People v. Macrander, 86SA232

Decision Date28 March 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86SA232,86SA232
Citation756 P.2d 356
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jason L. MACRANDER, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Robert R. Gallagher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Bruce H. Rabun, Deputy Dist. Atty., Littleton, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Linda Perkins, Deputy State Public Defenders, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

ROVIRA, Justice.

This case involves a dispute over the existence and terms of an alleged plea agreement between the People and the defendant, Jason L. Macrander. The district court found that the parties had entered into a valid plea agreement under the terms of which the charges in Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 85CR954 would be dismissed subject to Macrander's pleading guilty to one class 4 felony in Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 85CR1153, as well as to one class 4 felony in a related Denver District Court case. The court also determined that the defendant's due process rights would be violated if the agreement were not enforced, and accordingly, it dismissed the charges against Macrander in Case No. 85CR954. We affirm.

I.

On September 30, 1985, Macrander was arrested by Englewood police officers investigating reports of a prowler in a residential area. He was subsequently charged with several counts of burglary and criminal trespass in Arapahoe County District Court Case No. 85CR1153. 1

At the time of Macrander's arrest, the Englewood Police Department had accumulated between 50 and 70 reports of similar burglaries committed by an unknown person whom authorities dubbed the "Englewood cat burglar." Because of similarities between Macrander's and the Englewood cat burglar's methods of operation, Detective John Collins questioned Macrander regarding the unresolved burglaries. Although Macrander denied being the Englewood cat burglar, he confessed to having committed at least three burglaries. After Collins promised that Macrander's cooperation "would be duly noted to the Court," the defendant agreed to show Collins the houses he had burglarized. Shortly thereafter, Macrander identified two houses he had burglarized in Englewood and showed Denver detectives a house he had burglarized in Denver. 2 Englewood authorities later filed a complaint against defendant on October 24, 1985, Case No. 85CR954, charging Macrander with two counts of second-degree burglary, § 18-4-203(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986), class 3 felonies, and one count of theft, § 18-4-401(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986), a class 2 misdemeanor. Denver authorities filed similar charges against Macrander arising out of his activities in Denver. 3

A preliminary hearing in Case No. 85CR1153 was set for December 5, 1985 before the Arapahoe County Court. Deputy District Attorney Alan Molk and Robert Steiert, defendant's counsel, stipulated on the record to the following agreement:

MR. STEIERT: The agreement is that Mr. Macrander has agreed to waive his preliminary hearing here today. In return, the district attorney is agreeing to make the following offer to Mr. Macrander. That is that they are willing to drop all charges against Mr. Macrander, except for one Class 4 felony, to which Mr. Macrander would plead guilty. And there will be a stipulation that any sentence Mr. Macrander would receive in that Class 4 felony would run concurrent to any sentence he would receive in a case now pending in Denver.

....

Let me clarify the offer, after speaking to Mr. Molk. The offer is that the district attorney's office will not file any new charges here in Arapahoe County against Mr. Macrander which would arise out of the incidents mentioned in this case or out of any of the incidents to--which Mr. Macrander has already discussed with members of law enforcement here in Arapahoe and in Denver; and furthermore, that they would not file any charges arising out of any cases on which they first became involved in looking at Mr. Macrander as a suspect, because of his cooperation with law enforcement agencies, or any statements he has made.

MR. MOLK: The whole idea behind that is, if for some reason detectives from police agencies from Arapahoe County speak to the defendant in this case and he cooperates with them with regard to his involvement or someone else's involvement in burglaries or criminal practices, that we would not file charges against him, if he is the one who initiated and gave us the information. If, however, the police department independently arrives at certain information that leads to the defendant's involvement and they arrive at that information independently of anything he has provided to the police department, then we would be able to file those charges against him. It's a little convoluted.

At the time the defendant and the People entered into the agreement in Case No. 85CR1153, neither Steiert nor Molk was aware that charges in Case No. 85CR954 had already been filed and were still pending. 4 When Steiert became aware of Case No. 85CR954 in January 1986, he contacted the district attorney's office and requested that the charges in that case be dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. The district attorney's office, however, took the position that the plea agreement only prohibited the People from filing additional charges after December 5, 1985, and that because the charges in Case No. 85CR954 were filed in October, they were not included in the terms of the plea agreement.

The defendant moved for an order enforcing the plea agreement and to dismiss Case No. 85CR954. After hearing testimony from Collins, Steiert, and Molk, and reviewing the transcript of the December 5, 1985 hearing, the district court found it "clear and unequivocal that there exists a plea bargain. That plea bargain was that the Defendant would plead to two class 4 felonies, one in Denver and one in Arapahoe County." The court also found that the defendant had waived his right to a preliminary hearing and that he had entered a plea of guilty to a class 4 felony in Denver in March 1986. Holding that the defendant's right to a preliminary hearing had a constitutional foundation, the court concluded that the defendant's due process rights would be violated unless the plea agreement were enforced and thus the only relief appropriate was to order specific enforcement of the plea agreement. Accordingly, it dismissed the charges in Case No. 85CR954 and set arraignment in Case No. 85CR1153 for a later date, at which time the defendant would plead guilty to one class 4 felony and the remaining charges in Case No. 85CR1153 would be dismissed.

The People assert three grounds for error: First, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was a valid plea agreement; second, any plea agreement was unenforceable; and third, even if an enforceable plea agreement existed, the trial court erred in ordering specific performance as a remedy for the prosecution's breach.

II.

The basis for enforcing promises the prosecution makes to a defendant is found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and its requirement that an accused "be treated with 'fairness' throughout the [criminal] process...." People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922, 927 (Colo.1983), quoting Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir.1979); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1979). That right to fairness requires, in turn, that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499. The rationale of Santobello clearly extends beyond those cases in which a defendant's reliance takes the form of a guilty plea. Fisher, 657 P.2d at 927-30 (defendant relied on government's promise by participating in videotaped interview during which he discussed his commission of several crimes).

Santobello and Fisher both reflect the fundamental principle that while agreements between a defendant and the government may resemble formal contracts, it is the defendant's detrimental reliance on the government's promise--and not the presence or absence of a valid contract--that gives rise to a constitutional right to the government's performance of the contract:

Although contractual analogies will most often provide a reliable inclusive test for the existence of a constitutional right and violation, they do not necessarily provide an equally reliable exclusive test.... "[C]onstitutional decisions cannot be made to turn in favor of the government on the fortuities of communications or on a refusal to accord any substantive value to the reasonably induced expectations that the government will honor its firmly advanced proposals."

Fisher, 657 P.2d at 927, quoting Cooper, 594 F.2d at 17. Thus, an agreement's failure to satisfy the requisites of a formal contract does not preclude enforcement of the prosecution's promise. Similarly,

[A] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; it in itself is nothing more than a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or some other constitutionally protected interest.

Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984).

In light of those principles, our inquiry in determining whether a plea agreement should be enforced is directed to the following question: Did Macrander suffer some detriment in reasonable reliance on a promise by the government? If he did, then we must determine whether the appropriate remedy is to order the government to fulfill its promise.

A.

The People proffer three arguments purporting to show that the prosecution did not make a binding agreement with Macrander to dismiss the charges in Case No. 85CR954: First, because there was no "meeting of the minds" with respect to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
24 cases
  • State v. McDonnell
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • June 21, 1990
    ...a legally impermissible condition. Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 294-97 (2d Cir.1976); People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 359-61 (Colo.1988); State v. Miller, 110 Wash.2d 528, 756 P.2d 122, 126 (1988); See also State v. Schaupp, 111 Wash.2d 34, 757 P.2d 970, 972......
  • State v. Warren
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1989
    ...79 Mich.App. 714, 262 N.W.2d 890, 894 (1978); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash.2d 579, 564 P.2d 799, 801 (1977); see also People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 362 (Colo.1988) (prosecutor can, under circumstances suggesting prejudice to defendant, be barred from withdrawing from a guilty plea be......
  • People v. McCormick, 92SC334
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • October 4, 1993
    ...by performing his side of the bargain, principles of due process require the enforcement of the plea agreement. People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 359 (Colo.1988). The underlying question presented by the facts of this case is whether a defendant can enforce a plea agreement based on the pr......
  • St. James v. People
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1997
    ...the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, the promise must be fulfilled."); People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 359 (Colo.1988) (same); see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution & Defense Function § 3-4.2 at 88 (3d ed. 1993) ("A pros......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT