People v. M.A.

• Decision Date: 22 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 64476,64476
• Citation: 124 Ill.Dec. 511,124 Ill.2d 135,529 N.E.2d 492
• Parties: , 124 Ill.Dec. 511 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. M.A., a Minor, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 492

529 N.E.2d 492

124 Ill.2d 135, 124 Ill.Dec. 511

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. M.A., a Minor, Appellee.

No. 64476.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 22, 1988.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Terence M. Madsen, Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago (Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, Kenneth T. McCurry, Steven J. Zick, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellant.

Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Alison Edwards, Aaron Meyers, Marijane Placek, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee.

Howard H. Braverman, General Counsel, Dennis Rendleman, Asst. Counsel, Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Springfield, Elizabeth E. Clarke, Juvenile Justice Coordinator, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for amicus curiae, Illinois State Bar Ass'n.

Justice RYAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, M.A., a minor, was arrested and charged with the offense of unlawful use of weapons on school grounds. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(12).) Pursuant to the automatic-transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(6)(a) (now Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 37, par. 805-4(6)(a))), the defendant's case was transferred to criminal court so that he could be prosecuted as an adult. Following a hearing, the trial court held that the automatic-transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(6)(a)) is unconstitutional as applied to the charge of unlawful use of weapons on school grounds (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(12)). Because the statute was declared unconstitutional as applied, this case is here on direct appeal by the State. (See 107 Ill.2d R. 603.) The Illinois State Bar Association was granted leave to file an amicus curiae brief.

The defendant asserts that section 2-7(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act is invalid because it deprives him of due process and equal protection of the laws. Section 2-7(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:

"(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 2-2 of this Act shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or violation of the provisions of subsection 24-1(a)(12) of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended. These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted pursuant to the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(6)(a).)

The italicized language was added by an amendment in 1985, adding the offense of unlawful use of weapons on school grounds (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(12)) to those offenses required to be transferred automatically to the jurisdiction of the criminal court. (Pub. Act 84-1075, eff. Dec. 2, 1985.) The statute, Unlawful Use of Weapons (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(12)), provides in relevant part:

"(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

(12) Carries or possesses on or about his person any bludgeon, black-jack, sling-shot, sand-club, sandbag, metal knuckles, switchblade knife, tear gas gun projector bomb or any object containing noxious liquid gas, pistol or revolver or other firearm, bomb, grenade, bottle or other container containing an explosive substance of over one-quarter ounce, or cartridge while in the building or on the grounds of any elementary or secondary school, community college, college or university. * * * "

The State raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in holding that it is unconstitutional for the legislature to provide that 15 and 16 year olds charged with unlawful use of weapons on school grounds shall be automatically transferred to the criminal court for disposition.

The trial court found there was no rational basis for automatically transferring 15 or 16 year olds charged with unlawful use of weapons on school grounds when other 15 or 16 year olds charged with attempted murder or other Class X felonies are entitled to a hearing before the case is transferred. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 37, par. 702-7(3).) The trial court concluded that to automatically transfer juveniles charged with unlawful use of weapons on school grounds without a hearing violates due process and equal protection.

The defendant claims that the trial court correctly found that the inclusion of unlawful use of weapons on school grounds in the class of crimes excluded from the Juvenile Court Act violates equal protection because other similarly situated defendants fall within the scope of the Juvenile Court Act. Additionally, the defendant urges this court to apply the strict scrutiny standard to juveniles because as a class they are uniquely powerless. In support of this assertion, defendant relies on the fact that minors have no right to vote. (See also Stern, The Burger Court and the Diminishing Constitutional Rights of Minors: A Brief Overview, 1985 Ariz.St.L.J. 865, 894.) The defendant asserts that juveniles fall within the definition of a "suspect class" set forth in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 40: a class "regulated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritorian political process."

Courts, however, have routinely held that age is not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis, and thus the rational basis standard applies (See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520; Trafelet v. Thompson (7th Cir.1979), 594 F.2d 623; Shorez v. City of Dacono, Colorado (D.C.Colo.1983), 574 F.Supp. 130.) The Supreme Court has held that strict scrutiny is appropriate for classifications based upon "immutable characteristics determined solely by accident of birth" such as sex, race, and national origin because these classes have been historically discriminated against politically. (See Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), 411 U.S. 677, 685, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1769, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 591.) While it is true that juveniles are not entitled to vote, they have not been historically discriminated against and age is clearly not an immutable characteristic. Thus, this court's prior holdings that the rational basis standard is applicable to juveniles comports with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See In re Sekeres (1971), 48 Ill.2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7.

In People v. J.S. (1984), 103 Ill.2d 395, 83 Ill.Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090, this court upheld the validity of section 2-6 as it read before the 1985 amendment, and it is only the provision added by that amendment that is under consideration in this case. In People v. J.S., this court applied the rational basis test, which we have indicated above is applicable here. Also in People v. J.S., the defendants argued, as does the defendant in this case, that the classification of the crimes was arbitrary. In People v. J.S., this court held that the inclusion of murder, rape, deviate sexual assault, and armed robbery with a firearm--to the exclusion of other Class X felonies--in the class of cases in which minor defendants over 15 years of age would be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961, and not the Juvenile Court Act, was a rational classification.

The defendant here also asserts that even under the rational basis test the classification is unconstitutional because the legislature has arbitrarily denied the defendant a benefit (treatment under the Juvenile Court Act) which is granted to others who are similarly situated. Specifically, the defendant argues that a juvenile who is charged with unlawful use of weapons on school grounds commits intrinsically the same quality of offense whether he is on school grounds or at a park district playground. Although the defendant acknowledges that the legislature has the authority to define the limits of juvenile court jurisdiction, he asserts that the distinction which is drawn in section 2-7(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act, which includes unlawful use of weapons on school grounds, but not other similar offenses in the class of cases in which a minor defendant shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code, is arbitrary. We do not agree.

The juvenile court system was created by the legislature. "Nowhere in the Federal or in this State's constitution is there found the right to be treated as a juvenile for jurisdictional purposes." (People v. J.S. (1984), 103 Ill.2d 395, 402, 83 Ill.Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090.) In determining whether the classification violates the equal protection clause, it must be noted that the classification is presumed valid and that the party challenging the classification has the burden of showing invalidity. (People v. McCabe (1971), 49 Ill.2d 338, 340, 275 N.E.2d 407.) The classification will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection if facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. (Begich v. Industrial Comm'n (1969), 42 Ill.2d 32, 36, 245 N.E.2d 457.) "Whether the enactment is wise or unwise; * * * whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, and whether the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the honest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance." (Thillens, Inc. v. Morey (1957), 11 Ill.2d 579, 593, 144 N.E.2d 735.) Thus we must be concerned with the purpose of the classification and whether a rational basis exists to justify the classification. McCabe, 49 Ill.2d at 341, 275 N.E.2d 407.

The State asserts that the legislature has drawn a rational distinction because the presence of weapons on school grounds could lead to a...