People v. Letterlough

• Decision Date: 13 June 1995
• Parties: , 655 N.E.2d 146, 64 USLW 2022 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Roy C. LETTERLOUGH, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 105

631 N.Y.S.2d 105

86 N.Y.2d 259, 655 N.E.2d 146, 64 USLW 2022

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Roy C. LETTERLOUGH, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 13, 1995.

Kent F. Moston, Matthew Muraskin, Brian P. Schechter and Miro F. Cizin, Hempstead, for appellant.

Denis Dillon, District Attorney of Nassau County, Mineola (Judith R. Sternberg and Peter A. Weinstein, of counsel), for respondent.

Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., Lake Success (Raymond E. Kerno, of counsel), for Long Island Mothers Against Drunk Driving, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

Our sentencing courts continually confront the important task of fashioning conditions of probationary sentences to rehabilitate those who have committed the often-habitual crime of driving while intoxicated. This case presents the Court with the question whether, as a condition of probation, a court may order the defendant to affix to the license plate of any vehicle he drives a fluorescent sign stating "convicted dwi." We answer this question in the negative both because the condition is not reasonably related to defendant's rehabilitation, and, more generally, because, in the absence of more specific legislation, such a condition is outside the authority of the court to impose.

On December 10, 1991, defendant Roy Letterlough pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol as a felony (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2] ). This was defendant's sixth alcohol-related driving offense since 1971. Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to five years' probation and fined $500, his license was revoked (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193[2] ), and he was ordered to obtain alcohol treatment as directed by the Department of Probation. As an additional condition not part of the initial plea agreement, the sentencing court directed that if the Department of Motor Vehicles should reissue a driver's license to defendant during the probationary period, he must affix to the license plates of any vehicle he drives a fluorescent sign stating "convicted dwi." That condition specifically provides:

"16. DWI LICENSE PLATE ADDITIONS: If for any reason the N.Y. State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), or any other entity, restores full or conditional limited driving privileges to the Probationer prior to the full expiration of the term of Probation imposed by this Court, Probationer agrees as follows: He/she shall order and have installed at his/her sole cost and expense, within seven (7) days of such license reinstatement, two (2) legible (day and night) metal, wood, plastic, or other durable and waterproof signs or plaques, affixed to the top or bottom of both the front and rear license plate of the vehicle which he/she may be driving (including owned, borrowed, leased, rented, etc.). Said signs shall state in fluorescent, large block letters 'CONVICTED DWI.' Such signs shall be the full length of the license plate, and one-half ( 1/2) the width. Said signs shall be inspected and approved by the Probation Department within fourteen (14) days of such reinstatement, and at any time thereafter: they shall remain in place for the entire duration of the term of Probation imposed by this Court. Failure to install them, removal without permission, driving without them, or a police stop for any reason also noting the absence of the signs, shall be grounds--if proven in court--for a determination of VIOLATION OF PROBATION and immediate resentencing" (emphasis in original).

As to this condition, the court stated:

"I am not requiring that [the sign] be maintained permanently while others drive that vehicle, only when this individual drives that vehicle and he may design, should that contingency arise, any sort of a metal clip system so that it can be removed if anyone else in his family or friends decide they wish to drive his car with his consent.

"I only wish to warn the public of this and only have this sign apply to this Defendant" (emphasis added).

Defense counsel argued generally that the condition violated the State and Federal Constitutions, but declined an offer to withdraw his plea. In closing, the court stated: "This gentleman is 54 years of age and I do not wish to be the one that opens a newspaper and sees that this gentleman has caused an accident that has taken an innocent person's life because I did not do something that either warns the public or treated his problem. I hope to be doing both." The prosecution informed the court that defendant did not waive his right to appeal as part of the plea and the court specifically invited defendant to challenge the legality of the special condition on appeal.

The Appellate Division affirmed. Citing two Florida cases (Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So.2d 123; Lindsay v. State, 606 So.2d 652), the Court found "no statutory or constitutional violation in the imposition of [the special condition requiring defendant to place the fluorescent signs on his car]" (205 A.D.2d 803, 804, 613 N.Y.S.2d 687). A Judge of this Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal as well as a stay of enforcement of the disputed special condition pending the determination of the appeal. Defendant here challenges the legality of that special condition, arguing, in part, that the court was not empowered to order it under Penal Law § 65.10. ¹

Our analysis of the propriety of the special license plate condition necessarily begins with a review of Penal Law § 65.10 which grants courts the authority to fashion conditions on a sentence of probation. The statute directs, as a general proposition, that "conditions of probation * * * shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so" (Penal Law § 65.10[1]. The statute provides that the court "shall, as a condition of the sentence, consider restitution or reparation and may, as a condition of the sentence, require that the defendant" engage in or refrain from certain enumerated types of conduct (Penal Law § 65.10[2]. The list includes directives to "[a]void injurious or vicious habits," "[r]efrain from frequenting unlawful or disreputable places," maintain suitable employment, undergo medical or psychiatric treatment, participate in alcohol or substance abuse programs, support dependents and meet family responsibilities, make restitution or reparation, perform community service, if under 21, reside in a suitable location and contribute to his or her own support, post bond or security for performance of any condition, and observe conditions as specified in an order of protection (see, Penal Law § 65.10[2][a]-[k] ). Additionally, because the conditions of probationary sentences must be tailored to the particular defendant's case, and an exhaustive list of behavioral conditions would therefore have been impossible, the statute includes a catch-all provision which grants the court wide latitude to require the defendant to "[s]atisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his [or her] rehabilitation " (Penal Law § 65.10[2][l ] [emphasis added].

A probationary sentence " 'is a method of offering an offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, without institutional confinement, under the supervision of a probation officer and the continuing power of the court to use a more stringent sanction in the event the opportunity is abused' " (Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law art. 65, at 204, quoting Commn. Staff Notes, reprinted in Proposed N.Y.Penal Law [Study Bill, 1964 Senate Int. 3918, Assembly Int. 5376] § 25.00, at 260).

The overriding purpose of imposing a sentence of probation in lieu of other punishment is to rehabilitate "the convicted criminal by giving him appropriate treatment, in order to * * * return him to society so reformed that he will not desire or need to commit further crimes" (1 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5, at 32-33). As has been aptly noted, "[i]t is perhaps not entirely correct to call this treatment 'punishment,' as the emphasis is away from making [the probationer] suffer and in the direction of making his [or her] life better and more pleasant" (id., at 33 [emphasis added]. The utility of rehabilitation as a vehicle for preventing criminal behavior "rests upon the belief that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes, that these causes can be identified, and that on this basis therapeutic measures can be employed to effect changes in the behavior of the person treated" (id., at 33). The focus of rehabilitation is primarily on healing the individual. Indeed, when a criminal act stems from a substance abuse problem, the use of sentencing conditions as a tool of rehabilitation is especially meaningful, since there are specific therapeutic options that may well ameliorate the underlying condition and thereby remove the condition associated with the criminal behavior (see, e.g., People v. Berkley, 152 A.D.2d 788, 543 N.Y.S.2d 568).

Penal Law § 65.10's delineation of typical probationary sentences reflects this rehabilitative aim. Significantly, the conditions enumerated in Penal Law § 65.10(2)(a)-(k) are rehabilitative in nature, focusing on restoring the probationer to the status of a law-abiding member of the community. None have an inherently punitive aim, although many--such as those requiring a probationer to make restitution, refrain from frequenting "disreputable places" or to participate in an alcohol or substance abuse program--impose unpleasant restrictions on the probationer's freedom and thus may have incidental punitive and deterrent effects (see, Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 Duke LJ 1357, 1372, and n 94 [probation conditions may serve punitive, rehabilitative and deterrent functions].

Despite...