People v. Leonard
| Decision Date | 01 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 71870 |
| Citation | 364 N.W.2d 625,421 Mich. 207 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. Matthew LEONARD, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant. , |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Oakland County, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel by Graham K. Crabtree, Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, for plaintiff-appellant-cross-appellee.
LaBarge, Dinning, Lyons & Greve, P.C. by Robert G. Lyons, Roseville, for defendant-appellee-cross-appellant.
The defendant was convicted of three counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2). The Court of Appeals reversed those convictions because it found that the defendant, who had waived his right to have his counsel present at a polygraph examination, had not knowingly and understandingly waived that right as to post examination interrogation. 125 Mich.App. 756, 337 N.W.2d 291. The court ruled that since counsel was not present during the questioning which took place after the polygraph examination, defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated. Accordingly, the court concluded that inculpatory statements made by the defendant during this questioning should not have been admitted at his trial.
We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that these statements should not have been admitted. However, we premise our agreement on the ground that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to remain silent in view of the stipulation executed by the prosecution and the defense whereby the results of the polygraph examination and opinions drawn therefrom would not be admissible in evidence.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Although concurring with the per curiam decision, I write specifically, having arrived at that decision by the following analysis. A statement of the facts are included herein since the per curiam opinion excluded such statement.
Whether under the Michigan Constitution there was a valid waiver of defendant's right to the assistance of counsel for his defense is the major issue in this case. 1 That issue is one of first impression in this Court and has not been ruled on by the United States Supreme Court. 2
The waiver issue arises from the defendant submitting to a polygraph examination after it was suggested by the prosecution and after defendant's lawyer secured a stipulation and a court order which he argues suppresses all evidence from questions while in the polygraph examination room, and which the prosecution argues does not suppress testimony after defendant was detached from the polygraph machine. Miranda 3 rights were read three times prior to the beginning of the polygraph examination, and defendant responded "yeah" to his understanding of those rights and "yeap" to whether he waived them. This is the principal evidence of the alleged waiver. At no time during the interview were defendant's rights under the stipulation and the court order, and their relation to his Miranda rights, or the peculiar importance of assistance of counsel in an interrogation situation explained to him. Before trial, defendant moved on the basis of the stipulation and court order to suppress his responses to the polygraph examiner to questions after he was detached from the polygraph machine. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding a denial of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Thus, I hold that the prosecution did not meet its burden under the Michigan Constitution of proving that the defendant knowingly, intelligently and intentionally relinquished his right to counsel for his defense.
The events which gave rise to the charged offenses occurred on the evening of May 17, 1980. At trial, complainant, Mary O'Connor, testified that at 9:30 p.m. she left the fabric store where she was employed in the Oakland Mall. She walked with two other women toward her car in the parking lot. Since her car was parked farther away than the other women's she continued alone to her car.
Upon reaching her car, Ms. O'Connor opened her door, got in on the driver's side, and closed her umbrella outside the car with the door still open. She testified that defendant suddenly appeared, showed her a three-to-four-inch kitchen paring knife, ordered her to move over to the passenger side, and took control of the car. After driving around for a short time, defendant parked the car behind an industrial building in Troy, and forced her to submit to intercourse. Then defendant drove to another lot in Troy where she was again forced to submit to sexual intercourse. Defendant then left the car. Ms. O'Connor drove to her parents' home and subsequently was taken to Crittendon Hospital where she was examined by a doctor and interviewed by a Troy Police Department officer.
Detective Teasdale testified that on July 1, 1980, Ms. O'Connor identified the defendant from a photo line-up. The detective testified that he arrested the defendant on July 2, 1980 at his place of employment. The arrest was made as defendant was entering his car. A knife and rope were removed from the car of Matthew Leonard during the impoundment inventory procedure.
A preliminary examination was held on July 15, 1980 in the 52-4 District Court. Defendant was bound over to the Oakland Circuit Court as charged.
The defendant was arraigned in the Oakland Circuit Court on August 1, 1980. A notice of alibi defense was subsequently filed by defendant's counsel on August 15, 1980.
On December 10, 1980, at the suggestion of the prosecution, defendant agreed to take a polygraph examination to be administered at the Michigan State Police Northville Crime Laboratory. Prior to the administration of that examination defense counsel drafted a stipulation which read:
The prosecution agreed to the stipulation, and both the stipulation and an order signed by the trial judge were entered. 4 Defense counsel accompanied defendant to the examination site and reassured him that the results of the polygraph examination could not be used against him in court because they were excluded by the court's order. Defense counsel requested to view the administration of the polygraph examination and was denied the opportunity by the police agents in charge. Defense counsel waited for defendant outside the examination room.
On September 10, 1981, defense counsel brought a motion to suppress the confession made by defendant after he had been detached from the polygraph machine on December 10, 1980. The trial court denied that motion stating that the statements made after defendant was detached from the machine were not covered by the stipulation and order, but were separate and distinct from the polygraph examination. Further, the trial court found that there were ample (Miranda ) warnings given prior to the polygraph examination, and that the questions in issue were asked in a time span short enough to be encompassed by the original warnings. Testimony of the polygraph examiner was allowed at trial over defense counsel's objections.
At trial Mary O'Connor identified Matthew Leonard as the perpetrator of her abduction and rape. She testified that the rope taken from defendant's car upon his arrest was "just like the rope" used in her abduction; however, she stated that the knife known as People's Exhibit No. 2 was definitely not the knife which defendant showed her.
John Wojnaroski, a Michigan State Police trooper, testified that he conducted an interview with defendant on December 10, 1980. He testified that he interviewed the defendant for approximately two and one-half hours and asked him 125 [421 Mich. 215] to 150 questions. 5 At the conclusion of this interview, he asked the defendant three additional questions: 1) if he had at least advised his attorney as to what the whole truth of the investigation was; 2) if he was sorry for what he did to the victim and that the victim would have been in this situation; and 3) if he knew what caused him to do this to the victim. To the first question, defendant responded by looking down and shaking his head. To the second question, defendant again looked down and nodded, yes, more or less looking down at his legs and making a couple nods of his head. To the last question, defendant verbalized, "No." [73a]
After hearing the arguments, the jurors deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty on three counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2) and not guilty on the count of kidnapping, M.C.L. Sec. 750.349; M.S.A. Sec. 28.581. On November 6, 1981, Matthew Leonard was sentenced to life imprisonment on Count I, 25 to 100 years on Count II, and 25 to 100 years on Count III.
On appeal, one of the issues raised was whether the trial court erred by allowing Trooper Wojnaroski to testify as to the admissions made by the defendant. On May 17, 1983, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the issue of admitting into evidence such confession, and remanded the case for new trial. People v. Leonard, 125 Mich.App. 756, 337 N.W.2d 291 (1983).
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... ... Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024-25, 82 L.Ed. 1461]." ... The above principles established in Zerbst, Adams and Brewer were, in fact, adopted by this Court under Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 20 in People v. Leonard, 421 Mich. 207, 364 N.W.2d 625 (1984). On the facts of this case, we are not convinced that there was a valid waiver under the standards set forth above ... While there is some indication in the record that at some point the defendant stated that he did not need his attorney, ... ...
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