People v. Lloyd

Decision Date06 July 1950
Docket NumberCr. 4431
Citation220 P.2d 10,98 Cal.App.2d 305
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesPEOPLE v. LLOYD.

Richard E. Erwin, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Gilbert Harelson, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.

MOORE, Presiding Justice.

Having been convicted of murder upon purely evidential circumstances appellant demands a reversal upon the grounds of insufficiency of the proof, error in not properly instructing the jury, denial of due process and equal protection of the law under state and federal constitutions. While serious questions are raised as to the evidence of both motive and identity, the question for decision is whether the jury could fairly have convicted the accused upon the facts established at the trial.

Deceased, Faxon A. Robinson, resided alone in a cottage on Clark street in El Monte, a suburb of Los Angeles. He spent his days in bookmaking, i. e. selling bets on horse races and had his headquarters at Gay's Inn, a saloon in El Monte, where he conducted operations daily from 11 a. m. to 7 p. m. His habit of carrying on his person from $200 to $400 was known to appellant who had been his friend for about a year prior to February 18, 1949, and who had from time to time placed bets with and borrowed sums of money from him. On the evening of the day last mentioned, deceased left Gay's about 6 p. m., dined at a nearby cafe with the witness Letha Toth who accompanied him in a taxicab to his home about a mile distant. He was drunk upon their arrival. She observed him place on the dresser a stack of currency about three-fourths of an inch in thickness, including two $20 bills. Also, he checked up on his day's receipts on a small scratch pad on which he listed four checks, $300 cash, and the figures '$79.' Concerning the last item there was no evidential explanation. With Miss Toth's assistance he donned his night shirt, repaired to his bed and was soon in slumberland. Thereupon, his companion took $1.75 of his money; left a note that she had done so; turned off the lights and departed by the back door which she left unlocked. His body was found at 11 a. m. on the following day by Charles Kneedler.

On February 18 appellant was a plumber and was usually employed. He was indebted to Gay's Inn in the sum of $45 and to his employer in the amount of $75. For the preceding week ending February 12 he had received $45.12 a wages. On the afternoon of February 18 he arrived at Gay's Inn about 4:30 o'clock. For about three hours he loitered there in the enjoyment of his cups. During that period he wore blue denim clothes, a jacket and a cap. When he left at 8 p. m. he paid for his drinks with small bills which he removed from a front pocket. He returned at 8:30, sat at the lunch counter, ate and drank until 9:30. He then went out into a cold, foggy night. A figure similar to his was at the scene of the crime shortly after 9 p. m. according to the testimony of a Mrs. Evans who resided in the block adjoining that in which deceased lived. She testified that as she drove north on Clark street she saw a tall, thin man in work clothes walking from the Robinson home across the lawn toward the street; that his build was similar to that of appellant's.

On his return to the saloon about 11:30 his hair hung over his forehead, he wore no cap as he had done prior to nine o'clock; had much dirt on his clothes; 'looked like he had been wallowing in the dirt.' This, he explained, resulted from his having had trouble with his car in that it would not start. He sat around for a while, drank and paid for drinks with money taken from a wallet carried in his hip pocket. Prior to that time the bartender had never seen him take money from that part of his clothing. The stack of bills removed was three-eights of an inch in thickness. He paid first with a $20 bill. About 15 minutes later he paid someone a loan and ordered more drinks for several persons present and said, 'I am going to have to give you another $20 bill.' He left Gay's Inn about 12:15 a. m. and directed his course toward the home of deceased. About 12:40 a. m. an automobile resembling his was parked about 350 feet from the Robinson home.

Approximately 10 a. m. on the 19th witness Kneedler arrived at Gay's saloon for the purpose of placing a bet with Robinson. To calm the fears of Mr. Westerman who had been Robinson's associate, Kneedler drove to the home of deceased and on getting no response to his knocking attempted entrance at the back door. After telephoning to Westerman from a neighboring station he returned to the house, observed the broken screen on the bedroom window open, unhinged and hanging out. On entering the house he found deceased and blood stains in profusion.

The police having been informed arrived at noon and entered through the window at the broken screen, all doors being locked. Officer Ervin found a ring on the finger of deceased, a setting containing no stones, but he observed three small pieces of onyx in the bed covers and a gold initial letter 'R' in the bed. On the dresser he found some checks and appellant's watch, but no stack of bills. While the official inspection was in progress Harold Westerman entered. When he thereafter returned to Gay's Inn, appellant said to him, 'You rode down to Frankie's house with Harris in my car didn't you?' 'Yes,' answered Westerman. Then appellant inquired, 'Is he dead?' Prior to that dialogue neither Westerman nor Harris had told anyone of the conditions at the Robinson home.

The autopsy disclosed that death was due to a 'cerebral hemorrhage and contusion due to multiple fractures of the skull.' Such fractures had been caused by more than 30 blows administered by a plumber's auger. The pattern of the head wounds showed that they were caused either by the auger taken from appellant's car or by one identical with it. Also, the ring on Robinson's finger had been struck by appellant's auger. This is an instrument used by appellant in his plumbing trade 'for drilling holes through floor and ceiling joints to run 2"' vent pipes.' In the car with the auger the officers found a cap and jacket similar to those he wore to work on the preceding day.

Blood was found in several places in appellant's automobile and a large stain on the inside of the door just below the window was human blood. Appellant's cap was 'rather dirty and * * * the stain was not covered with dirt, which would indicate that * * * the cap had not been worn since it was put on and had not been in any place where it could get dirty.' Scrapings taken from the underside of appellant's right hand were found to contain blood. When officer England exhibited to appellant a red-like substance on the auger the morning of the 20th, the latter replied, 'I suppose you are going to tell me that's blood.'

A metal analysis was made of decedent's ring. It contained 42 per cent gold, 45 per cent silver, the balance, copper, lead and nickel. A similar examination was made of the auger for the purpose of ascertaining whether it had contacted the ring. A small dent and an adjacent marred area were found. A spectographic analysis of samples taken from the marred area and from the bottom of the dent showed aluminum, gold, silver, copper and a trce of lead. That analysis compared exactly with the analysis of the ring, with the addition of aluminum which came from the auger. The witness' opinion was that decedent's ring had come into contact with the auger and had caused the two wounds above and to the left of the left eye. The foregoing facts were established by three experts learned in chemistry and skilled in chemical analyses.

Appellant was taken to the police station about midnight on February 19 for questioning. When officer England showed him the auger he said to the prisoner, 'I believe you killed Frankie Robinson. In fact, I am sure you did.' No reply. 'You are a cold blooded murderer,' continued the officer, and some seconds elapsed in silence. When asked whether he could explain the presence of blood under his fingernails, appellant said that he could not do so.

The only motive ascribed to appellant was his dire need for money. His choice of Robinson as the source of a new supply ws encouraged by his knowledge that deceased usually carried from $200 to $400 on his person. He was in debt; drank intemperately and reveled in such society as commonly frequents the barroom. His own money had been squandered on drink prior to his leaving Gay's Inn. When he returned he was flush with a new supply. In a brief time he had broken two $20 bills. Not only do the facts established to the satisfaction of the jury show motive and opportunity for the crime but the murder weapon, peculiarly formed, was traced to appellant's possession, and his claim of innocence of murder required him to deny the accusation and to resent the accuser. People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 712, 715, 172 P.2d 18. Although he was accused on the 19th he did not deny his guilt until the 21st. Now on this appeal he arrays a list of persons who, he says, had the knowledge of deceased and of the latter's possession of money. He asserts they had motives for the crime and contends that the jury should have exonerated him under the doctrine governing circumstantial evidence. But those very things were before the jury whose duty was to determine whether any of the parties named by appellant had an equally burning motive to take Robinson's life, as full knowledge of his pecuniary possession and as intimate a knowledge of the route to his door. Whether the evidence of any circumstance was a necessary link in the chain of proof was essentially a question for the jury. People v. Watts, 198 Cal. 776, 799, 247 P. 884. Since their finding of his guilt is not unreasonable it cannot be said that the evidence is insufficient.

Appellant complains that...

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9 cases
  • People v. Ham
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 20 Mayo 1970
    ...allows an unauthorized act, there is authority to the effect that he waives the right of reversal by reason thereof. (People v. Lloyd, 98 Cal.App.2d 305, 313, 220 P.2d 10; People v. Escobar, 122 Cal.App.2d 15, 21, 264 P.2d Our consideration turns to whether, in any event, it was error for t......
  • People v. Duren
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 2 Abril 1973
    ...murder or manslaughter, but we have concluded that the refusal to give the requested instructions was proper. In People v. Lloyd, 98 Cal.App.2d 305, 311, 220 P.2d 10, 14, it was said: 'The facts established by the prosecution witnesses prove nothing short of murder in the first degree. Sinc......
  • People v. Busse
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 3 Octubre 2017
    ...remainder of testimony sufficient to show that defendant met MDO criteria].) Reversal on this ground is unwarranted. (People v. Lloyd (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 305, 313 (Lloyd) [defendant waives right of reversal if he or she "remains silent while the court does or allows an unauthorized act"].)......
  • People v. Imbler
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 17 Mayo 1962
    ...did not err in failing to instruct on second degree murder. (People v. Green, 13 Cal.2d 37, 44, 87 P.2d 821; People v. Lloyd, 98 Cal.App.2d 305, 311, 220 P.2d 10; People v. Sameniego, 118 Cal.App. 165, 170-171, 4 P.2d 809, 5 P.2d 653; see People v. Moran, 18 Cal.App. 209, 122 P. Defendant c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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