People v. Lujan

• Decision Date: 26 February 2014
• Citation: 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01341,980 N.Y.S.2d 815,114 A.D.3d 963
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. John Freddy LUJAN, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

114 A.D.3d 963

980 N.Y.S.2d 815

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 01341

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.John Freddy LUJAN, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Feb. 26, 2014.

Clinton W. Calhoun III, White Plains, N.Y., for appellant.

Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Laurie Sapakoff and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.

Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Zambelli, J.), both rendered March 5, 2013, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree under Indictment No. 12–01273, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree under Superior Court Information No. 12–01350, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's failure to advise him about the immigration consequences of his pleas of guilty ( see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284). In evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the courts look to the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, or whether the defendant received meaningful representation ( see People v. Heidgen, 22 N.Y.3d 259, 278, 980 N.Y.S.2d 320, 3 N.E.3d 657;People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 156, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213). “[A] defendant's showing of prejudice [is] a significant but not indispensable element” in determining whether the standard of meaningful representation was achieved ( People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 284, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883;see People v. Heidgen, 22 N.Y.3d at 278–279, 980 N.Y.S.2d 320, 3 N.E.3d 657;People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 714, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584). In the context of a Padilla claim, a defendant “must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances” ( Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. at 372, 130 S.Ct. 1473;see People v. Picca, 97 A.D.3d 170, 178, 947 N.Y.S.2d 120).

Here, the defendant failed to demonstrate that a decision to reject the pleas would have been rational under the circumstances ( cf. People v. Picca, 97 A.D.3d at 184–185, 947 N.Y.S.2d 120). Since there was no reasonable probability that the result would have been different and that he would not have taken the pleas, the defendant's claim also fails under the federal standard ( see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674).

Although a claim that a plea of guilty was not voluntary survives a valid waiver of the right to appeal ( see People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022;People v. Persaud, 109 A.D.3d 626, 970 N.Y.S.2d 324), the defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that his pleas of guilty were not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent since he did not move to withdraw his pleas on this ground prior to the imposition of sentence ( see CPL 220.60[3]; People v. Clarke, 93 N.Y.2d 904, 906, 690 N.Y.S.2d 501, 712...