People v. Lopez

• Decision Date: 21 October 1969
• Docket Number: Cr. 630
• Citation: 81 Cal.Rptr. 386,1 Cal.App.3d 78
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eddie Noyola LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 386

81 Cal.Rptr. 386

1 Cal.App.3d 78

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eddie Noyola LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 630.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Oct. 21, 1969.

Peter A. Haberfeld, Heisler & Stewart, Carmel, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Eddie T. Keller, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

OPINION

GARGANO, Justice.

Defendant, Eddie Noyola Lopez, was arrested in connection with the stabbing of one, Fabian Garcia. It seems that the injured man had gone to the home of Juanita Espinoza to help her move furniture. At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, defendant came to the home and told Mrs. Espinoza that he wanted to talk to Garcia. The two men went outside and, according to Garcia, defendant jumped him. After a few minutes the fight was broken up by the others present. Then, defendant left. Later, he returned with Robert Lopez and three other men. Defendant entered the house, walked up to Garcia and stabbed him in the mouth. As Garcia fell to the floor, defendant stabbed him in the neck and shoulder.

Defendant was represented by a deputy public defender at his jury trial; he was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon as charged in the information. Defendant then moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a modification of the verdict to a lesser included offense. He also asked the court to substitute Mr. Peter Haberfeld for the deputy public defender and to furnish his new lawyer, without cost, with a full transcript of the testimony adduced at the trial. Defendant's request for the substitution of attorneys was granted, but his request for a free transcript was denied. His motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a modification of the verdict, was also denied. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict, and defendant was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law.

The problem raised in this appeal is basic, and the answer could affect profoundly the orderly and expeditious handling of criminal trials in the trial courts of this state. Stated in general terms, it is whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the state of California to furnish indigent defendants with full trial transcripts in every case in which a motion for a new trial is made or contemplated. Thus, the first question we must answer is whether the trial judge's refusal to furnish defendant's new lawyer with a full transcript of defendant's trial proceeding for Mr. Haberfeld's use in connection with defendant's motion for a new trial was, of itself, a denial of equal protection under the law and produced the 'invidious discrimination' proscribed by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055. In that landmark decision, the high court held that the state must provide an indigent with a free reporter's transcript on appeal if the transcript is necessary to secure proper appellate review. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter succinctly stated in a concurring opinion:

'If it (the state) has a general policy of allowing criminal appeals, it cannot make lack of means an effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.' (351 U.S. 12, 24, 76 S.Ct. 585, 593.)

It is conceded that a state is not required, by federal constitutional mandate, to invest a person who has been convicted of a crime by a jury of his peers with the right to seek a 'new lease on life' from the judge who presided at his trial; the right to move for a new trial is a matter of state regulation, and in this state the right is purely statutory. Nevertheless, appellant equates this statutory right with appellate review and correctly argues that once established it 'must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.' (Griffin v. State of Illinois, supra; Douglas v. State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892; Draper v. State of Washington, 372 U.S 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899; Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577.) He asserts that the court's refusal to grant his request for a transcript made it impossible for his new lawyer effectively to argue his motion for a new trial and subtly suggests that it deprived him of open and equal access to the courts. Defendant also suggests that such transcripts are available to affluent defendants at every stage of a criminal trial and must be made available to indigent defendants for this reason.

With few exceptions, an accurate trial record, such as a reporter's transcript, is absolutely essential for the proper disposition of a criminal appeal. ¹ An appeal is before a different tribunal and, more often than not, is heard many months after the trial is concluded. On the other hand, a motion for a new trial is generally made by the lawyer who participated in the trial, before the judge who presided, and at a time when the testimony adduced is still fresh in everyone's minds. Thus, the need for a full trial transcript to argue a motion for a new trial simply does not exist in the ordinary case (People v. Putty, 251 Cal.App.2d 991, 1001, 59 Cal.Rptr. 881). Because of the shortness of time allowed by the statute for new trial proceedings and for the trial judge to rule (Code Civ.Proc. §§ 659, 659a, 660), if we were to hold that full trial transcripts must be provided to defendants, rich or poor, in every case in which new trial motions are made or contemplated, we would not only add to the tremendous burden which the trial courts of this state are already bearing, but in courts with heavily congested criminal trial calendars and a scarcity of qualified court reporters, we could even cause the wheels of justice to come to a grinding halt. We find nothing in the United States Constitution to absolutely require a trial court to interrupt its regular work schedule on each occasion that a motion for a new trial is made in order to give the court reporter time to prepare a full trial transcript within the time limit prescribed by the statute for argument on the motion.

However, we reject respondent's sweeping suggestion that an indigent is never entitled to a full stenographer's transcript in connection with a motion for a new trial. A new trial motion is an integral part of the trial itself (People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Cal.2d 7, 161 P.2d 934), and in a close case is of greater import to the defendant than appellate review; in passing on such a motion, the trial court, unlike an appellate court, may reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses (Yarrow v. State of California, 53 Cal.2d 427, 434, 2 Cal.Rptr. 137, 348 P.2d 687; Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Railway Corp., 25 Cal.2d 165, 153 P.2d 338; Ridge v. Calabrese Supply Co., 263 Cal.App.2d 546, 69 Cal.Rptr. 844). Thus, since the poor, as well as the rich, are entitled to Effective representation by counsel at every stage of a criminal prosecution (People v. Havel, 134 Cal.App.2d 213, 285, 285 P.2d 317), a situation could conceivably arise where the court's refusal to furnish an indigent defendant with a full reporter's transcript would not only deny him equal protection under the law, if under similar circumstances a full transcript were available to an affluent defendant, but would also deprive him of effective representation by counsel at a critical stage of his trial; the untimely death of the trial lawyer or the judge who presided at the trial are situations which readily come to mind.

We hold that an indigent defendant is not entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to a full reporter's transcript of his trial...