People v. Lucas

• Decision Date: 02 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2014–2635 S CR.,2014–2635 S CR.
• Citation: 43 N.Y.S.3d 768 (Table)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John M. LUCAS, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

43 N.Y.S.3d 768 (Table)

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,
v.
John M. LUCAS, Respondent.

No. 2014–2635 S CR.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Dept., 9 and 10 Judicial Dist.

Aug. 2, 2016.

Appeal from an order of the Justice Court of the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County (Edward D. Burke, J.), dated August 6, 2014. The order granted the branch of defendant's motion seeking to suppress evidence obtained as a result of defendant's allegedly unlawful arrest, and dismissed an accusatory instrument charging him with driving while ability impaired by drugs.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to suppress evidence obtained as a result of defendant's allegedly unlawful arrest is denied, the accusatory instrument is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Justice Court for a determination of the remaining branch of defendant's motion to suppress, based on an alleged denial of his right to counsel, and for all further proceedings.

Defendant was charged, in a misdemeanor information, with driving while ability impaired by drugs (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[4] ). He was separately charged, in a simplified traffic information, with speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180[d] ), which charge is not at issue on this appeal.

Defendant moved to suppress "all evidence and information procured through the questioning, testing and observation of the defendant while he was in custody at Southampton Police Headquarters ." At a "probable cause" hearing, a police officer testified that, at approximately 12:15 a.m. on June 24, 2012, he had observed defendant driving a vehicle at a speed of 51 miles per hour in an area where the speed limit was 30 miles per hour. The officer stopped defendant's vehicle. The officer detected the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. Defendant's speech was slurred, and his eyes appeared bloodshot and glassy. After defendant failed several field sobriety tests, the officer arrested defendant on a charge of driving while intoxicated. However, when defendant was given a breathalyzer test, his blood alcohol content was 0.00. Defendant was subsequently charged with driving while ability impaired by drugs, after undergoing a "drug influence evaluation."

After the hearing, the Justice Court concluded that defendant was lawfully stopped for speeding and driving while intoxicated. However, the court found that the arrest for driving while ability impaired by drugs was not based on probable cause. The court thus determined that "[t]he arrest is suppressed," and dismissed the accusatory instrument charging defendant with driving while ability impaired by drugs. The court, "viewing the evidence or lack thereof in the light most favorable to the prosecution," found "that it will not be legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," and "upon the exercise of [its] factual review power," the court was "satisfied that a verdict of guilt will be against the weight of the evidence," citing CPL 470.15(5).

The "legality of an arrest ... is not conditioned upon whether the arresting officer specified the correct subdivision of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, or upon his belief as to which subdivision had been violated. All that is required is that [the arresting officer] have had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192" (People v. Hilker, 133 A.D.2d 986, 987–988 [1987] ; see People v. Gramajo, 49 Misc.3d 131[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 51435[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2015]; People v. Andrews, 30 Misc.3d 133[A], 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 52357[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]; People v. Gingras, 22 Misc.3d 22, 24, 871 N.Y.S.2d 812 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008] [state trooper properly arrested the defendant for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, "irrespective of the particular offenses ultimately charged"] ). Based on the odor of alcohol emanating from defendant's breath, his slurred speech and bloodshot and glassy eyes, and his failure to properly perform field sobriety tests, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant on a charge of driving while intoxicated, even though defendant was ultimately charged with driving while ability impaired by drugs. Thus, the Justice Court improperly granted suppression of evidence on the basis that there was no probable cause for defendant's arrest.

In any event, the Justice Court could not "order dismissal as a consequence of suppression" (People v. Yendo, 30 Misc.3d 135[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op 50140[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2011]; People v. Davidson, 9 Misc.3d 131[A], 2005 N.Y. Slip Op 51593[U], *1 [App Term, 2d...