People v. Lookadoo

• Decision Date: 30 March 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 9056
• Citation: 66 Cal.2d 307,425 P.2d 208,57 Cal.Rptr. 608
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 425 P.2d 208 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leo Carlton LOOKADOO, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Page 608

57 Cal.Rptr. 608

66 Cal.2d 307, 425 P.2d 208

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leo Carlton LOOKADOO, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 9056.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

March 30, 1967.

Richard M. Grossberg, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws, John L. Giordano and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

McCOMB, Justice.

This is an automatic appeal (Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b)) from a judgment, after trial before the court without a jury, finding defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and imposing the death penalty.

Facts: Early in the morning on Sunday, October 25, 1964, defendant took his .22 caliber rifle, left his apartment, and drove to a service station in Modesto operated by John Arthur Inman. He bought a dollar's worth of gasoline and a quart of oil. He then asked for a package of cigarettes, and when Inman went back into the living area of the station to get the cigarettes, defendant picked up his rifle, followed Inman inside, and said, 'This is a stick-up, I want to get some money.' Turning around, Inman replied, 'Nobody is going to get me,' and moved toward defendant, reaching for the rifle.

Defendant started firing at Inman. He fired six shells in all, and when Inman continued to advance toward him, defendant hit him with the rifle and knocked him to the floor unconscious. He poured a pan of gasoline over Inman's outstretched body, took the money from the cash register, struck a match to the gasoline-soaked body, and fled.

On February 11, 1965, defendant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to the murder charge and thereafter waived the 60-day time limitation. (Pen.Code, § 1382, subd. 2.) On April 14, 1965, he appeared in court with counsel and made motions for leave to waive a jury trial and to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Both motions were granted.

On April 19, 1965, defendant, represented by counsel, was tried before the court without a jury and found guilty of murder in the first degree. The court fixed the penalty at death.

Defendant contends:

First. That in view of his mental condition he should not have been permitted to waive a jury trial.

Two court-appointed psychiatrists examined defendant prior to the hearing at which he waived a jury trial. One classified him 'in the border line mental defective groups,' and the other estimated him to be 'of dull normal intelligence.' Defendant contends that he should therefore not have been permitted to waive a jury.

In People v. Monk, 56 Cal.2d 288, 298(10), 14 Cal.Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865, we rejected the defendant's claim that because of his lack of education and his mental state, as evidenced by psychiatrists' reports, he was unable to understand the consequences of waiving a jury trial. The reports showed that he was emotionally disordered but sane, that his native intelligence was adequate, and that he had been in school to perhaps the tenth grade.

In the present case both psychiatrists concluded that defendant was sane. One of them reported that on direct examination defendant was found to be in contact with his environment, that he could think quickly and easily, that there was no blocking of thought, and that on the Bellvue Verbal test he scored highest in comprehension, arithmetical reasoning, and retention. The other reported that his responses were coherent and relevant and without evidence of any disorder in his thought processes. Defendant started school at five or six years of age and quit at sixteen in the ninth grade. Accordingly, our holding in the Monk, case is controlling here.

Although the trial court in a criminal case is not required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequences of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the case at bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his counsel has been misled as to the result which might occur from his waiving a jury trial (People v. Golston, 58 Cal.2d 535, 538--539(3), 25 Cal.Rptr. 83, 375 P.2d 51; People v. Langdon, 52 Cal.2d 425, 432(2), 341 P.2d 303), the record shows that the trial court nevertheless went to great lengths to explain the nature and consequences of such a waiver. In addition, defendant's attorney in several instances paraphrased the court's statement to present the matter in even simpler language.

The judge asked defendant numerous times if he understood the explanations given to him, and defendant repeatedly replied that he did and also acknowledged that his attorney had fully explained them to him before the hearing at which he waived a jury trial.

The excerpt from the reporter's transcript quoted in the footnote ¹ shows that the matter was presented in such clear and concise language that even one 'in the border line mental defective groups' or one 'of dull normal intelligence' must be presumed to have understood what his rights were when he gave as clear an indication of comprehension as defendant did.

Under the circumstances, the trial court properly accepted defendant's waiver.

Second. That the trial court's finding of premeditated murder was erroneous in view of the evidence of defendant's mental condition.

This contention is likewise without merit. The first degree murder conviction is warranted on the theory that the homicide was committed during the perpetration of a robbery. The evidence leaves no doubt that defendant robbed the victim and killed him in the perpetration of the robbery.

Under the felony-murder rule of section 189 of the Penal Code, a killing committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under section 288 is murder of the first degree. This is true whether the killing is wilful, deliberate, and premeditated or merely accidental and whether or not the killing is planned as a part of the commission of the robbery. (People v. Cheary, 48 Cal.2d 301, 313 (13), 309 P.2d 431; People v. Morlock, 46 Cal.2d 141, 146 (6), 292 P.2d 897.)

Even independent of the felony-murder rule, however, the first degree murder conviction finds adequate support in the theory that defendant committed a deliberate and premeditated killing.

As stated in People v. Cartier, 54 Cal.2d 300, 305--306 (2), 5 Cal.Rptr. 573, 577, 353 P.2d 53, 57: 'The necessary elements of deliberation and premeditation may be inferred from proof of such facts and circumstances as will furnish a reasonable foundation for such an inference, and where the evidence is not in law insufficient, the matter is exclusively within the province of the trier of fact to determine.' (See also People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692, 703 (7), 44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382; People v. Robillard, 55 Cal.2d 88, 95(5), 10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086.)

Evidence of the circumstances at the time of the killing, as well as the circumstances before and after the killing, is competent to show deliberation and premeditation. (People v. Sears, 62 Cal.2d 737, 743 (6), 44 Cal.Rptr. 330, 401 P.2d 938; People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal.2d 68, 72 (4), 292 P.2d 513.)

The manner and means employed to accomplish the killing arealso important considerations in determining the degree of murder. (People v. Guldbrandsen, 35 Cal.2d 514, 520 (3), 218 P.2d 977; People v. Steward, 156 Cal.App.2d 177, 184 (7), 318 P.2d 806.)

The record shows that defendant coldly, dispassionately, and without mercy murdered his victim. As hereinabove indicated, defendant left his apartment with his newly purchased .22 caliber automatic rifle and went to the service station operated by the victim at a time when other customers were unlikely to be there. He purchased a dollar's worth of gasoline. The victim chatted with defendant and asked him how his children were. After the gasoline was put in the car, defendant asked for some cigarettes. When the victim went inside to obtain a package, defendant reached inside the car, took his rifle from the floorboards in the back of the car, and followed him. Once inside, he told the victim he was going to rob him, and when the victim turned, defendant started shooting. He shot all six shells, four bullets striking the victim. When the victim did not fall and reached for the rifle, defendant struck him with it. The victim then slumped to the floor, and defendant poured gasoline over him, took the contents of the cash register, lit the gasoline on the victim's body, and fled.

There is no merit in defendant's argument that in view of his mental condition the doctrine of 'diminished responsibility' should be a factor and that thus the evidence is insufficient to show deliberation and premeditation.

A claim of diminished responsibility is defensive matter and must be raised by the defendant in the trial on the issue of his guilt. (See People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 490--491 (5, 6), 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677.) In the present case, no evidence entitling defendant to rely on such defense was introduced during the guilt phase. The reports of the medical experts apparently relied on by defendant were introduced during the penalty phase. Accordingly, the doctrine is inapplicable here.

Even assuming, however, that the medical reports were intorduced during the guilt phase, they would not support defendant's contention. ² Such reports and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom support the conclusion that defendant possessed sufficient mental capacity to commit a deliberate and premeditated murder and, accordingly, would not entitle him to rely on the doctrine of diminished responsibility.

Third. That his statements were improperly received in evidence.

The record shows that while defendant was in custody in Bakersfield on another charge, Sergeant Hall, of the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Office, went to the Kern County Jail to question him...