People v. Mannozzi

• Decision Date: 06 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 2-92-1499,2-92-1499
• Citation: 632 N.E.2d 627,260 Ill.App.3d 199,198 Ill.Dec. 297
• Parties: , 198 Ill.Dec. 297 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laurie J. MANNOZZI, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 627

632 N.E.2d 627

260 Ill.App.3d 199, 198 Ill.Dec. 297

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laurie J. MANNOZZI, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-92-1499.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

April 6, 1994.

Joseph M. Laraia, Kenneth D. Hubbard, Joseph M. Laraia & Associates, P.C., Wheaton, for appellant.

James E. Ryan, DuPage County State's Atty., William L. Browers, Deputy Director, Lisa A. Hoffman, Robert J. Biderman, Richard G. Norris, Staff Atty. State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutors, Springfield, for appellee.

Presiding Justice INGLIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Laurie Mannozzi, appeals her conviction in the circuit court of Du Page County of unlawful possession of less than 30 grams of a controlled substance (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1402 (now 720 ILCS 570/402 (West 1992))). For the following reasons, we affirm.

Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501(a)(4) (now 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 1992))), and two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 11-501(a)(1), (a)(2) (now 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1992))). She moved to suppress evidence seized from her purse. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court found that although the search was not a proper inventory search, it was a proper search incident to a lawful arrest. Defendant then pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs and not guilty to the possession count. The State nol-prossed the remaining counts.

Following a stipulated bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance. For this offense the court sentenced her to two years' probation and imposed a $200 fine and a mandatory assessment. For the DUI offense the court sentenced defendant to 18 months' supervision (concurrent with the two years' probation) and fined her $300, plus court costs. Defendant appeals the possession conviction, contending that the court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

Testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that on August 21, 1991, around 11:15 p.m., defendant was driving a blue Chevrolet Beretta in the area of 63d Street and Clarendon Hills Road in Du Page County, Illinois. Willowbrook police officer Paul Oggerino testified that he observed the Beretta stopped in that intersection, apparently waiting for the traffic signal to turn green. The Beretta was in the middle of the intersection in front of the left turn lane of 63d Street, one or two car lengths beyond the solid white stop line.

Officer Oggerino followed the Beretta south on Clarendon Hills Road and observed it leave the paved roadway twice onto the gravel shoulder. He followed the Beretta into a condominium apartment complex. He activated his Mars lights as the Beretta pulled into a parking space. He approached the Beretta and asked to see the license of the driver, defendant Mannozzi.

Defendant testified that on the night in question she had been drinking and smelled of alcohol. She produced her license without difficulty from the wallet in her purse, which was in the bucket seat beside her. Oggerino informed defendant that he had stopped her for improper lane usage. He then asked her to perform a battery of field sobriety tests. Defendant returned her license to her wallet, and leaving the wallet in the purse on the car seat, she exited the car and followed the officer around behind the car.

Defendant testified that she walked and spoke without difficulty and performed the tests adequately. She stated that she remembered nothing unusual about her demeanor that evening. Oggerino testified that defendant seemed confused as to her whereabouts, that her eyes were glassy, and that she spoke with a "thick tongue" and slurred speech.

Oggerino administered four field tests. First, he asked defendant to recite the English alphabet. She in fact sang the alphabet, by her account only once and without flaw. According to Oggerino, she sang it twice, hesitating at "G" and stopping at "J" the first time, and skipping from "G" to "W, X, Y, Z" the second time. Next Oggerino administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. By his account, she failed this test.

He then asked defendant to walk a straight line, taking nine steps heel-to-toe. According to defendant, she performed perfectly. According to the Oggerino, she lost her balance while listening to his instructions, failed to walk heel-to-toe, lost her balance while walking, and took an incorrect number of steps. Finally, the officer had defendant stand on one foot and count for 30 seconds. Defendant testified that she made one attempt, counting only to 10. According to Oggerino, she failed three attempts, reaching only three or four seconds each time. At some point during the field sobriety tests, another officer arrived at the scene to assist.

After all the tests, Oggerino told defendant she was under arrest for DUI. He handcuffed her and placed her in the squad car. He and the other officer then secured the Beretta. They closed the windows, locked the doors, and took defendant's purse, without opening it, to the squad car.

Oggerino took defendant to the Willowbrook police station booking room, where a matron searched her at approximately 11:22 p.m. Defendant was secured to a bench, and the matron proceeded to inventory the contents of the purse. During this search, the matron found a razor blade, a rolled-up dollar bill, and a small paper packet containing a white powdery substance.

Oggerino field-tested the substance and found positive indications for cocaine. He then informed defendant that she was under arrest for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Thereafter, defendant agreed to take a breathalyzer test, which registered .22. At some point that evening Officer Oggerino had defendant's car impounded.

On appeal, defendant contends that the search and seizure of her purse were unreasonable and could not be justified either as incident to a lawful arrest or as a valid inventory search. On a motion to suppress, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the search and seizure complained of were unreasonable. (People v. Neal (1985), 109 Ill.2d 216, 218, 93 Ill.Dec. 365, 486 N.E.2d 898.) A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence will be reversed only if it is manifestly erroneous. (People v. Hoskins (1984), 101 Ill.2d 209, 212, 78 Ill.Dec. 107, 461 N.E.2d 941.) Defendant attacks Oggerino's conduct on several levels.

First, she contends that the removal of her purse from her car constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. She argues that the impoundment of her car was improper, because it was parked on private property. She also asserts that the officer had no right or responsibility to remove her purse from her car without her express permission, that the officer did not have probable cause to search the interior of her vehicle, and that the car was not within her "wingspan" once she was secured in the squad car.

Next, she asserts that the search of the contents of the purse was unreasonable. She challenges the court's incident-to-arrest reasoning on grounds that (1) the State has waived the issue on appeal; (2) the search was remote in time and place from the arrest; and (3) the purse was not immediately associated with her person, since the police had exclusive control of it at the time of the search. She challenges the State's assertion that the search constituted a valid inventory search on the same ground articulated by the trial court: that the search was not conducted in contemplation of incarceration.

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." (U.S. Const., amend. IV.) Defendant does not appeal the trial court's finding of probable cause for the stop and the arrest.

She contends initially that Officer Oggerino wrongfully seized her car by having it towed from a private parking lot. The validity of the search of an impounded vehicle is dependent upon the validity of the impoundment. (People v. Braasch (1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 747, 752, 78 Ill.Dec. 67, 461 N.E.2d 651.) Defendant contends that Oggerino lacked probable cause to seize her car, because it was lawfully parked on private property. We find this argument wholly irrelevant to the suppression issue, as the purse was removed long before the car was impounded, and the car was impounded only after the cocaine was discovered in the purse.

A "search," as contemplated by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, occurs when an expectation of privacy considered reasonable by society is infringed. (United States v. Jacobsen (1984), 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 94.) A search implies a quest by an officer of the law, some action by the police looking for something. (See Hale v. Henkel (1906), 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652, overruled on other grounds in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n. of New York Harbor (1964), 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678.) If an inspection by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no "search" subject to the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. (Illinois v. Andreas (1983), 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003, 1010; Neal, 109 Ill.2d at 218, 93 Ill.Dec. 365, 486 N.E.2d 898; People v. Uran (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 294, 299, 109 Ill.Dec. 742, 510 N.E.2d 610.) Defendant cites no authority to support the proposition that securing the vehicle of a custodial arrestee intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of the arrestee's privacy.

Defendant characterizes...