People v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 28 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | D068584 |
| Citation | 4 Cal.App.5th 1085,208 Cal.Rptr.3d 895 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Henry LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles C. Ragland and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
O'ROURKE
, J.
In 2014 the voters enacted Proposition 47, the so-called “Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362
(Rivera )), which enacted numerous changes to California's statutory scheme, including reclassifying several crimes to misdemeanors which previously had been designated as felonies or “wobblers” (id . at p. 1091, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362 ) and adding Penal Code,1section 1170.18. Under subdivision (a) of section 1170.18, a defendant “currently serving a sentence” for a conviction of a crime previously designated as a felony or a wobbler but which was reclassified as a misdemeanor can petition for relief under Proposition 47 to be resentenced and the court has discretion (subject to certain conditions) to resentence the petitioner to a misdemeanor sentence. (See, generally, People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 403, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592
, (Morales ).) However, under subdivision (f) of section 1170.18, when a person has “completed his or her sentence” for a conviction of a crime previously designated as a felony or a wobbler but which is now designated as a misdemeanor, a court “shall” (upon application by that person) redesignate that conviction as a misdemeanor conviction.
The different procedures and standards for obtaining the relief made available by section 1170.18
thus depend on whether the petitioner has “completed his or her sentence” (id . at subd. (f)), or is “currently serving a sentence” (id . at subd. (a)), for a felony that has been recharacterized as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The single issue here is a matter of first impression and turns on statutory interpretation: which set of procedures and standards apply to a petitioner who is not currently incarcerated but is still serving a period either of parole or of postrelease community supervision (PRCS2 ) for an offense which otherwise qualifies for resentencing or redesignation under Proposition 47? Appellant John Henry Lewis contends the standards outlined in subdivision (f) of section 1170.18
apply to such a petitioner, and therefore argues the trial court erred when it denied his section 1170.18 petition for relief because it erroneously employed the standards for petitioners who are still “serving” their sentences.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
In 2011, Lewis entered a negotiated plea agreement in which he pled guilty to grand theft from a person (§ 487, subd. (c)) and admitted a “prior strike” allegation (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a “prison prior” allegation (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668, 1170.12) in exchange for a dismissal of the balance of the charged offenses and a total stipulated sentence of five years in state prison. The court imposed the stipulated sentence in 2012.
Lewis originally petitioned for resentencing in November 2014, while still incarcerated in state prison. The People, while agreeing Lewis's offense was an offense which qualified for resentencing, opposed resentencing because the People contended he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. On April 9, 2015, while that petition was still pending, Lewis was released from prison custody and was placed on PRCS. The court ultimately denied Lewis's first petition because it found he posed unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
Two weeks after his first petition was denied, Lewis filed the present petition seeking to invoke the remedies provided by section 1170.18, subdivision (f)
. He asserted his release on PRCS meant he had “completed” his sentence within the meaning of that subdivision, and therefore resentencing under section 1170.18, subdivision (f), was mandatory. The People opposed the petition, arguing Lewis had not completed his sentence within the contemplation of section 1170.18, subdivision (f), because he was still serving his PRCS term,3 and therefore argued Lewis was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.18, subdivision (f).
The court ruled that a person serving PRCS is still serving a sentence within the meaning of section 1170.18
. Accordingly, the court concluded Lewis's petition was governed by the provisions of section 1170.18, subdivision (a), and denied the petition because its ruling on Lewis's prior petition barred him from relief. This appeal followed.
II
THE STATUTORY STRUCTURE
By enacting Proposition 47, the voters changed certain felony or wobbler drug-related and theft-related offenses to misdemeanors for eligible defendants. (Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 109 3362; People v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 129
.) Specifically, as to criminal offenses, Proposition 47: (1) added sections 459.5, 490.2, and 1170.18 and (2) amended sections 473, 476a, 496 and 666 and Health and Safety Code sections 11350, 11357 and 11377. (Lynall , at p. 1108, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 129.)
The dispositive section added by Proposition 47 is section 1170.18
, which states in relevant part:
, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, [as] those sections have been amended or added by this act, unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety....
[¶] ...
(d) A person who is resentenced pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be given credit for time served and shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence, unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its resentencing order, releases the person from parole. Such person is subject to Section 3000.08 parole supervision by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the jurisdiction of the court in the county in which the parolee is released or resides, or in which an alleged violation of supervision has occurred, for the purpose of hearing petitions to revoke parole and impose a term of custody.
(e) Under no circumstances may resentencing under this section result in the imposition of a term longer than the original sentence.
(f) A person who has completed his or her sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under this act had this act been in effect at the time of the offense, may file an application before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to have the felony conviction or convictions designated as misdemeanors.
(g) If the application satisfies the criteria in subdivision (f), the court shall designate the felony offense or offenses as a misdemeanor.
(h) Unless requested by the applicant, no hearing is necessary to grant or deny an application filed under subsection (f).”
Thus, under subdivision (a), a person “currently serving” a felony sentence for an offense that is now a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 may seek resentencing. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)
;
Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362
.) If the person satisfies the statutory criteria in section 1170.8, subdivision (a), his or her sentence is recalled and he or she shall be “ ‘resentenced to a misdemeanor ... unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’ ” (Rivera, at p. 1092, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 362 ; § 1170.18, subd. (b).) However, if the petition is granted and the sentence is recalled, the person must be given credit for time served but shall also be subject to parole under section 3000.08 for one year following completion of his or her sentence unless the court, in its discretion and as part of the resentencing order, release the person from parole. (§ 1170.18, subd. (d)
; Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 404–405, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 371 P.3d 592.)
In contrast, under subdivision (f), an eligible person who has “completed his or her sentence” for a felony that has become a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 may apply to have that felony conviction designated as a misdemeanor. (§ 1170.18, subd. (f)
.) No hearing is required unless requested by the applicant (§ 1170.18, subd. (h) ), and if the application satisfies the criteria in subdivision (f), the court “shall” designate the felony offense as a misdemeanor. (§ 1170.18, subd. (g).) There is no provision for any period of parole accompanying the redesignation of the offense as a misdemeanor under subdivision (f), nor does subdivision (f) confer discretion on the court to deny the application based on current dangerousness.
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