People v. Lindberg
| Decision Date | 01 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 91095,91095 |
| Citation | 412 N.W.2d 272,162 Mich.App. 226 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas J. LINDBERG, Defendant-Appellant. 162 Mich.App. 226, 412 N.W.2d 272 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[162 MICHAPP 227] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Div., and Margaret G. Horenstein, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Richard C. Digon, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and HOOD and SWALLOW, * JJ.
Defendant, Thomas J. Lindberg, [162 MICHAPP 228] was convicted by a jury of uttering and publishing, M.C.L. Sec. 750.249; M.S.A. Sec. 28.446, and false pretenses with intent to defraud over $100, M.C.L. Sec. 750.218, M.S.A. Sec. 28.415, and pleaded guilty to a charge of being an habitual offender, second offense, M.C.L. Sec. 769.10; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1082, based on a prior conviction for breaking and entering a coin-operated device. At that time, defendant also had prior convictions for manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On August 13, 1985, the Oakland Circuit Court sentenced defendant to a term of from three to fourteen years on the uttering and publishing conviction, and from three to ten years on the false pretenses conviction, both of which sentences were vacated upon imposition of the terms of from six to twenty-one years and from six to fifteen years, respectively, under the applicable habitual offender statute. Defendant now appeals as of right, and we reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new trial.
The record reveals that on April 6, 1983, defendant gave seventy-three-year-old Mary Greisser a check with a forged endorsement. Greisser and her grandson, William Mayfield, defendant's friend, testified that defendant assured Greisser that the federal income tax refund check in the amount of $441.25 had been properly endorsed to him by the named payee, Brenda Barnes, as payment for work defendant had performed on Barnes' car. Defendant told Greisser that he could not cash the check himself because he had no bank account, which prompted Greisser to agree to deposit the income tax check into her own account and to write defendant a check when the $441.25 was credited to her by the bank. On April 12, 1983, Greisser wrote a check on her account for defendant, and defendant cashed it. About six months [162 MICHAPP 229] later, the federal government determined that the endorsement on the income tax check was a forgery. The bank froze Greisser's account and charged her $441.25. According to Greisser and Mayfield, defendant promised to pay Greisser back, but did not do so for about two years. Thereafter, Greisser pressed charges and a few days before the March 18, 1985, preliminary examination, defendant admitted to Greisser that he knew the check was bad; he then paid her back in cash.
Brenda Wilson, formerly Brenda Barnes, testified that when she did not receive her federal income tax check for 1982 she contacted federal authorities in Columbus, Ohio. After identifying her purported signature on the back of the check as a forgery, she was issued another check by the government. She stated that she did not know defendant and that he had never done any work for her.
Defendant, an unemployed master mechanic, testified that a neighbor named Johnny had brought Brenda Barnes to defendant's house, explaining to defendant that Barnes' car had serious engine problems. Defendant stated that he subsequently installed a rebuilt engine into Barnes' car and that she paid him with a federal income tax refund check which she endorsed to him. On cross-examination it was disclosed that the endorsement of Brenda Barnes' name was spelled "Brenda Barns." Defendant explained that normally his father-in-law cashed his checks, but that since at that time his father-in-law was out of town, he requested William Mayfield to ask his grandmother to cash the check. She cashed the check and later gave defendant the cash. According to defendant, when, about six months later, Greisser told him that the check was bad, he immediately gave Greisser $50 and thereafter paid back the [162 MICHAPP 230] balance in small amounts over the course of time. Defendant also asserted that when criminal charges were filed against him, he again paid back complainant in full on March 15, 1985, believing that Greisser would no longer press charges.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court's failure to comply with the requirements of MRE 609 and applicable case law regarding the admission of his prior convictions mandates reversal. In particular, defendant contends that the trial court failed to articulate on the record its reasons for admitting evidence of his prior convictions, and that that failure requires reversal in this case. We agree.
Just before the commencement of trial, defendant requested that evidence of his prior convictions be suppressed. He argued that his prior conviction for breaking and entering a coin-operated device be suppressed on the basis of its similarity to the charged crimes of uttering and publishing and of false pretenses, reasoning that all these offenses involved larcenous activity. The prosecutor argued in response that all of defendant's prior convictions, including those for breaking and entering a coin-operated device, manslaughter, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, be admitted into evidence because "they're more probative than prejudicial." The ruling in full by the circuit judge on defendant's motion was: "The Court is going to deny the motion."
Effective May 14, 1980, the Supreme Court amended MRE 609 (a)(2) to require a court, when determining the probative value of admitting evidence of prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching a witness' credibility, to articulate on the record the factors considered in making its determination. 408 Mich. cxv. Despite the amended [162 MICHAPP 231] language, however, the majority of panels of this Court which have addressed this issue have held that the failure of a trial court to articulate on the record the factors considered in determining the admissibility of prior convictions does not alone mandate reversal. See, e.g., People v. Eggleston, 148 Mich.App. 494, 502-503, 384 N.W.2d 811 (1986); People v. Gendron, 144 Mich.App. 509, 376 N.W.2d 143 (1985), lv. den. 425 Mich. 853 (1986); People v. Cummings, 139 Mich.App. 286, 362 N.W.2d 252 (1984); People v. Ferrari, 131 Mich.App. 621, 345 N.W.2d 645 (1983), lv. den. 421 Mich. 852 (1985); People v. Steele, 115 Mich.App. 758, 321 N.W.2d 804 (1982). Cf. People v. Terryes Johnson, 122 Mich.App. 172, 333 N.W.2d 32 (1982), lv. den. 417 Mich. 897 (1983). Rather, harmful error occurs, and reversal is therefore required, only if the transcripts indicate that the trial court was unaware of its discretion to rule on the issue and affirmatively misapplied any of the factors enunciated in People v. Crawford, 83 Mich.App. 35, 39, 268 N.W.2d 275 (1978). People v. Bell, 155 Mich.App. 408, 411-412, 399 N.W.2d 542 (1986); People v. Handley, 422 Mich. 859, 365 N.W.2d 752 (1985), rev'g. People v. Handley (On Remand), 135 Mich.App. 51, 352 N.W.2d 343 (1984). The Crawford factors, which have often been repeated by this Court, are as follows:
"(1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that [there is] danger that the jury will consider the defendant a 'bad man' or infer that because he was previously convicted he likely committed this crime, and therefore create prejudice which outweighs the probative value on the issue of credibility?), and (3) the effect on the decisional process if the accused [162 MICHAPP 232] does not testify out of fear of impeachment by prior convictions (are there alternative means of presenting a defense which would not require the defendant's testimony, i.e., can his side of the story be presented, or are there alternative, less prejudicial means of impeaching the defendant?)." Crawford, supra, 83 Mich.App. p. 39, 268 N.W.2d 275.
In the instant case, the trial court did not demonstrate that it applied the Crawford factors in deciding to deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence of prior convictions. Indeed, the trial court did not articulate on the record any factors that it considered in denying defendant's motion. The only possible indications on the record from which we might infer that the trial court was aware that its decision was discretionary were the facts that the motion was heard, both parties were...
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