People v. Leonardi

• Decision Date: 23 October 1894
• Parties: PEOPLE v. LEONARDI.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

143 N.Y. 360

38 N.E. 372

PEOPLE

v.LEONARDI.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 23, 1894.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer, Montgomery county.

Pasquale Leonardi was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed.

Louis H. Reynolds, for appellant.

Leonard F. Fish, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of the Montgomery oyer and terminer, entered upon the verdict of a jury convicting him of the crime of murder in the first degree. He was convicted of the killing of one Conover, by stabbing him with a knife. The defendant is an Italian, about 24 years of age. On the afternoon of September 12, 1893, in one of the streets of Amsterdam, the defendant met the deceased, and inflicted upon him the wounds from which he died in the course of a few days. The killing was done publicly, in the presence of a number of people; and, so far as the deceased was concerned, it was wholly without provocation, and, as counsel contended, it was also without motive. There was evidence upon the part of the defendant that he was very much intoxicated at the time, and the material question in this case arises over the charge of the judge as to the proper effect to be given to this fact. It would seem that the counsel for the defendant had maintained before the jury that defendant was substantially insane, and therefore irresponsible at the time he committed the deed, or, if not insane, that he was so far intoxicated as not to have been guilty of murder in the first degree. Further elaboration of the facts preceding and surrounding the killing is unnecessary in order to appreciate the bearing of the remarks of the learned judge in his charge to the jury upon the question of intoxication.

The judge charged that if the defendant had intelligence enough to know right from wrong as to the character of the act which he committed,-knew that it was wrong,-he was responsible; but if he were bereft of reason, intelligence, sense, and judgment, and acted without knowledge or intent as to the result of his acts, he was an irresponsible person. No criticism can be passed upon this portion of the charge. The judge then said that that was all he should say as to the intoxication of the defendant bearing upon his knowledge of right and wrong, of his capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, and to know whether the act of stabbing and killing Conover was wrong, but that he should speak thereafter upon the subject of intoxication as bearing upon the question of motive. His charge thus far, it is seen, was confined to the question of drunkenness as an excuse, so far as to render the person irresponsible as an insane person, or as one who was so far intoxicated as to be wholly unaware of the act committed by him, or of its nature or extent. Then other matters were touched on by the learned judge, and subsequently he charged the jury with great ability and clearness upon the law in regard to the grade of the crime, the fact of premeditation and deliberation, and the time necessary to elapse in order to constitute the higher grade of the crime of murder. All this was done with great fairness, and in a manner which left nothing to be desired. He then continued his charge upon the fact of intoxication with regard to this portion of the case as follows: ‘Now, that is all I propose to say on that branch of the case except with respect to intoxication. Of course, the defendant must, in order to be found guilty of murder in the first degree, or indeed of any degree of murder, have the intention to kill; have some motive, perhaps. The law does not, however, require that any motive shall be proved, and perhaps I ought to correct my statement by saying that it is proper for you to look into the testimony closely for the purpose of discovering a motive. It is not necessary that you should find it. It is alleged on the part of the defendant that the prisoner did not, in consequence of intoxication, have any motive; that he did not have any such sufficient intention to kill as would constitute murder in the first degree; and that he was not capable of so deliberating as to be guilty of murder in the first degree. These are question for you to consider upon all the evidence. I express no opinion with respect to it. It is not my province to express any opinion with reference to a question of that nature. It is a question of fact for you to determine, and I am only required to state the rules of law which you ought to have in your minds in reaching your determination. If he was sober enough to know what he was about, and that the act was wrong, then his intoxication and his motive would both exist, and the one would not destroy the other. If his intoxication made him more excitable, and led him the more readily and easily to commit the crime, to form the intent, and to reach a conclusion, as the result of deliberation upon it, then his intoxication would not help him. He must be so completely intoxicated, in order to be excused, as to be destitute of the capacity to realize the wrongful nature of his act; that his acts are wholly aimless, and without purpose. I might illustrate the idea which I have in mind, and am trying to present to you by referring to the testimony in relation to [his brother] Pietro's acts upon the streets. As I before remarked, there does not seem to be much question but what Pietro was very much intoxicated; and among the other acts which are spoken of by witnesses as having been done by Pietro is the act of standing on the street, and picking up stones, and throwing them down again with violence. Now, what motive could he have had for picking up stones, and throwing them down on the street? That seems...