People v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 28 December 1989
• Citation: 550 N.Y.S.2d 104,156 A.D.2d 884
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William F. LYNCH, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 104

550 N.Y.S.2d 104

156 A.D.2d 884

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William F. LYNCH, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Dec. 28, 1989.

Robert D. Cook, Kingston, for appellant.

Michael Kavanagh, Dist. Atty. (Joan Lamb, of counsel), Kingston, for respondent.

Before KANE, J.P., and CASEY, WEISS, MERCURE and HARVEY, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Vogt, J.), rendered April 11, 1986, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of rape in the first degree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape in the first degree in full satisfaction of all charges pending against him in accordance with the provisions of a plea-bargain arrangement. Following extensive questioning by County Court, the plea was accepted. At sentencing, defendant made application to withdraw his plea. After inquiring as to the reasons for defendant's request, County Court adjourned the proceedings for one week to enable defendant to consult with his attorney and prepare a written motion. On the adjourned date, in the absence of a written motion and after further inquiry, County Court denied defendant's motion. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 7 to 21 years. This appeal followed.

Initially, defendant's contention that County Court erred in denying his application to withdraw his plea is not persuasive. Clearly, it is within the discretion of the trial court to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea (CPL 220.60[3]; People v. Jackson, 130 A.D.2d 810, 811, 514 N.Y.S.2d 834). Here, the record of the plea proceedings confirms that defendant was fully apprised of his rights and the consequences of his guilty plea, that he acknowledged to the court that he was pleading guilty of his own free will, and that he detailed his commission of the crime without apparent hesitation and without protestations of innocence. Under these circumstances, defendant's belated and conclusory claims of innocence, without basis in the record, presented County Court with an issue of credibility which it could properly resolve against him (see, People v. Dixon, 29 N.Y.2d 55, 323 N.Y.S.2d 825, 272 N.E.2d 329; People v. Fridell, 93 A.D.2d 866, 461 N.Y.S.2d 375; People v. Eagan, 90 A.D.2d 909, 456 N.Y.S.2d 872). Thus, we cannot say that County Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's application (see, People v. Jones, 95 A.D.2d 869, 870, 463 N.Y.S.2d 888).

Next, we reject the contention that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. It has recently been noted that "when a defendant receives an advantageous plea and the record does not cast doubt on the apparent effectiveness of counsel, defendant is deemed to have been furnished meaningful representation" (People v. Mayes, 133 A.D.2d 905, 906, 520 N.Y.S.2d 276; see, People v. Kalakowski, 120 A.D.2d 763, 764, 501 N.Y.S.2d 499, lv. denied 68 N.Y.2d 669, 505 N.Y.S.2d 1034, 496 N.E.2d 692). The record here and the favorable plea negotiation, significantly reducing defendant's exposure, demonstrate that defendant received meaningful...