People v. Louzon

• Decision Date: 27 November 1953
• Docket Number: No. 78,78
• Citation: 338 Mich. 146,61 N.W.2d 52
• Parties: PEOPLE v. LOUZON et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 52

61 N.W.2d 52

338 Mich. 146

PEOPLE v. LOUZON et al.

No. 78.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 27, 1953.

Frank G. Millard, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Gerald K. O'Brien, Pros. Atty. Wayne County, Ralph Garber, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Samuel Brezner, Samuel J. Torina, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for the People.

W. Newton Hawkins, Ecorse, for defendants and appellants, Edward Louzon and Richard Sen Lowery B. Hicks, Detroit, for defendant and appellant, Archie Long.

Before the Entire Bench.

BUTZEL, Justice.

Edward Louzon, Richard Sen and Archie Long were tried together and found guilty of robbery not armed. They appealed from the jury's verdicts, judgments entered thereon, and denial of motions for a new trial.

While at work at the Lancaster Theatre in River Rouge, Michigan, around 2 a. m. on March 26, 1951, Otto Agnew, a janitor, was overpowered by three men, one of whom pressed a hard round object against his body and made him open the manager's office. Subsequently he was confined in the men's room and from there heard the hammering of the robbers in their attempt to open a safe. The robbers worked rapidly and broke open a small safe and removed therefrom $676 placed there by the theatre cashier. Before leaving the theatre they bound Agnew with a cord from a vacuum cleaner. They threatened him and stated they would kill him if he attempted to be a hero. After their departure, Agnew managed to crawl to the door and call for assistance from a passer-by who summoned the police.

Immediately following the robbery Agnew stated to several witnesses that he could not identify the robbers, and that one had a paper bag over his head. At the trial he postitively identified the three defendants as the men who had committed the robbery. He testified that his earlier denial of ability to identify the three men was made because of the threats the men had made to him and his fear induced thereby. He stated that he had been scared by the threats and was still scared. He further testified that he had to go to the hospital a short time after the robbery because of a heart condition which he claimed was caused by his experience during the robbery. The credibility of his testimony was to be judged by the jury.

It was not until 5:30 p. m. on April 11, 1951, that defendant Sen was arrested for investigation in regard to several crimes that had been committed in River Rouge. He claims that he was interrogated that same evening but denied participation in any crime. He was questioned about seven times while in custody. He requested permission to see his mother and also an attorney but was refused. His mother finally located him and she was also told that she could not see him until the investigation was completed. She was, however, finally permitted to see him about 6:30 p. m. in the evening of April 13, 1951, and later that same evening about 8:30 Sen signed a confession written up by one of the police officers. In it he implicated the other two defendants, who had also been apprehended. The following day all three defendants were taken to the prosecutor's office in Detroit where Sen made a very complete and full confession, stating in detail what occurred. In this second confession Sen stated that no promises had been held out to him; that his answers were free and voluntary; and that he was aware of his constitutional privilege not to answer the questions. Both Louzon and Long became very angry when Sen made this confession at the prosecutor's office and they were permitted to leave the room.

The trial judge properly conducted a preliminary examination in the absence of the jury to determine the voluntary character of the confessions prior to their admission to the jury. People v. Prestidge, 182 Mich. 80, 148 N.W. 347; People v. Dudgeon, 229 Mich. 26, 201 N.W. 355. Defendant Sen claimed that he volunteered to accompany the officers to the police station the afternoon they stopped him but after being interrogated he was pushed into a cell which had only a bench and a steel sheet for a bed. Sen testified that he was cold and could not sleep because the steel sheet was not provided with a mattress, a pillow, or blankets. He stated that the next morning he was served chili but received no spoon. He could not, or did not, eat the chili. The following day he was served eggs and potatoes that were cold. He claimed that all the meals were unpalatable. He was able to drink the coffee. He made no claim whatsoever that any physical violence was used or that he was subjected to constant interrogation. The trial judge very carefully went into the details when Sen stated that the entire confession was untrue and that he signed in order to be released. Upon questioning, Sen admitted that he was responsible for the statement in the confession that he drove his car toward the Lancaster Theatre and turned into an alley and let Louzon and Long out of the car; also, that they all had 'handkerchiefs over their faces.' The absurdity of his claim that the confession was all made up by the officers is shown by these admissions. He also claimed that he signed the confession because the officers told him that they were after Louzon and Long and not after him as he did not have the record that the other two had. Sen further testified that the officers told him that they would try to get him off with probation. The judge pertinently asked him why he would want probation if he had committed no crime. At the conclusion of the preliminary examination the trial judge stated that both confessions would be received into evidence and the question of their voluntary character would be submitted to the jury. This was proper in view of the conflicting testimony, People v. Crow, 304 Mich. 529, 8 N.W.2d 164; People v. Cavanaugh, 246 Mich. 680, 225 N.W. 501; People v. Dudgeon, 229 Mich. 26, 201 N.W. 355.

Many decisions are cited to the effect that confessions obtained through physical violence or intimidation through threat of harm, promises, inducements or hope of reward, or a method known as 'sweating' are inadmissible. People v. Brockett, 195 Mich. 169, 161 N.W. 991; People v. Cavanaugh, 246 Mich. 680, 225 N.W. 501; People v. Prestidge, 182 Mich. 80, 148 N.W. 347. Defendants rely upon People v. Cavanaugh, supra, wherein we condemned confessions obtained through improper methods. But in that case we also stated [246 Mich. 680, 225 N.W. 503]:

'The police had testified that the confession was voluntary. Defendant had an undoubted right to lay before the jury his full claim of what the police said to him, and it was for the jury to say whether, under all the circumstances, the confession was voluntary.'

In People v. Prestidge, supra, we stated in 182 Mich. at page 82, 148 N.W. at page 347:

'If the preliminary testimony made it clear either that the statement claimed to have bee made was voluntary or involuntary, it was the duty of the trial court to admit or reject it. If the testimony left the question in doubt, it was the duty of the court to admit it, and leave the question to the jury under proper instructions to determine whether it was voluntarily made.'

In People v. Moshier, 306 Mich. 714, 721, 11 N.W.2d 300, 303, we stated:

'Nellie Brooks and the defendant were both sworn and testified before the jury. Their testimony was squarely contradictory. The jury is the sole judge as to the credibility of witnesses. The jury heard the testimony of these witnesses, of the State police officers who obtained the confession, and others who corroborated the people's claim of guilt. It was not for this court to say that the jury erred in accepting the defendant's confession as true. The issue was adequately before the jury, whether to believe the defendant's detailed confession of the crime, or her subsequent testimony at the trial that it was merely a story she concocted at Nellie Brooks' suggestion. The court did not err in refusing to set aside the verdict, and in denying a new trial, on this asserted ground.' (Italics supplied.)

It is true that the United States Supreme Court in capital cases has for many years condemned the use of confessions where force, mental intimidation, promises, or inducements were held out to obtain the confession but in the most recent case of Stein v. People of State of New York 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 1092, the court, in the majority opinion, stated as follows:

'Interrogation is not inherently coercive, as is physical violence. Interrogation does have social value in solving crime, as physical force does not. By their own answers many suspects clear themselves, and the information they give frequently points out another who is guilty....