People v. Mancha

• Decision Date: 05 March 1963
• Docket Number: Cr. 8460
• Citation: 29 Cal.Rptr. 72,213 Cal.App.2d 590
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Respondent, v. Raoul MANCHA, Defendant.

Page 72

29 Cal.Rptr. 72

213 Cal.App.2d 590

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Respondent, v. Raoul MANCHA, Defendant.

Cr. 8460.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

March 5, 1963.

Chandler & Duncan, by Elinor Chandler, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

LILLIE, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of hit and run in violation of section 20001, Vehicle Code; a probation report was ordered and the cause continued. A judge other than the one before whom defendant was tried heard his application for probation, denied the same and sentenced him to the State prison. He appeals from the judgment and sentence. While the sole issue is whether it was error for one other than the trial judge to impose sentence, appellant's claim that there were 'mitigating facts' which were not considered by the sentencing judge and the case 'could easily have gone either way as to innocence or guilty,' requires a brief summary of the evidence. The point of conflict was whether defendant knew he had been involved in an accident.

On the afternoon of February 13, 1962, at approximately 3:40, Mr. Beauchamp, a coca cola salesman, was driving his 2 1/2 ton truck east on 14th Street. As he approached Central Avenue he noticed Darold, a 4-year-old boy, crouched at the curb at the front of some cars parked on the north side of the street. As he slowed down he saw defendant driving a 1948 Cadillac car coming toward him on 14th Street at about 20 or 25 miles an hour. When defendant was approximately three car lengths from Darold the boy suddenly darted into the street about six feet. The right front of defendant's car struck him. Beauchamp was about 100 yards away and over the noise of his own truck engine, heard a loud thud. The boy was thrown to the ground and the car passed over him, although the wheels missed him. Beauchamp immediately stopped and jumped out of the truck. After defendant struck the boy he reduced his speed to about 15 miles an hour and looked back, but kept on going; as he passed within 8 feet of Beauchamp the latter shouted after him, 'Stop. You hit a little boy.' When defendant did not stop Beauchamp wrote down the license number of his car. Darold's head was 'skinned up' and a hip was broken. When police arrived, Beauchamp gave Officer Knowles the license number and described the car and defendant. At the scene no one identified himself to anyone as the driver, nor was defendant or his Cadillac ever seen near there after the accident. Darold was released from the hospital 50 days later and on the day of trial was still under medical care. Two days after the accident defendant voluntarily surrendered; he told Officer Foyle that he had been driving west on 14th Street, at Central Avenue around 4 p. m. on the day of the accident, that he felt a bump and heard a thud but paid no special attention to them and drove on, and that he did not turn around and did not hear anyone 'yell' at him.

Testifying briefly, defendant admitted that he heard a 'thud' but did not know he had hit anyone and continued on his way without slowing or looking back. As to whether his car rattled much, he stated the motor was 'shot, pretty shot.'

Appellant claims that the evidence was not 'clear cut' on the issue of innocence or guilt, and the sentencing judge was familiar with neither the 'mitigating facts' therein which might have resulted in probation, nor the record. He argues that there was no 'maliciousness' evidenced, the probation report shows he had a clean record and he would have been able, on a program of probation, to make restitution to the family for injuries suffered to the child, and that 'these things were not pointed out to the court at the time of sentencing'; he concludes that 'had the original judge' pronounced sentence 'he would not [sic] sentenced this man to the State penitentiary.'

'The matter of granting or denying probation is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless it is shown there was an abuse of discretion. (People v. Jackson, 89 Cal.App.2d 181, 182, 200 P.2d 204.) As stated in People v. Jennings, 129 Cal.App.2d 120, 123, 276 P.2d 124, 126: 'Probation is not a matter of right; it is an act of clemency, the granting and revocation of which are within the sound discretion of the trial court.'' (People v. Privitier, 200 Cal.App.2d 725, 730, 19 Cal.Rptr. 640, 643.) On the issue of abuse of discretion and prejudice, appellant seeks to reargue the facts, but the evidence, even his own testimony, points to but one conclusion, as stated by the trial judge: 'Everything occurred that should have brought it (the accident) to his attention, and I believe it was brought to his attention.' In finding defendant guilty he commented: 'I think we would have to be less than naive if we believe for a moment that defendant did not realize he had some collision * * * He should have been called upon to stop.'

The 'mitigating facts,' with which appellant claims the sentencing judge was not familiar, refer mainly to those to which he testified at the trial and the matters which constituted his defense, and which were obviously disbelieved by the trial judge. In rejecting them and, in particular, defendant's version of what occurred, the trial judge commented: 'I just don't have that faith in his integrity, that he didn't hear it. I think he heard it and went on going'; and accepting Beauchamp's credibility, remarked that '(H)is testimony is very clear and concise * * * There is no question about it at all, and it is tied in perfectly by the defendant...