State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Rabbi Allen B. Bennett, Dr. James A. Donahue, Suleiman Ghali, Rev. Cannon Charles Gibbs and Rev. Dr. Cecil L. Murray as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Michael Ogul, Chief Deputy Public Defender (Solano) and Denise Graff, Deputy Public Defender (Orange) for California Public Defenders Association and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Donald de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General, Stan Cross, Janis S. McLean, David A. Rhodes, Janet E. Neeley and Daniel B. Bernstein, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CORRIGAN, J.

Here we determine whether an appellate court must perform a comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal to evaluate whether the advocate's stated reasons for peremptorily challenging prospective jurors are truthful or pretextual. (See People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (Wheeler); Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (Batson).) The United States Supreme Court conducted such a comparative analysis for the first time on appeal in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (Miller-El II)¹ and again recently in Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (Snyder). When read in their entirety, those cases stand for the unremarkable principle that reviewing courts must consider all evidence bearing on the trial court's factual finding regarding discriminatory intent. Comparative juror analysis is evidence that, while subject to inherent limitations, must be considered when reviewing claims of error at Wheeler/Batson's third stage when the defendant relies on such evidence and the record is adequate to permit the comparisons. In those circumstances, comparative juror analysis must be performed on appeal even when such an analysis was not conducted below.

Here, defendant's Wheeler/Batson motion was properly denied. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After two mistrials, defendant was convicted of crimes arising from a fatal shooting in Bakersfield.² Defendant shot and killed Lamar Rufus. He also shot at and missed Lamar's cousin, Curtis Rufus. The jury convicted him of numerous crimes and enhancements, including first degree murder and attempted murder. (Pen.Code §§ 187; 664/187.)³ Defendant was sentenced to a total indeterminate term of 50 years to life in prison, and consecutive determinate terms totaling 21 years.

Because the sole issue presented in this appeal concerns jury selection, we focus on that process. California trial judges have broad discretion over the specific manner in which voir dire is conducted (see Code Civ. Proc., § 223), and practices vary widely. In some courts 12 panelists are selected and questioned. If a panelist is excused for cause or by peremptory challenge, a new panelist is called. Other courts screen larger groups of prospective jurors. Some trial judges do a great deal of questioning, others very little. Some courts place time limits on counsel's questioning and either require or permit counsel to ask group questions. Practices vary in terms of which counsel questions panelists first and who exercises the first peremptory challenge. Advocates who pass an opportunity to challenge retain the option to challenge a seated panelist after an opponent exercises a challenge. The jury is not considered mutually accepted until both sides pass in succession or exhaust their challenges.

In this case, the court announced that it would select 13 jurors. At the end of the trial, one of the 13 would be selected by lot and designated as the alternate. The court conducted jury selection in the following manner. From the entire venire panel, a group of 21 panelists was called and questioned by the court and counsel.⁴ After panelists were excused for cause, the court designated 13 of the remaining panelists as the group subject to peremptory challenges. As a member of this group was challenged, his or her seat was filled by the panelist seated next in order until all members of the original group of 21 panelists were seated or excused. The court then called 21 new panelists and the process began again until both counsel accepted the panel by "passing," or exercising no more peremptory challenges.

After the first group of 21 panelists had been questioned, one juror was excused by the court and the prosecutor then passed for cause. The defense requested that five panelists be excused for cause; the court excused two. The prosecutor then used peremptory challenges against one White and two Hispanic panelists. Alternating with the prosecutor, defense counsel also exercised three peremptory challenges. At this point 12 panelists were seated in the jury box, including L.F., a Black man.

The clerk then called another 21 panelists whom the court and counsel questioned. Among this group was C.A., a Black woman. Defense counsel questioned C.A. first. In response to his questions, C.A. stated she did not know any of the names on the witnesses list. When asked whether anything about the nature of the case concerned her, C.A. stated "the murder aspect." Defense counsel then asked her if she understood that charges do not equate with guilt and that a determination of guilt must be based on evidence, to which C.A. replied yes. C.A. also stated that she could evaluate the credibility of witnesses and treat all witnesses the same.

The prosecutor subsequently asked C.A., "[Y]ou had indicated to [defense counsel] that you were particularly troubled by some of the charges, especially the murder charges; is that correct?" C.A. answered yes. The prosecutor then inquired, "I know anybody, of course, would be troubled by charges like that, but is there something—if I can ask—is there something beyond that." C.A. replied, "The fact that someone lost a life." The prosecutor then asked, "Have you yourself had anyone close to you involved in something like that?" C.A. answered that her sister's husband, to whom she was close, had been murdered 10 or 11 years ago. When asked if the murder was gang related, C.A. answered yes. The prosecutor asked which gang committed the offense. C.A. said the murder had occurred in Los Angeles County and no one had ever been arrested. Asked if she had "any trouble" with law enforcement for failing to make an arrest, C.A. said no. The prosecutor asked, "Was it one of those situations where basically nobody had an idea who did it?" C.A. said yes, and that she would not hold the experience against defendant. Asked whether there was anything else the parties needed to know about her brother-in-law's murder or any "similar situations," C.A. said no.

Later, the prosecutor asked the entire venire: "Has anybody here had any contacts with law enforcement that were hostile, confrontational, adverse, however you want to describe it, that might carry over into what we're going to do here in this courtroom? Anybody at all? Traffic ticket you didn't feel you deserved?" C.A. was the sole juror to reply and stated that she had gotten a traffic ticket. When asked whether the officer was impolite "or anything like that," C.A. answered, "No. Well, no one ever feels they deserve a ticket. That was all." The prosecutor asked, "You feel that maybe he was a little shading the truth a little bit in it?" C.A. answered, "Yeah." The prosecutor then asked, "Did you feel you deserved it?" C.A. replied, "I didn't know if I deserved it or not, so I just went along with it."

The court on its own motion excused two panelists in the second group of 21. The prosecutor passed for cause and the court sustained one of defense counsel's two challenges for cause. A member of the second group was added to the 12 panelists remaining from the first group. The next peremptory challenge was with the prosecutor, who accepted the panel. Defense counsel exercised his fourth peremptory challenge against L.F., the Black panelist, and the prosecutor again accepted the panel. Defense counsel exercised his fifth peremptory challenge, and the prosecutor used his fourth peremptory challenge against a Hispanic panelist. Defense counsel then made a Wheeler motion,⁵ which the court reserved until the completion of voir dire.

C.A. was then one of the designated 13 panelists subject to peremptory challenge. After defense counsel exercised his sixth peremptory challenge, the prosecutor struck C.A. Defense counsel exercised a seventh peremptory challenge, and both sides accepted the panel. Both sides left unused a substantial number of their allotted peremptory challenges.

The jury was composed of six Caucasians, four Hispanics, and two Filipinos. No Blacks served as jurors or alternates. The record contains no information on whether any Blacks other than C.A. and L.F. participated in the venire.⁶

At the Wheeler/Batson hearing, defense counsel pointed out that the prosecutor had excluded three Hispanics and one Black, and claimed the prosecutor "was excluding minorities from the jury, particularly Hispanics." As to the three Hispanic panelists, the prosecutor provided reasons which are not in dispute here.

Regarding C.A., the prosecutor stated that...