People v. Maddox

• Decision Date: 09 November 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 11355
• Citation: 63 Cal.Rptr. 371,67 Cal.2d 647,433 P.2d 163
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 433 P.2d 163 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Randolph MADDOX, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 371

63 Cal.Rptr. 371

67 Cal.2d 647, 433 P.2d 163

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Randolph MADDOX, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 11355.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Nov. 9, 1967.

William Randolph Maddox, Jr., in pro. per., and Don Edgar Burris, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Raymond M. Momboisse and Frank O. Bell, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him on one count of attempted escape from the custody of an officer while charged with a felony (Pen.Code, § 4532, subd. (b)) and one count of battery (Pen.Code, § 242).

The question presented is whether a defendant who properly exercises is constitutional right to represent himself is entitled to a reasonable continuance for the purpose of preparing his defense. We have concluded that upon timely request such a continuance should be granted, and that its denial in the case at bar requires the judgment to be reversed.

The record discloses the following chronology of events:

On November 10, 1965, defendant and one Larry West went on trial in department 119 of the Los Angeles Superior Court on charges of robbery and kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. Police Officer Sanders was detailed to escort them from a holding cell on the fourth floor of the Brunswig Building to the courtroom on the fifth floor. He handcuffed the prisoners to each other, and the two men started up a stairway in front of him. A brief fist fight broke out between defendant and Officer Sanders, and the latter called for help. A number of fellow officers arrived on the scene and quickly subdued defendant.

On December 27, an information was filed charging defendant with attempted escape and battery on Officer Sanders. He was not represented by counsel, and requested continuances until January 10, 1966.

On January 10, the public defender was appointed to represent defendant in this matter.

On January 14, defendant appeared and moved to represent himself in propria persona. The motion was denied. Defendant then entered a plea of not guilty, and the case was set for trial in department 105 before Judge John G. Barnes.

On March 2, defendant's petition for writ of mandate to compel observance of his right to represent himself was denied by Judge Barnes.

On March 10, the public defender moved to be relieved as counsel so that defendant could appear in propria persona. The motion was denied 'without prejudice,' and the public defender was ordered to give his copy of the preliminary hearing transcript to defendant.

On March 18, defendant's petition for writ of mandate to secure the right to represent himself was transferred from this court to the Court of Appeal, and on March 21 the petition was denied without opinion.

On March 28, the case was called for trial. At the outset of the proceedings the public defender, Mr. Spencer, renewed his motion to be relieved for the purpose of allowing defendant to proceed in propria persona. Defendant explained that Mr. Spencer had not subpoenaed a number of witnesses whom he desired to call. Judge Barnes inquired what the testimony of these witnesses would be, but defendant was reluctant to answer in the presence of the district attorney and the prospective jurors. The salient points of the colloquy are as follows:

'THE COURT: * * * Now, you have the right under the Constitution to represent yourself at this trial. We are ready for trial here this morning.

'THE DEFENDANT: Well, I am not ready, your Honor.

'THE COURT: Well, the District Attorney is ready and there's no reason why you shouldn't be ready.

'THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yes, there is, your Honor. I haven't had the opportunity to look--to go to the Law Library to prepare to subpoena any witnesses. * * *

'THE COURT: Well, this case is going to go forward, Mr. Maddox.

'THE DEFENDANT: Well, your Honor, I would like the record to show I have running objections as to prohibit any further proceedings in this case. * * *

'THE COURT: You want to continue this matter to get those witnesses, do you?

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

'THE COURT: And if you would tell me what they will testify to and who they are, I will consider your motion to continue.

'THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, like I said before, it would be highly prejudicial, not under oath, to let the DA know what my defense is at this early stage.

'THE COURT: I see no prejudice in that at all.'

Finally acknowledging that 'If you insist on representing yourself here at this trial, I can't stop you from it,' the court admonished defendant that he would receive no greater consideration by reason of his decision and ordered Mr. Spencer relieved of further duty.

Immediately thereafter the court directed the impaneling of the jury. Defendant protested, saying that 'since I have discovered that I am representing myself in this case, I am not adequately prepared either physically or mentally at this time to defend myself in this matter; therefore I would like to continue this for 60 days.' The motion was denied. Defendant thereupon moved to disqualify Judge Barnes under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, and that motion too was denied. Defendant then moved 'to prohibit any further proceedings because I'm not adequately prepared to defend myself. I have no witnesses.' The court replied that defendant previously had adequate opportunities and 'we are prepared to proceed this morning.' During the selection of the jury defendant again requested the court 'to stop right now, to dismiss the jury, to let the defendant have time to get witnesses on his behalf so he can adequately prepare the defense. * * *' The court noted the names and addresses of several witnesses mentioned by defendant, but did not grant a continuance.

The taking of testimony began after the noon recess, and the People's case was concluded the same day. The following morning defendant was able to put on the stand only one useful witness, his former codefendant West, who had been easy to find as he was incarcerated in the building in which the courtroom was situated. Most of defendant's other witnesses, however, could not be located by the process servers in time for resumption of the proceedings that day. The court denied defendant's request for a list of the names of the deputy sheriffs assigned to the Brunswig Building on November 10, 1965, whom he wished to call as witnesses to establish Officer Sanders' hostility towards him, and also denied his request for a transcript of the previous day's testimony for impeachment purposes.

Defendant then moved to dismiss, stating in part that 'I have requested transcripts--the daily transcript of this trial. I have requested a photostatic copy of the list of names of the officers that were in that building that day. I have requested to have at least five days preparation, five days time so that I could at least seek some type of legal knowledge so that I could adequately prepare myself in this case. * * * I was forced mentally and physically to go to trial to select a jury when I had no knowledge of the procedures of selecting a jury or impaneling a jury or whatsoever to do with the jury.' After further discussion the colloquy concluded:

'THE COURT: Your motions are denied.

'THE DEFENDANT: Without reason?

'THE COURT: I have my reasons for it.

'THE DEFENDANT: All right.

'THE COURT: I don't believe your motions are valid. That's the reason.'

The appeal is from the ensuing judgments of conviction.

The defendant in a criminal case has the constitutional right to waive counsel and represent himself if he knowingly and intelligently elects to do so. (Cal.Const., art. I, § 13; People v. Carter (1967) 66 A.C. 693, 699, 58 Cal.Rptr. 614, 427 P.2d 214, and cases there cited.) ¹ No question has ever been raised in this case as to defendant's competence to make that decision. Accordingly, the court erred in denying his motion to proceed in propria persona on January 14, 1966; and the error was repeated each time the subsequent efforts of defendant or the public defender to secure the observance of this right were frustrated.

The court finally allowed defendant to represent himself, but its sudden about-face on this issue occurred on the very morning the trial was to begin. The dispositive question, therefore, is whether defendant was entitled to a reasonable continuance as that point to prepare himself for trial.

The problems posed by defense requests for continuances at the start or in the course of trial have recently engaged our attention in varying contexts. (See, e.g., Jennings v. Superior Court (1957) 66 A.C. 904, 59 Cal.Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304; People v. Carter (1967) supra, 66 A.C. 693; 58 Cal.Rptr. 614, 427 P.2d 214; People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284, 417 P.2d 868.) In Jennings we reiterated that "While the determination of whether in any given case a continuance should be granted 'normally rests in the discretion of the trial court' (People v. Buckowski (1951) 37 Cal.2d 629, 631, 233 P.2d 912, 913), that discretion may not be exercised in such a manner as to deprive the defendant of a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. 'That counsel for a defendant has a right to reasonable opportunity to prepare for a trial is as fundamental as is the right to counsel.' (People v. Sarazzawski (1945) 27 Cal.2d 7, 17, 161 P.2d 934, 939; accord, Cooper v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 291, 302, 10 Cal.Rptr. 842, 359 P.2d 274.)" (Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) supra, at pp. 912--913 of 66 A.C., at p. 445 of 59 Cal.Rptr. at p. 309 of 428 P.2d quoting from People v. Murphy (1963) 59 Cal.2d 818, 825, 31 Cal.Rptr. 306, 382 P.2d 346.)

The rationale, of course, is that a counsel who has been denied the opportunity to prepare is the equivalent of no counsel at all: 'the denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to...