People v. Logan
Citation | 41 Cal.2d 279,260 P.2d 20 |
Decision Date | 14 July 1953 |
Docket Number | Cr. 5384 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Parties | PEOPLE v. LOGAN. |
William B. Esterman, Hollywood, and Richard L. Rykoff, Los Angeles, for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Dan Kaufmann, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Defendant appeals from a judgment pursuant to the verdict of a jury which found him guilty of (count one) assault with a deadly weapon and (count two) robbery of the first degree, and from an order denying his motion for new trial. We have concluded that various matters, hereinafter described, of which defendant complains did not constitute prejudicial error, but that the judgment must be reversed as to the first count because a single, indivisible act (the use of a baseball bat as a club) constituted count one assault with a deadly weapon and count two robbery of the first degree because committed by one 'armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon'. Pen.Code, § 211a.
The People's evidence discloses the following events: Early on the morning of May 12, 1951, Mrs. Adalyn Hickson was walking toward her home. She had left the store where she was employed as a cashier at 12:30 a. m. As she neared her home, she testified, 'I heard light footsteps right behind me, just a few footsteps, I didn't have a chance to turn around,' and 'I came to in the hospital.' She had suffered skull fractures, concussion, and cuts and bruises on her face and head. This incident occurred between 1:30 and 2:00 a. m., according to Mrs. Hickson's testimony.
At 1:40 a. m. Police Officers Judd and Bunda, on routine patrol duty in a radio car, observed a Ford car with lights off being driven away from the vicinity where Mrs. Hickson was later found. The lights of the Ford came on and it was driven through a boulevard stop without a halt. The officers displayed the red light of the police car as a signal to defendant, the driver of the Ford, to stop. Instead he accelerated and drove away, made a right turn and then a second right turn, the latter into a private driveway, and crashed through a metal gate. He then got out of the car, threw an object into the next yard, and ran toward the rear of the yard in which he was. The officers had pursued defendant, first in the police car and then on foot. At Officer Judd's command defendant halted at the rear of the yard into which he had driven. Officer Judd In the adjoining yard Officer Judd found Mrs. Hickson's purse. Defendant then said that 'he had found the purse in a parked vehicle.' In defendant's Ford was a baseball bat which, it was later learned, had a spot of human blood on it. Defendant had been drinking but did not appear to be intoxicated.
The officers took defendant to a police station where they and Detective Barclay interviewed him. Defendant first repeated that he had found the purse in an automobile. Barclay said, 'Don't lie, I know better, where did you get the purse?' Defendant then said that he had taken it from a woman, that he had struck her with his fist and she had fallen down, that she had not screamed and that he did not know whether she got up after he struck her. Defendant further said he did not know the name of the street where the attack took place but that he believed he could direct the officers to the vicinity. The officers took defendant to the address shown in Mrs. Hickson's purse and found that she was not there. They then drove slowly along the street where defendant said the attack had occurred, defendant 'stated that a bush looked familiar,' and Officer Judd got out of the car and found Mrs. Hickson, unconscious, lying on the lawn. She was discovered at about 3:30 a. m. At this time defendant said,
The police summoned an ambulance, other officers, and photographers. While he was still at the scene of the crime defendant said he had hit the woman with a stick, then admitted that he had hit her with the baseball bat which was in his car and that he did not know why he had done so.
At about 4:00 a. m. defendant was taken back to the police station. Under questioning by the police he made a confession which was reported and transcribed by a stenographer. At about 5:30 a. m. defendant signed each of the five pages of the statement. Defendant was then taken to a cell where he slept. The next morning at about 10:30 another officer assigned to investigate the case questioned defendant and defendant again confessed and described the assault.
The substance of defendant's confessions is as follows: He was on his way to pick up his wife, who had been to a party, when he saw a woman walking along the sidewalk. He did not observe whether she had a purse. Defendant stopped his car, got out, and hit the back of her head with the baseball bat. The bat was part of the athletic equipment which defendant used in his work as a playground director. Defendant seized the woman's purse, fled, and was apprehended in the manner described by Officers Judd and Bunda.
At the trial defendant testified that he had not followed anyone or struck anyone with anything or taken a purse on the night of May 11 or early morning of May 12, 1951. He categorically and repeatedly denied having made any of the various oral admissions and confessions to which the officers had testified. He testified that the incriminating portions of the transcribed statement which he made in the police station had not been made by him in answer to questions but had been formulated by the interrogating officers after discussion between them in his presence, and that he signed the typed statement without having read it because 'I was so dead for sleep at the time I wanted more than anything in the world just to be allowed to lie down and go to sleep and then again I was afraid if I didn't sign it I would be beaten like I was beaten before when I was a kid, by the police.' (The circumstances under which the typed statement was prepared will be hereinafter described in connection with the discussion of its admissibility in evidence.)
Over defendant's objection the trial court admitted in evidence two photographs, taken at the scene of the crime shortly after its discovery, which show defendant, police officers, and the bleeding victim, and a photograph, taken at the police station after defendant had been returned there, which shows defendant, the baseball bat, and Mrs. Hickson's purse. Officer Judd testified that the photographs accurately show the circumstances there depicted. They do not purport to represent re-enactments of the crime.
Defendant argues that the photographs serve no proper evidentiary purpose and connect him with the crime in such a striking manner that the jury may well have been unduly impressed by them. The effect of the photographs was made worse, defendant says, by the following argument of the prosecuting attorney to the jury:
The above quoted argument of the prosecuting attorney does not suggest that the photographs are evidence of anything more than that which they depict and to which the officers testified. However, it is not apparent how the jury would be aided in solving the facts of the case by pictures showing defendant in the presence of the victim. As defendant says (quoting from People v. Burns (1952), 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 542, 241 P.2d 308, 242 P.2d 9), 'photographs should not be offered or admitted for any purpose other than to help the jury.' (See People v. Dabb (1948), 32 Cal.2d 491, 498, 197 P.2d 1; People v. Sambrano (1939), 33 Cal.App.2d 200, 213, 91 P.2d 221.)
The People argue that the photographs were admissible to show the scene of the attack, the condition of the victim, and the relevant real evidence of the victim's purse and of the bat which, according to other evidence, had been used as a weapon. (See People v. Ah Lee (1912), 164 Cal. 350, 352, 128 P. 1035; People v. Smith (1940), 15 Cal.2d 640, 649, 104 P.2d 510.) Furthermore, the People say, the photographs were admissible to support the officers' testimony that defendant was with them at the scene of the crime and was in the police station. Obviously the foregoing matters could have been shown without the graphic connection of defendant and the victim which resulted from photographing them together. However, in view of the abundance of other evidence connecting defendant with the crime, it does not appear that the erroneous use of the photographs amounted to prejudicial error requiring a reversal.
The first reference to any prior criminal record of defendant occurred during cross-examination of Officer Brennan, a witness for the People. Brennan was assigned to this case as investigating officer and prepared a report which contained information as to defendant's background. Defendant's counsel asked Brennan, ...
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