People v. Letourneau
Citation | 34 Cal.2d 478,211 P.2d 865 |
Decision Date | 29 November 1949 |
Docket Number | Cr. 4961 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. LETOURNEAU. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
George T. Davis and Kenyon C. Keller, San Francisco, for appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
Defendant was charged with the murder of his mother-in-law, Mrs. Rosario Maniscalco, and pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury found that he was guilty of murder of the first degree and did not specifically recommend the penalty; the same jury found that he was sane at the time he committed the murder. Defendant appeals from the ensuing judgment imposing the death penalty and from an order denying his motion for new trial. His principal contention is that the trial court erred to his prejudice by excluding, on the trial of the general issue of not guilty, proffered evidence which assertedly would have tended to show (or raise a reasonable doubt) that he did not possess the mental state ('malice aforethought,' deliberation and premeditation) essential to constitute the homicide murder of the first degree. We have concluded, for reasons hereinafter detailed, that defendant has failed to establish error in respect to this contention, and that other points urged by him show no miscarriage of justice.
In support of his main contention defendant relies upon the recent holding of this court (in People v. Wells (1949), 33 Cal.2d 330, 350, 351, 202 P.2d 53, 66; that As is hereinafter shown, the exclusionary rulings of which defendant complains were made upon stated grounds contrary to this holding of the Wells case and, if no other ground for the rulings existed, error would appear; however, such rulings were actually correct because (as in People v. Danielly (1949), 33 Cal.2d 362, 364, 202 P.2d 18, 19, 'although the proof of malice aforethought and deliberation and premeditation was, of course, an essential part of the prosecution's case, the rejected evidence was not materially relevant to any theory of defense raised upon the trial of the general issue.'
The objective circumstances of the killing, viewing the evidence most favorable to respondent People insofar as it is in conflict, 1 were as follows: In March, 1946, defendant married Catherine, the daughter of Antonio and Rosario Maniscalco. About one month after their marriage, defendant and his wife went to live with the wife's mother and father. Upon the premises were a two-flat dwelling and a small cottage. A son of the Maniscalcos and the son's wife, Roberta, lived in the cottage with their two small children. The elder Maniscalcos and other members of the family lived in the upper flat. Defendant and Catherine lived in the lower flat. Defendant killed not only his mother-in-law, Mrs. Maniscalco, but also his wife's infant niece, Rosario Cecchi, aged about eleven months. He was not charged with the latter killing. The infant Rosario was left in the care of her grandmother, the elder Mrs. Maniscalco, while her parents worked. Defendant and his wife were godparents of the infant girl. Prior to April 21, 1948, the day of the killings, defendant had consistently evidenced great affection for his mother-in-law and the infant niece.
On the morning of April 21, 1948, defendant had 'cramps all over' and did not go to work. His wife, who was regularly employed, went to her work, as did other adult members of the family. The only members of the family, aside from defendant, who remained on the premises were Mrs. Rosario Maniscalco (defendant's mother-in-law), the infant Rosario Cecchi, and Roberta and her two children. Some time after ten o'clock, while the mother-in-law was at the grocery store, Roberta was in her bedroom making the beds, and the three children were playing in the cottage. Defendant came to Roberta's kitchen window, stood on a chair, and forced open the window. Roberta went into the kitchen and defendant said, Roberta unlocked the door of the cottage and ran to the street. As she passed defendant he 'made a grab,' caught Roberta's dress, but she 'broke loose and ran but * * * and half way down the block.' There she met her mother-in-law and told her that defendant 'was breaking in the house after me, and she got mad.' Roberta returned to her cottage. The mother-in-law went into defendant's flat and Roberta could hear her 'hollering real loud,' but could not understand what she said. The mother-in-law then returned to Roberta's cottage and picked up the infant Rosario. Defendant called to the mother-in-law from his flat, asking her to help him fix some artichokes. She replied that she would help him and went into his flat carrying the baby. Some time later (how long, Roberta did not recall) defendant returned to Roberta's cottage. The following description of events is taken from her testimony: Roberta obtained a bandage and, as she was preparing it defendant Defendant removed his trousers and completed an act of sexual intercourse with Roberta. Blood from the cut on defendant's face was on her face and where he accomplished two more acts of sexual intercourse. He then put on his trousers, combed his hair, and left the cottage. Roberta 'waited until he went out, * * * and I put my pants on and I ran upstairs to tell my mother-in-law * * * what he had done. * * * (Defendant) was standing at the phone, with the receiver in his hand. * * * He said 'Dial this number," and Roberta dialed a number as defendant directed. (Although Roberta did not know it, this was the number of the police station.) She then 'started walking away, and he said to me, 'Guess who I am dialing?' And I ignored him, and he said, 'Come over here. There is a murder." Roberta at once ran from the house and into the street in search of help. A police officer arrived and Roberta went with him to defendant's flat. The officer tried the door, found it locked, and knocked. Defendant admitted them.
In the dining room of defendant's flat were the bodies of his mother-in-law and infant niece. Defendant had struck each of them many times about the head with a wrench, fracturing the skull and inflicting many lacerations and bruises, then, with a carving knife, had stabbed each of them repeatedly in the head, arms, chest, abdomen and thighs and partially eviscerated them.
When he was questioned by the police and a deputy district attorney at about 2:20 in the afternoon of April 21, 1948, defendant gave an account of the killings largely similar to that which he gave in his testimony. According to defendant's testimony, Roberta (sometimes referred to as Bobbie) came into his flat on the morning of the 21st. They were 'holding hands' when their mother-in-law came in. Defendant asked the mother-in-law to prepare some artichokes. As the mother-in-law was doing this, holding the baby under her left arm and a cup in her right hand, Roberta said 'She is going to squeal,' and handed defendant the wrench. Defendant ...
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