People v. Mamon

• Decision Date: 20 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 85519,85519
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark MAMON, Defendant-Appellee. 435 Mich. 1, 457 N.W.2d 623
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 623

457 N.W.2d 623

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark MAMON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 85519.

435 Mich. 1, 457 N.W.2d 623

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 9, 1990.

Decided June 20, 1990.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Criminal Div., Research, Training and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for People.

Cornelius Pitts and Elaine Carlis, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

RILEY, Chief Justice.

This case presents us with the issue whether the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Michigan's analogous provision, Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 11, ¹ apply to a defendant who discards illegal contraband during a police chase. Our determination of this issue depends upon the resolution of two narrower issues: First, whether a person has standing in the context of the Fourth Amendment to challenge the introduction of a discarded bag containing illegal drugs, or, more specifically, whether the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the discarded bag and its contents, and, second, whether police pursuit of a person amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Under the facts of the instant case, we would hold that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the introduction of the narcotics discovered in the bag. Rather, we believe that the defendant renounced any reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents once he abandoned it during the police chase. We also would hold that the police pursuit of the defendant did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the police conduct never implicated the constitutional protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. We would reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. ²

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7403(2)(a)(iv); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iv). Kelvin Patrick, a Detroit police officer, offered the only testimony at the preliminary examination. He testified that on September 19, 1986, at approximately 7:50 p.m., he and his partner were driving a marked patrol car southbound on Log Cabin in Detroit. As they approached the corner of Log Cabin and Grove, an area with a history of narcotics activity, they observed the defendant, Mark Mamon, standing next to a public telephone. The defendant noticed the police car and fled toward a dwelling located at 16744 Log Cabin. The officers stopped the car and followed the defendant on foot, during which time they saw the defendant reach into his right pocket and throw away a burgundy-colored bag. The officers detained the defendant and retrieved the bag, in which they discovered six particles of suspected cocaine. ³

Upon the basis of this information, the district court bound the defendant over to Detroit Recorder's Court on the controlled substance charge. At a hearing on May 29, 1987, the Recorder's Court suppressed the cocaine and dismissed the case upon the basis of People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985). The court reasoned that the police obtained the cocaine as a result of an unlawful seizure. In particular, the court found that the police pursuit constituted a seizure and that, at the time the police initiated their pursuit of the defendant, they did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion upon which they could base their actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. ⁴ On June 30, 1989, this Court granted the people's application for leave to appeal. ⁵

II. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." U.S. Const., Am. IV. In order to receive the panoply of its constitutional safeguards, a person must have standing in the context of the Fourth Amendment to challenge the introduction of the particular piece of evidence being offered against him. This initial standing inquiry depends upon whether the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular goods at issue. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Moreover, a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in property which he has "abandoned." Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924); People v. Jackson, 175 Mich.App. 562, 438 N.W.2d 84 (1988); People v. Wright, 151 Mich.App. 354, 390 N.W.2d 187 (1986); People v. Boykin, 119 Mich.App. 763, 327 N.W.2d 351 (1982); United States v. Thomas, 275 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 23-24, 864 F.2d 843 (1989). As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently explained:

"A warrantless search or seizure of property that has been 'abandoned' does not violate the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Abel v United States, 362 US 217, 241; 80 S Ct 683, 698; 4 L Ed 2d 668 (1960). 'When individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of privacy in it that they might have had.' United States v Jones, 707 F2d 1169, 1172 (CA 10 [1983] ) (citation omitted), cert den 464 US 859; 104 S Ct 184; 78 L Ed 2d 163 (1983). The test for abandonment in the search and seizure context is distinct from the property law notion of abandonment: it is possible for a person to retain a property interest in an item, but nonetheless to relinquish his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. See, e.g., United States v Colbert, 474 F2d 174, 176 (CA 5, 1973). To determine whether there is abandonment in the fourth amendment sense, the district court must focus on the intent of the person who is alleged to have abandoned the place or object. See United States v Anderson, 663 F2d 934, 938 (CA 9, 1981). The test is an objective one, and intent may be inferred from 'words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.' Colbert, 474 F2d at 176."

Accordingly, in the instant case, we must determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents. If he did, then the search of the bag without a warrant violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Whereas, if he did not, as the people contend, when the defendant threw away the bag, he abandoned it and cut off his standing to challenge the introduction of the bag and its contents under the Fourth Amendment.

The people argue, and we agree, that the police did not need a warrant to search the discarded bag. Our assessment of the facts persuades us that the defendant unquestionably relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents when he voluntarily reached into his right pocket and discarded the bag. ⁶

However, the defendant contends that even if he abandoned the bag, he did so contemporaneously with or after the police unlawfully seized him. Therefore, he contends that the trial court properly suppressed the narcotics found in the bag as evidence obtained solely from an unlawful seizure. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We will only reverse the decision of the trial court if it clearly erred at the suppression hearing. People v. Burrell, 417 Mich. 439, 448, 339 N.W.2d 403 (1983). Consequently, we must determine whether the police conduct constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

In a recent case almost identical to the one before this Court today, the United States Supreme Court refused to adopt a brightline rule to determine when a police chase constituted a seizure. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). ⁷ Rather, the Court reaffirmed its adherence to a "traditional contextual approach":

"In Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968), the Court noted:

" 'Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a "seizure" has occurred.' Id. at 19, n 16 ....

"The test provides that the police can be said to have seized an individual 'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' ...

"The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to 'leave' will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs." (Citations omitted.)

In Chesternut, two police officers, while on routine patrol in a marked police car, approached an intersection in a high crime area of Detroit when they noticed the defendant standing at the street corner talking with another man. The defendant ran upon seeing the police car. The police followed the defendant in their car "to see where he was going." Id., p. 569, 108 S.Ct. p. 1977. They caught up with him and drove alongside the defendant for a short distance. At this point, the police observed the defendant throw away a number of tiny packets. One officer got out of the car and examined the packets. The packets contained pills which the officer suspected contained codeine. The police arrested the defendant for possession of narcotics. A...