People v. Mack
Citation | 258 N.E.2d 703,26 N.Y.2d 311,310 N.Y.S.2d 292 |
Parties | , 258 N.E.2d 703 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James MACK, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 16 April 1970 |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Richard A. Levy and Milton Adler, New York City, for appellant.
Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (Frank Di Lalla, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division, Second Department, which affirmed a judgment of Supreme Court, Kings County, convicting defendant (after the denial of his motion to suppress) on his plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon as a misdemeanor.
At the suppression hearing Patrolman James Stevens was the only witness for the People. He testified that on October 20, 1968 he and a brother officer were investigating narcotic activity in the area of Jefferson Street and Howard Avenue in Brooklyn. At approximately 2:30 P.M. and while the officers were sitting in an unmarked car, a radio patrol car with two uniformed patrolmen pulled up beside them. One of the uniformed officers got out and informed Stevens that three burglaries had been committed in the area that day and that 'two males * * * had been seen in the vicinity of this block that we were sitting in'. The uniformed officer then gave the following descriptions to Stevens and his partner:
'The Court: What description did he give you?
'The Witness: He gave us one male was six feet and wearing a camel hair overcoat with a brown hat.
'The Court: White or Negro?
At 2:45 P.M., approximately 15 minutes after the uniformed officers had left, Stevens observed two men, the defendant and another, who fit the descriptions he had been given. Without taking any immediate action at this time, Stevens testified to the following events leading to the defendant's arrest:
'Q. What did you observe? What did you see? A. I saw the defendant and this other person walk into an apartment house. They stayed in there approximately 15 seconds. Came out. Looked in both directions and continued to walk in our direction and walked into another building. This time, the other person with the defendant came out first, looked up and down the street, looked back behind him, and then the defendant came out, and they continued to walk into our direction.
'Q. How long did they stay in that building? A. Approximately 15 to 20 seconds.
'Q. And you saw them go into two buildings at this point? A. That is correct.
'Q. Did you then observe anything further? A. At the third--another building, the defendant walked into, and the other person with him stood out on the stoop or the doorway looking up and down, and at this particular time, I got out of the car and started to walk in their direction on the opposite side of the street. There came a time when the defendant and the other person with him came off the stoop and started walking in my direction on the other side of the street. I walked up to a point of where I had passed the defendant and the other person, crossed over to their side of the street, and started walking directly behind them. There came a time when my brother officer had crossed over onto the side of the street where the defendant and the other person were walking, and he approached them from the front, and I saw he had his shield in his left hand, and his hand on his revolver, and says,
'Q. At that time, where were you? A. At this time, I was directly behind the defendant James Mack.
'Q. What were you doing at that time? A. At that particular time, I told the defendant to freeze.
'The Court: What does that mean?
'The Witness: I then told him to remove his hands from his coat pockets very slowly which the defendant did.
'The Court: How was the defendant dressed?
'The Witness: The defendant had on a camel hair overcoat and a brown hat.'
'The Court: Is that in the form of a frisk?
After the defendant testified, the motion to suppress was denied. The court stated:
On appeal the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed without opinion (30 A.D.2d 776, 292 N.Y.S.2d 835).
Firstly, as stated earlier, Officer Stevens was the sole witness for the People. Since the reasonable suspicion giving rise to his stopping the defendant was at least in part based upon the information relayed by the unidentified uniformed police officer, defendant thought he was entitled to the production of this officer. The suppression Judge, however, thought otherwise and denied his motion. The defendant contends that the uniformed officer should have been produced because part of his information, the detailed description, was apparently not even a result of his own observations and thus his testimony was necessary to establish that the description was something more than mere rumor or unfounded speculation. Accepting this argument for the moment, the failure to produce the uniformed officer did not constitute reversible error for, even absent the detailed description, the knowledge of the occurrence of three burglaries in the area that day, coupled with the furtive conduct of the defendant and his companion, was sufficient to formulate a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention under the standards established by section 180--a of the Code of Criminal Procedure or at common law. Moreover, even if the description is a necessary ingredient to find reasonable suspicion herein, our recent decision in People v. Arthurs, 24 N.Y.2d 688, 691, 301 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617, 249 N.E.2d 462, 463, recognizes that the burden on the People to produce the source and establish the reliability of information precipitating police action is quite different in the area of detentions based on reasonable suspicion, than in the area of arrests based on probable cause. We stated: (Supra, at pp. 692--693, 301 N.Y.S.2d at p. 617, 249 N.E.2d at p. 465).
Accordingly, at that point in time when Officer Stevens first detained the defendant, his actions were in all respects proper. Of course, we must now turn to the primary question presented-- the propriety of the limited search for weapons more popularly known as the 'frisk'.
In People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32, we stated:
'And as the right to stop and inquire is to be justified for a cause less conclusive than that which would sustain an arrest, so the right to frisk may be justified As an incident to inquiry upon grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not initially sustain a search.' (Supra, at pp. 446, 447, 252 N.Y.S.2d at p. 461, 201 N.E.2d at p. 35; emphasis added).
It is evident that the rule contemplated in Rivera was that because of the inherent danger to a police officer in confronting an individual he reasonably suspects to be a criminal, the officer should have the right to frisk as an incident to that inquiry so that he may neutralize any danger to himself or to others. The Legislature, however, in enacting section 180--a of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court in deciding Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, seem to have tempered the 'incidental frisk theory' of Rivera by the establishment of a standard justifying the frisk separate and apart from that which will justify the detention (cf. People v. Rosemond, 26 N.Y.2d 101, 308 N.Y.S.2d 836, 257 N.E.2d 23).
Section 180--a provides:
'1. A police officer...
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