People v. Lyons
| Decision Date | 13 May 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 25732,25732 |
| Citation | 521 P.2d 1265,185 Colo. 112 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Carl LYONS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., E. Ronald Beeks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave, III, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal from a sentence of from twenty-five years to life and dismissal of proceedings under the 'Colorado Sex Offenders Act of 1968,' 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 39--19--1 et seq. The only issue presented by appellant Lyons is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel affords him the right to require a trial court to adopt a previous finding in another case--before a different district judge--that he was a threat to the members of the public under section 39--19--11(2). In our view, however, the doctrine of collateral estoppel has no application, for we hold that under the Act the district court has the option of sentencing or committing a defendant who has been found to be a threat to the public.
Appellant has a long and varied history of sexual offenses. In late 1971, he was arrested and charged with numerous sexual offenses. The charges evolved into two distinct criminal actions. In case No. 16492, a two-count information, he was charged in count I with taking indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen on October 11, 1971, and, in count II, with unnatural carnal copulation occurring on the same date. In case No. 16488, he was charged with statutory rape, allegedly committed on May 31, 1971. In both cases, Lyons plead guilty and filed a motion to proceed under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, 1969, Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 39--19--5. Because these offenses were the result of distinctly different acts, they were not joined in the same proceeding, Crim.P. 13, 14.
In case No. 16492, which was resolved first, the district court determined that Lyons constituted a threat of bodily harm to members of the public as provided in section 39--19--11(2) and ordered that he be committed pursuant to section 39--19--3 from one day to life. Contrary to the action of the judge then sitting in the district court, a different judge terminated the proceedings under the Sexual Offenders Act, section 39--19--9, in case No. 16488 on appeal here. The judge, making an independent determination, found that Lyons did not constitute a threat to the members of the public and sentenced him to from 25 years to life within the range of punishment for statutory rape as provided by C.R.S.1963, 40--2--28. It is this sentence which is the basis for the appeal.
Appellant's position is that the district court proceeding in case No. 16492, which culminated in his being sentenced under the Sex Offenders Act, permits him to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel so as to bind the district court in the dispositional phase in case No. 16488.
As one of several options afforded a court in determining punishment after conviction, the legislature in 1968 enacted a comprehensive scheme for the processing of sex offenders. 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 39--19--1 et seq. Two sections are of importance here. By section 39--19--3, the legislature vested the district courts with discretion to order commitment of a sex offender 'in lieu of the sentence otherwise provided by law.' In People v. Sanchez (1974), Colo., 520 P.2d 751, we held that this section, read together with section 39--19--11(2), established that the district courts could not give a defendant, who was found to constitute a threat of bodily harm to the public, a sentence of commitment And a...
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Wimberly v. Williams
...term, the sentencing court could not impose a "concurrent term for the underlying offense." Id. ; see also People v. Lyons , 185 Colo. 112, 521 P.2d 1265, 1267 (1974) (stating that Sanchez "established that the district courts could not give a defendant ... a sentence of commitment and a se......
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...v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); see also People v. Medina, 193 Colo. 190, 564 P.2d 119 (1977); People v. Lyons, 185 Colo. 112, 521 P.2d 1265 (1974); Jordan v. People, 161 Colo. 54, 419 P.2d 656 (1966); Ray v. People, 160 Colo. 173, 415 P.2d 328 (1966); Raullerson v. People, ......
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Christensen v. People, 93SA194
...legislature as one of several options available to trial courts for the sentencing of convicted sex offenders. People v. Lyons, 185 Colo. 112, 114, 521 P.2d 1265, 1267 (1974). We also examine the role of the parole board under the The Sex Offenders Act is set out in sections 16-13-201 to -2......
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People v. Breazeale
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