People v. Manikowski

• Decision Date: 27 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 5,5
• Citation: 186 Ill.App.3d 1007,542 N.E.2d 1148
• Parties: , 134 Ill.Dec. 641 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Patrick MANIKOWSKI and Allan Bernard Manikowski, Defendants-Appellees. 87-0823.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1148

542 N.E.2d 1148

186 Ill.App.3d 1007, 134 Ill.Dec. 641

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Patrick MANIKOWSKI and Allan Bernard Manikowski Defendants-Appellees.

No. 5 87-0823.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

July 27, 1989.

Mark C. Hunter, State's Atty. Massac County Courthouse, Metropolis, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Matthew E. Franklin, Staff Atty., Office of the State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph Jay Jackson, Metropolis, for James Patrick Manikowski.

Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Mt. Vernon, Lori L. Mosby, Asst. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Allan Bernard Manikowski.

Justice RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from the decision of the circuit court of Massac County granting the motions of defendants, James Patrick and Allan Bernard Manikowski, to suppress evidence in connection with their charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. We reverse.

On June 28, 1987, defendants were en route from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to Chicago, Illinois, pursuant to a drive-away contract. Just across the Illinois border, defendants were stopped by the State police for traveling 70 to 75 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone. Allan was driving the car. Upon running a check of defendants' identifications, the troopers learned both defendants had criminal arrest records for narcotics. Because both defendants appeared to be nervous, the troopers asked if the vehicle contained any firearms or drugs. Allan replied no. The troopers then asked to search the vehicle and its contents. The troopers testified both defendants gave verbal permission and Allan signed a written consent form. Both defendants denied any such consent at the suppression hearing. The troopers proceeded to search the car when they learned bad weather was approaching. They asked defendants to drive to a police weigh station some 40 miles up the road in order to finish the search undercover. En route, the troopers signaled defendants to turn off at a garage in Vienna, in Johnson County, approximately 20 miles away from the initial stop. Additional troopers and a canine unit met defendants there. Continued search of the car produced a shaving kit underneath the left front wheel well. The shaving kit contained a clear plastic bag with gray duct tape around it which appeared to contain rice and a white substance. The white substance subsequently was identified as cocaine. Both defendants filed motions to quash their arrests and to suppress the evidence stemming from the search of the car. The trial court granted defendants' motions to suppress, finding that the troopers did not have valid consent to search the auto at the garage in Vienna.

The State first argues on appeal the trial court erred in granting James' motion to suppress. The State believes James lacked standing to raise the issue of whether the search was proper because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the drive-away car in which he was riding. We agree with the State's contention.

A person who has been aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure and the subsequent introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has no "standing" to claim any infringement of his fourth amendment rights unless he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. (See Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 135, 144, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 395, 402. See also United States v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 96, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2554-57, 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 631; People v. Thomas (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 592, 595, 44 Ill.Dec. 710, 713-14, 411 N.E.2d 1076, 1079-80.) James had no property or possessory interest in the car, was not driving the car when stopped by the troopers, and even though he had paid half of the traveling expenses and had personal items in the car, was not even listed as a potential passenger on the drive-away contract. As such, regardless of whether contributions to expenses had been made or not, James had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the left wheel well of the car. Consequently, James also had no "standing" to challenge the search. (See People v. Mezo (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 679, 681, 121 Ill.Dec. 328, 329, 525 N.E.2d 134, 135; People v. Carlton (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1064, 89 Ill.Dec. 172, 174, 479 N.E.2d 1178, 1180; People v. Flowers (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 348, 353, 67 Ill.Dec. 203, 207, 444 N.E.2d 242, 246; People v. Norris (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 664, 668-69, 57 Ill.Dec. 307, 310-11, 428 N.E.2d 987, 990-91. See also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149-50, 99 S.Ct. at 433 58 L.Ed.2d at 404-05.) The trial court erred in holding otherwise, and James' motion to suppress should have been denied.

James argues, however, the totality of the police conduct amounted to an unlawful seizure of his person in violation of his fourth amendment rights thereby conferring standing upon him for yet another reason. (See People v. Kunath (1981), 99 Ill.App.3d 201, 205, 54 Ill.Dec. 621, 624-25, 425 N.E.2d 486, 489-90.) This argument ignores the fact that the car in which he was riding was stopped for speeding. A traffic violation provides more than a reasonable basis for stopping a vehicle. (See Flowers, 111 Ill.App.3d at 354, 67 Ill.Dec. 208, 444 N.E.2d at 247.) Likewise, an officer's request to produce identification is not unreasonable, nor does it constitute a fourth amendment seizure. (See People v. Long (1983), 99 Ill.2d 219, 229-30, 75 Ill.Dec. 693, 697, 457 N.E.2d 1252, 1256.) More importantly, however, neither defendant's freedom of movement was restricted. No guns were drawn, no handcuffs were used. One of the troopers testified defendants could have left at any time once the warning ticket had been issued. The narcotics supervisor who met defendants at the garage in Vienna testified he told defendants they were not under arrest and they could go off and eat at a restaurant across the street if they so desired. There simply was no unlawful arrest or seizure of either defendant in this instance. (See United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 555-56, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509-10; Long, 99 Ill.2d at 231, 457 N.E.2d at 1257. Cf. Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 502-03, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 239-40; People v. Wiseman (1974), 59 Ill.2d 45, 50, 319 N.E.2d 225, 227; People v. Reynolds (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 576, 579, 57 Ill.Dec. 144, 146, 428 N.E.2d 694, 696.) Consequently, any argument that the cocaine should have been suppressed as the "fruit" of an illegal arrest is also without merit. Moreover, the search which produced the cocaine was based upon a valid written consent, unrelated to any possible illegal arrest. See People v. Brumfield (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 382, 387-88, 55 Ill.Dec. 687, 691-92, 426 N.E.2d 1012, 1016-17.

The State next finds fault with the trial court's ruling that the search conducted at the garage in Vienna exceeded the scope of Allan's written consent to search. The State contends the troopers made only one continuous search within the scope of consent given which neither defendant ever withdrew. Again we must agree with the State.

Allan, as driver of the car, signed a blanket comprehensive written consent form allowing the troopers to search the car in which defendants were riding as well as its contents. At no time was this consent ever withdrawn or limited. While both defendants denied giving their consent and Allan denied signing the consent form, credibility is an issue for the trier of fact which we will not disturb on review. (See, e.g., ...