Sekeres, In re
| Decision Date | 21 May 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 43510,43510 |
| Citation | 270 N.E.2d 7,48 Ill.2d 431 |
| Parties | In re Elvira SEKERS, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Elvira SEKERES, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Patrick T. Murphy and Lewis A. Wenzell, Chicago, and Barry E. Barnes, The District of Columbia, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (Morton Friedman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Novelle and Michael J. Goldstein, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
This is an appeal from an order of the Juvenile Division of the circuit court of Cook County committing the defendant, Elvira Sekeres, to the custody of the Department of Corrections. The presence of constitutional questions sustains this direct appeal. 43 Ill.2d R. 302, Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, c. 110A, § 302.
On August 13, 1969, the defendant, who was then 15 years old, was adjudged to be a 'minor in need of supervision', as defined in section 2--3 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 37, par. 702--3), for frequently absenting herself from home, and she was placed on six months' probation.
Later, pursuant to a delinquency petition filed by her probation officer indicating that the defendant had violated her probation by truanting herself from school, defendant's probation was extended and hearing on said petition was continued to June 30, 1970. A clinical examination was ordered. However, on April 28, 1970, pursuant to a supplemental petition filed by defendant's probation officer, the court determined that the defendant had continued her truancy in violation of the terms of her probation. The court found the defendant to be a delinquent minor and revoked her probation. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 37, par. 702-- 2(b).) She was committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections which placed her in the Illinois State Training School for Girls. Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 37, par. 705--10.
On July 21, 1970, the court directed the guardian to report his custodianship, with the defendant present, and the court was informed she was due for parole. The defendant was paroled in August and released to the custody of her mother. Within two weeks the defendant again ran away, was apprehended and returned to the custody of the Department of Corrections which returned her to the Geneva School.
The defendant contends that the finding of delinquency and subsequent confinement subjected her to cruel and unusual punishment for noncriminal acts in violation of the United States and Illinois constitutions. To support this contention defendant argues that her conduct, I.e., truancy and running away from home was not a criminal offense and as such she should not be subject to confinement. Therefore such confinement is a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment made applicable to the States by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758.
We disagree. The defendant was not adjudged a delinquent because of her truancy from school or running away from home, but rather because she violated a lawful court order. In a recent decision this court held that such a violation and subsequent commitment of a juvenile to an appropriate State agency is not unconstitutional because 'To hold otherwise would substantially thwart one of the salutary purposes of the Juvenile Court Act, Viz. to provide for the rehabilitation of delinquent minors at a stage before they have embarked upon the commission of substantive criminal offenses * * * and it (the State) would be largely hamstrung if it were precluded from depriving incorrigible minors of their liberty in the absence of the proof of their commission of substantive crimes.' In re Presley, 47 Ill.2d 50, at 56, 264 N.E.2d 177, at 180.
The defendant further argues that she is being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because she may potentially be confined until she reaches the age of 21 and that the record of these proceedings will follow her for the rest of her life. The former argument was advanced in In re Presley, in which the court concluded that the defendant had ample recourse to obtain her release under Illinois law either by court action under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 37, par. 705--11(2)) or by the defendant's own application for a change of custody. Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 37, par. 705--8(2).
Moreover, defendant's fear that her record will follow her for the rest of her life is...
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ALJ, Matter of, C-90-9
...the dissent of Justice Craven, id. 29 Ill.Dec. at 390, at 1073); In re Blakes, 4 Ill.App.3d 567, 281 N.E.2d 454 (1972); In re Sekeres, 48 Ill.2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1008, 92 S.Ct. 691, 30 L.Ed.2d 656 (1972); In re Presley, 47 Ill.2d 50, 264 N.E.2d 177 (1970). The......
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J.M., In re
...control); In re Baker (1978), 71 Ill.2d 480, 17 Ill.Dec. 676, 376 N.E.2d 1005 (minor repeatedly ran away from home); In re Sekeres (1971), 48 Ill.2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7 (minor frequently absented herself from home).) Thus, it is not adequate to prove a minor is absent from home or beyond his ......
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People v. M.A.
...the rational basis standard is applicable to juveniles comports with decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See In re Sekeres (1971), 48 Ill.2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7. In People v. J.S. (1984), 103 Ill.2d 395, 83 Ill.Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090, this court upheld the validity of section 2-6......
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T.L.B., In Interest of
...upon this issue in In re Presley (1970), 47 Ill.2d 50, 264 N.E.2d 177, the rule of which was thereafter followed in In re Sekeres (1971), 48 Ill.2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7. In Presley, the issue was the constitutionality of a commitment to the Youth Commission, raised by a motion to dismiss in th......