People v. Letteer
Citation | 103 Cal.App.4th 1308,127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 |
Decision Date | 27 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. H021920.,H021920. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark Duane LETTEER, Defendant and Appellant. |
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Deputy Attorney General, William Kuimelis, Deputy Attorney General, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1997, defendant Mark Duane Letteer pleaded guilty to possession and being under the influence of methamphetamine and admitted having three prior felony convictions that qualified as strikes under the "Three Strikes" law. (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11377, subd. (a); 11550, subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12.) At sentencing, the Honorable John T. Ball dismissed two of defendant's strikes in furtherance of justice (see Pen.Code, § 1385; People v. Superior Court (Romero) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628) and imposed a one-strike term of 32 months for possession and a concurrent 90-day jail term for being under the influence. The District Attorney immediately challenged the dismissal of two strikes by seeking a writ of mandate.
On May 15, 2000, this court filed an opinion in which we concluded that Judge Ball had abused his discretion in dismissing the two strikes. (People v. Superior Court (Letteer) (May 15, 2000, H020324) [nonpub. opn.].)1 We issued a peremptory writ of mandate, directing the superior court to vacate the dismissal order, reinstate the two strikes, and resentence defendant as a person with three strike prior convictions.
On remand, the prosecutor disqualified Judge Ball from resentencing defendant by filing a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure, section 170.6, subdivision (2), and, over defendant's objection, resentencing proceeded before the Honorable Paul T. Teilh.2 Judge Teilh denied defendant's request for a formal sentencing hearing, reinstated the previously dismissed strikes, and imposed a three-strike term of 25 years to life for possession of methamphetamine and a concurrent six-month jail term for being under the influence.
On appeal from the judgment, defendant claims, among other things, that sentencing by Judge Teilh violated the terms of the plea bargain. We agree, reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Citing People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.Sd 749, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220 (Arbuckle), defendant contends that an implied term of the plea bargain entitled him to have Judge Ball resentence him, and therefore, resentencing by Judge Teilh violated the plea bargain and denied him due process of law. We agree.
In Arbuckle, the defendant entered a plea before a particular judge, but before the sentencing hearing, that judge was transferred to a different department. The defendant's request to have the case transferred was denied, and a different judge imposed sentence. (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220.) In reversing the judgment, the California Supreme Court stated, (Id. at pp. 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220.) The court held that 3 (Id. at p. 757, 150 Cal. Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220, fn. omitted.)
The People claim that Arbuckle is inapplicable here because at the time defendant entered his plea, he did not reasonably expect Judge Ball to sentence him, and therefore, sentencing by Judge Ball did not become an implied term of the plea bargain. We disagree.
The People correctly note that Arbuckle rights arise only where the record affirmatively indicates that the defendant reasonably expected to be sentenced by the judge who took the plea. (In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165, 666 P.2d 22; People v. Adams, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1543, 274 Cal.Rptr. 629; People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701, 707, 261 Cal.Rptr. 814; People v. Serrato, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 764, 247 Cal.Rptr. 322; People v. Guerra (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1067, 1071-1072, 246 Cal.Rptr. 392; People v. Ruhl (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 311, 315, 214 Cal.Rptr. 93; In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911, 919-920, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61.) For example, in Arbuckle, the court found a reasonable expectation because the judge who took the plea repeatedly used the personal pronoun in referring to the future sentencing hearing. (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 4, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220.) Similarly, in In re Mark L., the court found a reasonable expectation because the judicial officer interchangeably used the personal pronoun and "`the Court'" when referring to sentencing. (In re Mark L., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165, 666 P.2d 22.)
Here, in taking the plea, Judge Ball referred to the possible alternative sentences "the court" could impose. After accepting the plea, he stated, (Italics added.) He then referred the matter to the probation department, asking defense counsel if defendant waived time. Counsel waived time and asked if "the Court" would be available for sentencing during a particular week. Judge Ball said that he would be.
When Judge Ball and defense counsel said "the court," they were referring to Judge Ball. Moreover, in scheduling the sentencing hearing, Judge Ball indicated he would be the one to sentence defendant. Thus, the record affirmatively shows that defendant expected Judge Ball to sentence him. Indeed, Judge Ball did sentence him. At that time, he used "I" and "the court" interchangeably, and counsel referred to him as "the court."
Any possible ambiguity concerning defendant's expectation is dispelled by his conduct after entering his plea. He wrote Judge Ball a letter about the upcoming sentencing hearing, and in closing stated, Defendant's letter unmistakably reflects that he expected Judge Ball to sentence him. Moreover, later, after the prosecutor successfully removed Judge Ball, defendant expressly objected to sentencing by Judge Teilh, claiming a violation of his Arbuckle rights. (See People v. Horn, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 709, 261 Cal.Rptr. 814 [ ].)4
The People further claim that even if defendant expected Judge Ball to sentence him, Arbuckle is still inapplicable. In support of this claim, the People cite People v. Dunn (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 572, 222 Cal.Rptr. 273 (Dunn ). Again, we disagree.
In Dunn, the judge who took the plea retired before sentencing, and a different judge imposed sentence. On appeal, the court found Arbuckle inapplicable because the original judge's unavailability was due to "a matter clearly beyond the power of the court to control"—retirement—rather than an internal administrative problem or convenience of the court, as was the case in Arbuckle. (Dunn, supra, 176 Cal. App.3d at p. 575, 222 Cal.Rptr. 273.) In support of its holding, the court quoted People v. Watson (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 5, 180 Cal.Rptr. 759, a case where the original judge died before sentencing. According to Watson, (Watson, supra, 129 Cal. App.3d at p. 7, 180 Cal.Rptr. 759; Dunn, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 575, 222 Cal. Rptr. 273.)
Building on the Watson court's doubt, Dunn states that (Dunn, supra, 176 Cal. App.3d at p. 575, 222 Cal.Rptr. 273; see also People v. Jackson (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 393, ...
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