People v. Maiden

• Decision Date: 01 March 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 1-87-0275,1-87-0337,s. 1-87-0275
• Citation: 569 N.E.2d 120,155 Ill.Dec. 120,210 Ill.App.3d 390
• Parties: , 155 Ill.Dec. 120 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David MAIDEN and Leon Rayford, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 120

569 N.E.2d 120

210 Ill.App.3d 390, 155 Ill.Dec. 120

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David MAIDEN and Leon Rayford, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 1-87-0275, 1-87-0337.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fifth Division.

March 1, 1991.

George C. Howard, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

Jack O'Malley, Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Sara Dillery Hynes and Robyn Berman, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court.

After a bench trial, defendant Leon Rayford was found guilty of manufacture and delivery of more than 30 grams of a controlled substance (PCP) and possession thereof with intent to deliver (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1401(a)(10)) and sentenced to 10 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant David Maiden was found guilty of possession of less than 30 grams of a controlled substance (PCP) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1401(b)) and sentenced to two and-one-half years probation with the first six months served in the Cook County Department of Corrections.

The issues raised on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant Maiden's motion to suppress his statement; (2) whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the State had produced sufficient evidence to establish residency of the search premises by defendant Rayford; (3) whether the trial court erred when it found defendant Rayford guilty of a class X felony; (4) whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant Rayford's Franks motion to quash the search warrant and to produce the informant; and (5) whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant's "no knock" motion.

According to Officer Klunk of the Chicago Police Department, he went to 11664 South Vincennes Street on October 8, 1985, to execute a search warrant. Upon arrival, the officer observed defendant Maiden outside the residence. The officer was unsuccessful in his attempt to execute the warrant since defendant Maiden quickly entered the house and locked the door behind him. Officer Klunk testified that he yelled "police" and after receiving no response, he and nine other officers forcefully entered the residence. Upon entering, Officer Klunk observed defendant Maiden near the stairs leading to the basement. Officer Klunk while having his gun drawn, grabbed Maiden. Officer Klunk detected an intense odor which he thought was PCP coming from the basement and thus asked defendant Maiden, "What are you doing, what did you do, or what is the odor?" Maiden responded that he had dumped PCP downstairs. Officer Klunk then proceeded downstairs to the basement where he observed several jars containing chemicals.

While Officer Klunk proceeded to the basement, Officer Peck went upstairs to the bedroom where he found defendant Rayford in bed with a woman. Officer Peck searched the bedroom and found three "little bottle[s] that [were] crown royal--like you get drinks on the airplane full of liquid". The officer also recovered a gas bill and a bill of sale for the house in defendant Rayford's name, a tinfoil packet containing white powder, and men's clothing in the dresser drawers. Officer Peck then proceeded to the basement where he observed bottles identical to the ones recovered in the bedroom. He also recovered $28,000 in cash and two plastic bags, one containing a crushed green plant and one containing a white powder.

Prior to trial, both defendants filed a variety of pretrial motions. Defendant Maiden filed a motion to suppress his statement regarding the PCP smell emanating from the basement. Defendant Rayford moved to quash the search warrant and produce the informant and also filed a "no knock" motion claiming that the officers failed to knock and announce their office prior to forcibly entering the premises. The court denied defendant Maiden and Rayford's motions.

At trial, in addition to the above testimony, Odiest Washington, a forensic chemist for the Drug Enforcement Administration testified that he smelled PCP and ether emanating from a trap in the basement and that he observed other evidence indicating the manufacture of PCP. Jean Dietrich a chemist with the Chicago Police Department testified that she preliminarily tested the three liquor bottles that were found in the bedroom of the house, and the tests indicated the presence of PCP. She stated that the individual weight of the liquid in the bottles was 23.11 grams, 27.02 grams, and 21.85 grams. The combined weight of the bottles was 66.98 grams. Her preliminary tests of all three bottles indicated the presence of PCP, but she conclusively tested the liquid from only one of the bottles which tested positive for PCP.

Defendant Maiden rested at the close of the State's case, calling no witnesses on his behalf. Rayford testified on his own behalf. He testified that he never lived at 11664 South Vincennes, never received a bill for utility service at that address and had never been in the basement of the house on Vincennes. Ida Mae Brown then testified that she lived with defendant Rayford at the Michigan Plaza Hotel. Moreover, the manager and another employee of the hotel testified that Rayford was registered and paid rent at the hotel, but they were unaware whether Rayford actually resided there.

Defendant Maiden's first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by not suppressing his reply to Officer Klunk's question regarding the odor emanating from the basement. Specifically, Maiden contends that he was in custody when he made the statement and therefore should have been advised of his Miranda rights before any questioning.

The prosecution may not use statements of the defendant stemming from custodial interrogation unless Miranda warnings have been given. (Miranda v. Arizona (1968), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) Custodial interrogation of a defendant means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. Although Miranda rights must be given to an accused during a custodial interrogation they are not necessary where the police conduct a general on-the-scene questioning as to the facts surrounding the crime. (People v. Parks (1971), 48 Ill.2d 232, 269 N.E.2d 484, cert. denied 404 U.S. 1020, 92 S.Ct. 692, 30 L.Ed.2d 669.) In determining whether a statement was made in a custodial setting the court must evaluate whether a reasonable, innocent person would have felt free to leave. People v. Savory (1982), 105 Ill.App.3d 1023, 61 Ill.Dec. 737, 435 N.E.2d 226.

Thus, the question in this case is whether defendant Maiden was subject to general on-the-scene questioning or whether he was under custodial interrogation and thus deprived of his freedom of action. In support of his contention that he was in custody, Maiden relies on People v. Hentz (1979), 75 Ill.App.3d 526, 31 Ill.Dec. 384, 394 N.E.2d 586. In Hentz, two police officers received a radio message directing them to a Chicago address where they found the victim of a gunshot wound. After speaking with the wounded man, who stated that the defendant had shot him, the officers proceeded to the defendant's residence. When the defendant answered the door, an officer with gun drawn asked defendant what had happened. The defendant replied that he had had an argument with the victim and shot him. Although the officer admitted that he had not advised defendant of his rights prior to making the statement, he indicated that the defendant was not in custody or under arrest when he made the incriminating statements. The officer did, however, state that if the defendant attempted to run, he would have stopped him. Hentz, 75 Ill.App.3d 528, 31 Ill.Dec. 384, 394 N.E.2d 586.

The court in affirming the trial court's decision to suppress the statement, noted that this was not a crime scene questioning and the police considered the defendant a suspect prior to asking him the question. Moreover, the officers had no intention of letting defendant escape. Two police officers covered the back entrance to defendant's house and another testified that if defendant tried to run he would have been stopped. Moreover, the court stated that "of the greatest significance is the fact that at least one of the officers who greeted the defendant had his gun drawn." Based on these factors, the court determined that defendant was deprived of his freedom in a significant way and therefore should have been given his Miranda warnings prior to being questioned. Hentz, 75 Ill.App.3d at 530, 31 Ill.Dec. 384, 394 N.E.2d 586. The court reached a similar result in People v. Calderon (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 469, 57 Ill.Dec. 21, 428 N.E.2d 571, in which the court concluded that the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing clearly showed that the defendant's statement was given during a period of custodial interrogation which necessitated Miranda admonishments. Four officers entered the defendant's home, with revolvers drawn, and ordered the partially clad man out of his bedroom. Defendant assumed a prone position on the floor and during that time an officer had his gun pointed at him. It was at that point that the defendant made a statement. The court therefore concluded that it was evident from these facts that defendant's statement was given during a police-dominated atmosphere from which he was unable to leave. Calderon, 101 Ill.App.3d at 478, 57 Ill.Dec. 21, 428 N.E.2d 571.

The State cites People v. Fischetti (1970), 47 Ill.2d 92, 264 N.E.2d 191 and People v. Kilfoy (1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 276, 80 Ill.Dec. 798, 466 N.E.2d 250 to support its argument that Miranda warnings were unnecessary. In Fischetti, police officers went to the defendant's parent's apartment equipped with a search warrant. The ensuing search uncovered marijuana in certain items of clothing which the defendant admitted owning. The supreme court found...