People v. Lewis

Decision Date15 July 2009
Docket NumberNo. 106306.,106306.
Citation234 Ill.2d 32,912 N.E.2d 1220
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Terry L. LEWIS, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson, Deputy Defender, and Catherine K. Hart, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Defendant Terry L. Lewis was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2004)). The circuit court of Adams County sentenced him to a term of probation with conditions including payment of a $100 street-value fine. On appeal, defendant challenged the street-value fine. The appellate court held defendant forfeited his challenge and imposition of the street-value fine was not reviewable as plain error. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment. 379 Ill.App.3d 336, 318 Ill.Dec. 528, 883 N.E.2d 759.

We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and now hold that imposition of the street-value fine without a sufficient evidentiary basis is reviewable as plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court's judgment and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged with two controlled substance offenses. He filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, alleging police officers stopped the vehicle he was driving because it had a cracked windshield. During the detention, the officers searched defendant, the vehicle, and the surrounding area and recovered evidence leading to the charges. Defendant sought suppression of the evidence, arguing that the stop, detention, and search violated his constitutional rights. Defendant also sought suppression of statements he made after his arrest. The trial court denied defendant's motion.

The parties then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. The trial court found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and later sentenced him to 24 months' probation. Defendant's probation was subject to several conditions, including payment of a $100 street-value fine. Defendant did not object to the street-value fine or file a motion to reconsider the sentence.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal containing a heading that stated, "An appeal is taken from the Order and Judgment described below." The notice listed the date of the order or judgment as "4/3/06— Order denying motion to suppress." The part of the notice under "Nature of order appealed from, other than conviction" was left blank.

On appeal, defendant did not challenge the order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Instead, his sole argument was that the trial court committed plain error by imposing the $100 street-value fine without an evidentiary basis to determine the value of the controlled substance.

The State responded that defendant's notice of appeal did not adequately indicate the basis of the appeal because it only referred to the order denying his motion to suppress. Accordingly, the State argued the notice was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction to review the street-value fine and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On the merits, the State conceded that the trial court erred in imposing the street-value fine without a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The appellate court did not address the State's jurisdiction argument. 379 Ill. App.3d 336, 318 Ill.Dec. 528, 883 N.E.2d 759. Instead, the appellate court proceeded directly to defendant's claim that the trial court's imposition of the street-value fine was plain error.

The appellate court first noted that defendant conceded he forfeited his argument on sentencing error by failing to raise it in the trial court. While the appellate court agreed that the trial court erred in imposing the $100 street-value fine, the court disagreed with defendant's contention that imposition of the fine was reviewable as plain error. The appellate court reasoned that plain error is a narrow and limited exception to the forfeiture rule. According to the appellate court, the plain-error exception would "essentially swallow[ ]" the general rule of forfeiture if it applied to a sentencing sanction as minimal as the $100 fine involved in this case. 379 Ill.App.3d at 340-41, 318 Ill.Dec. 528, 883 N.E.2d 759, quoting People v. Rathbone, 345 Ill.App.3d 305, 311, 280 Ill.Dec. 408, 802 N.E.2d 333 (2003). The appellate court, therefore, rejected defendant's request to apply the plain-error exception to forfeiture in this case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. 379 Ill.App.3d 336, 318 Ill.Dec. 528, 883 N.E.2d 759.

II. ANALYSIS

Initially, in response to defendant's appeal, the State renews its argument that the notice of appeal was insufficient to confer jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenge to the street-value fine. We have recently emphasized that courts of review have an independent duty to consider jurisdiction even if a jurisdictional issue is not raised by the parties. Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill.2d 209, 213, 327 Ill.Dec. 541, 902 N.E.2d 662 (2009); People v. Smith, 228 Ill.2d 95, 104-06, 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053 (2008). The State's jurisdictional claim is a threshold issue. Accordingly, we must address that issue before considering defendant's appeal.

The State contends the notice of appeal does not confer appellate jurisdiction over the sentencing challenge raised by defendant because the notice only lists the order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant replies that the notice of appeal, liberally construed, gave the State adequate notice that the appeal was from his conviction and sentence.

In noncapital criminal cases, appeals are perfected by filing a notice of appeal. In re D.D., 212 Ill.2d 410, 416-17, 289 Ill.Dec. 143, 819 N.E.2d 300 (2004). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step required to initiate appellate review. In re D.D., 212 Ill.2d at 417, 289 Ill.Dec. 143, 819 N.E.2d 300. A reviewing court lacks jurisdiction and is obliged to dismiss an appeal if there is no properly filed notice of appeal. Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 104, 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053.

The purpose of the notice of appeal is to inform the prevailing party that the other party seeks review of the trial court's decision. Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 104-05 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053. The notice must identify the nature of the order appealed if the appeal is not from a conviction. 210 Ill.2d R. 606(d). A notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court to consider only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the notice. Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 104, 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053. The notice is sufficient to confer jurisdiction if, considered as a whole and construed liberally, it fairly and adequately identifies the complained of judgment. Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 104-05, 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053. The failure to comply strictly with the form of the notice is not fatal if the deficiency is nonsubstantive and the appellee is not prejudiced. Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 105, 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053.

The form of defendant's notice of appeal conforms substantially to the one provided for criminal appeals in Supreme Court Rule 606(d) (210 Ill.2d R. 606(d)). Defendant's notice accurately identifies his conviction of possession of a controlled substance and the sentence imposed by the trial court. The notice was left blank under the heading "Nature of order appealed from, other than conviction." Thus, the notice of appeal indicates that defendant is appealing from his conviction.

Contrary to the State's contention, the part of the notice identifying the date of the judgment as the date of the denial of defendant's motion to suppress does not cause uncertainty as to the nature of defendant's appeal. Defendant's notice expressly states he is appealing from no orders "other than conviction." Additionally, a defendant may not appeal only from an order denying a motion to suppress evidence. See People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d 118, 138, 281 Ill.Dec. 38, 803 N.E.2d 442 (2003). Thus, the State could not have believed defendant was appealing only from the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress.

The State relies on Smith in arguing defendant's notice of appeal is insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction. In Smith, the defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, arguing the factual basis offered by the State at the plea hearing was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The defendant later filed a pro se "Motion to Correct Sentence." The trial court denied that motion and the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The notice, however, referred only to the judgment and date of conviction rather than the subsequent order denying the defendant's motion to correct his sentence. In his appellate brief, the defendant challenged the trial court's order denying his motion for sentence correction. The appellate court addressed the defendant's arguments and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 102-03, 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053.

On appeal to this court, we noted that the record revealed a threshold question of whether the notice of appeal, listing only the judgment of conviction, effectively conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the order denying the motion for sentence correction. Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 103-04, 319 Ill.Dec. 373, 885 N.E.2d 1053. We observed that "[t]he notice not only failed to mention the [order denying the motion for sentence correction]; it specifically mentioned a different judgment, and only that judgment." Smith, 228 Ill.2d at 105, 319 Ill.Dec....

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