People v. Smith

• Decision Date: 22 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 104468.,104468.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Edward SMITH, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

885 N.E.2d 1053

228 Ill.2d 95

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Edward SMITH, Appellant.

No. 104468.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 22, 2008.

Rehearing Denied March 24, 2008.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Gary R. Peterson, Acting Deputy Defender, Colleen Morgan, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Julia R. Rietz, State's Attorney, Urbana (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick, Karl R. Triebel, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Defendant, Edward Smith, pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2002). The circuit court of Champaign County entered judgment against defendant and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment. The circuit court denied defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the appellate court affirmed. People v. Smith, No. 4-05-0104 (2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant thereafter filed a pro se pleading in the circuit court entitled "Motion to Correct Sentence," challenging the constitutionality of the term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) that had been imposed as part of his sentence. The court denied the motion sua sponte. The appellate court affirmed. 371 Ill.App.3d 817, 311 Ill.Dec. 164, 867 N.E.2d 1150. We granted leave to appeal (210 Ill.2d R. 315), and now remand the cause to the appellate court with directions.

BACKGROUND

In December 2003 the State charged defendant with unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 1 gram but less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine—a Class 1 felony—in violation of section 401(c)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2002)). Because of defendant's prior convictions, he was subject to sentencing as a Class X offender, pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2002)). On November 10, 2004, defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for the State's recommendation, inter alia, that he be sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and given credit for 125 days already served in custody. During the plea colloquy, the circuit court admonished defendant as to his possible sentence. Included in the court's admonishments was a warning that, if defendant were sent to prison, "there is a period of mandatory supervised release of three years." The court asked defendant if he understood his potential maximum penalties, and defendant answered "Yes." Following the State's presentation of a factual basis, the circuit court accepted defendant's guilty plea, entered judgment against defendant, and sentenced him—in accordance with the plea agreement—to 10 years' imprisonment with credit for time served of 125 days.

In December 2004 defendant filed a pro se "petition to withdraw guilty plea" alleging, among other things, that (l) he was unaware that the MSR term was in addition to his 10-year prison term, rather than incorporated within it, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Counsel was appointed to represent defendant, and counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the guilty plea.¹ The circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant's sole argument was that the factual basis presented by the State at the plea hearing was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The appellate court rejected this argument, and affirmed the trial court's judgment. People v. Smith, No. 4-05-0104 (2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

In February 2006 defendant filed a pro se "Motion to Correct Sentence" and a memorandum of law in support. In this pleading and accompanying memorandum, defendant challenged the constitutionality of the term of MSR that had been imposed—in addition to his term of imprisonment—as part of his sentence. According to defendant, it was a violation of the Illinois and United States constitutions to require that a term of MSR be served after the successful completion of a judicially imposed sentence. Defendant alleged that, because his term of MSR was in addition to his term of imprisonment, rather than incorporated within it, his sentence "is void and does not compor[t] with the constitutions." Defendant asked the court to "encompass" his MSR term within his prison sentence. As alternative relief, defendant asked, among other things, that he be released from incarceration to serve the remainder of his sentence on MSR, or that his term of MSR be vacated.

The circuit court denied the motion sua sponte. In an order dated February 21, 2006, the court stated: "The Defendant's motion for sentence correction is denied by this court. Also, the court determines that the pleadings are frivolous and patently without merit."

On the same day, the court sent a letter to the warden of the prison where defendant was incarcerated, informing the warden of the court's finding and pointing specifically to section 3-6-3(d) of the Corrections Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) (West 2002)). The letter stated: "Enclosed please find an Order denying Mr. Smith's motion for sentence correction. The Court considers this pleading to be frivolous and patently without merit. I am informing you of this pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) with regard to the inmate's good conduct credit."

Section 3-6-3(d) provides, in pertinent part:

"If a lawsuit is filed by a prisoner * * * against the State, the Department of Corrections, or the Prisoner Review Board, or against any of their officers or employees, and the court makes a specific finding that a pleading, motion, or other paper filed by the prisoner is frivolous, the Department of Corrections shall conduct a hearing to revoke up to 180 days of good conduct credit by bringing charges against the prisoner sought to be deprived of the good conduct credits before the Prisoner Review Board as provided in subparagraph (a)(8) of Section 3-3-2 of this Code. * * *

* * *

(2) `Lawsuit' means a petition for post-conviction relief under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, a motion pursuant to Section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, a habeas corpus action under Article X of the Code of Civil Procedure or under federal law (28 U.S.C. 2254), a petition for claim under the Court of Claims Act or an action under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.1983)." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) (West 2002).

On March 16, 2006, defendant sent a letter to the clerk of the circuit court asking for a copy of the order denying his motion. In his letter, defendant stated that he "was written a discipline report for the motion, and the ticket said see the Judge's order."

On March 20, 2006, defendant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal. However, defendant's notice referred only to the circuit court's judgment of conviction on November 10, 2004, rather than the court's order denying his motion for sentence correction on February 21, 2006. In his brief to the appellate court, defendant identified the judgment appealed from as the circuit court's denial, on February 21, 2006, of his motion to correct sentence.

On appeal, defendant did not challenge the circuit court's finding that his motion was frivolous and patently without merit. Instead, defendant focused on the letter from the circuit court judge to the warden, which mentioned section 3-6-3(d) "with regard to the inmate's good conduct credit." According to defendant, the judge—in this letter—"advised the warden * * * that due to the dismissal order, [defendant] was subject to loss of his good conduct credit under [section 3-6-3(d)]." Defendant argued that, in reaching this conclusion, the circuit court necessarily found that defendant's "Motion to Correct Sentence" was a "lawsuit" as defined in section 3-6-3(d) and therefore fell within the scope of that provision. However, defendant noted that a "motion to correct sentence" was not among the causes of action defined as a "lawsuit" in section 3-6-3(d)(2). Accordingly, defendant argued that the circuit court erred in finding that defendant's "Motion to Correct Sentence" was a "lawsuit" for purposes of section 3-6-3(d). In defendant's view, he was not subject to the loss of good-conduct credit under this provision.

Defendant argued, in addition, that "it cannot be inferred that the circuit court recharacterized the motion as a post-conviction petition," which is one of the causes of action defined as a "lawsuit" in section 3-6-3(d). Defendant noted that, under People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill.2d 45, 295 Ill.Dec. 657, 833 N.E.2d 863 (2005), a circuit court must follow certain procedures before recharacterizing a pro se pleading as a first postconviction petition. According to defendant, the circuit court in the case at bar did not adhere to these procedures. In defendant's view, any recharacterization of his motion as a postconviction petition would have been improper.

Finally, defendant argued that the circuit court's determination that his motion was subject to section 3-6-3(d) was "an issue properly before this Court." According to defendant, the circuit court's characterization of his pleading as a "lawsuit" under section 3-6-3(d) was a precursor to the court's finding that his motion was frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant therefore argued that his "challenge to the circuit court's order denying his motion also properly includes a challenge to the court's finding that the motion was a `lawsuit' as defined [in section 3-6-3(d)]."

The appellate court rejected defendant's argument that the circuit court erred in finding that his motion was a "lawsuit" under section 3-6-3(d). According to the appellate court, "the trial court appears to have treated the motion as a petition under the [Post-Conviction Hearing] Act...