People v. Mar

• Citation: 52 P.3d 95,28 Cal.4th 1201,124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161
• Decision Date: 22 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. S086611.,S086611.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Allen MAR, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161

28 Cal.4th 1201

52 P.3d 95

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Allen MAR, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S086611.

Supreme Court of California.

August 22, 2002.

As Modified September 11, 2002.

Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Clayton S. Tanaka, Garrick W. Chock, W. Scott Thorpe and David A. Rhodes, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

In this case we must determine under what circumstances a defendant in a criminal trial in California may be required, as a security measure, to wear a remote-controlled electronic "stun belt"—a device that, in its current design, delivers an eight-second-long, 50,000-volt, debilitating electric shock when activated by a transmitter controlled by a court security officer. The Courts of Appeal have reached conflicting conclusions with regard to whether the principles set forth in this court's decision in People v. Duron (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322 (Duran), establishing the limited circumstances under which a defendant may be subjected at trial to physical restraints such as shackles or manacles, apply as well to the use of a stun belt, and we granted review in part to resolve that issue. In addition, because this is the first occasion this court has been called upon to address the use of a stun belt in courtrooms in California, we also determine whether there are features and aspects of such a device that are sufficiently distinct to require a trial court to consider additional factors before compelling a defendant to wear one during a criminal trial.

As we shall explain, with respect to the first point we conclude that the Court of Appeal in this case correctly determined that the general principles set forth in Duran that apply to the use of traditional types of physical restraints also apply to the use of a stun belt. Unlike the Court of Appeal, however, we further find that the trial court's ruling in this case compelling defendant to wear a stun belt while testifying on his own behalf was erroneous under Duran, and also conclude that this error was prejudicial. Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment of conviction must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.

In addition, to provide guidance both to the trial court in this case (should a question as to the potential use of a stun belt arise on retrial) and to other courts that may be faced with the question of the use of a stun belt in future trials, we discuss a number of distinct features and risks posed by a stun belt that properly should be taken into account by a trial court, under the Duran standard, before compelling a defendant to wear such a device at trial.

Unlike shackles and manacles, which have been used for hundreds of years and whose operation is predictable and effects well known, the stun belt is a relatively new device with unique attributes and whose use has not been without problems or controversy. In light of the nature of the device and its effect upon the wearer when activated, requiring an unwilling defendant to wear a stun belt during trial may have significant psychological consequences that may impair a defendant's capacity to concentrate on the events of the trial, interfere with the defendant's ability to assist his or her counsel, and adversely affect his or her demeanor in the presence of the jury. In addition, past cases both in California and in other jurisdictions disclose that in a troubling number of instances the stun belt has activated accidentally, inflicting a potentially injurious high-voltage electric shock on a defendant without any justification. The potential for accidental activation provides a strong reason to proceed with great caution in approving the use of this device. Further, because the stun belt poses serious medical risks for persons who have heart problems or a variety of other medical conditions, we conclude that a trial court, before approving the use of such a device, should require assurance that a defendant's medical status and history has been adequately reviewed and that the defendant has been found to be free of any medical condition that would render the use of the device unduly dangerous.

Finally, inasmuch as the governing precedent establishes that even when special court security measures are warranted, a court should impose the least restrictive measure that will satisfy the court's legitimate security concerns, we conclude that a trial court, before approving the use of a stun belt, should consider whether there is adequate justification for the current design of the belt—which automatically delivers a 50,000-volt shock lasting 8 to 10 seconds, a shock that cannot be lowered in voltage or shortened in duration—as opposed to an alternative design that would deliver a lower initial shock and incorporate a means for terminating the shock earlier. Particularly in view of the number of accidental activations, we conclude that a trial court should not approve the use of this type of stun belt as an alternative to more traditional physical restraints if the court finds that these features render the device more onerous than necessary to satisfy the court's security needs.

I

Before examining the circumstances relating specifically to the trial court's ruling on the use of the stun belt—the focus of the issue before us—we summarize the facts that gave rise to the underlying criminal charges against defendant James Allen Mar. The following summary is taken largely from the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeal.

A

1. Prosecution's case

The evidence presented by the prosecution at trial established that on September 3, 1996, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Raymond Mellon of the Kern County Sheriffs Department went to a residential street in the City of Taft to investigate a report of a disoriented man. Mellon found defendant sitting on a curb, apparently crying. Defendant told Mellon that he could not recall his name, although defendant said he believed his first name might be "Jim." Defendant had no identification on his person or among his belongings, and agreed to accompany Mellon to the Taft Police Department for a fingerprint check to help determine his identity.

Mellon transported defendant, without restraints, to the police department. At the booking counter, defendant recalled his last name and other pieces of information. The dispatcher conducted a warrant check for "James Mar" and found an outstanding "want" by a parole agent; shortly thereafter, parole agent David Soares telephoned Mellon and asked him to place a parole hold on defendant. At Mellon's request, defendant entered an open booking holding cage and sat down on a bench; Mellon then closed and locked the wire door of the cage and informed defendant that he was under arrest for a parole violation.

Mellon testified that at that point defendant's demeanor abruptly changed. Defendant began pacing the floor, yelling, and pounding on the cage's walls and wire mesh door with his closed fists, threatened to "kick [Mellon's] ass," and challenged Mellon to open the door so they could fight. Sergeant Matthew Holm heard the noise and went to the booking area with another officer to investigate. Defendant threatened to "kick everybody's ass" and continued pounding on the walls and pacing.

Although inmates normally are placed in a jail cell once booking is complete, Holm and Mellon testified that because of defendant's agitated state they were concerned he might injure himself if left in the booking cage or placed in a regular cell, so they decided to move him into a specially padded "detox" cell, whose floor was covered with a rubberized coating. They also hoped that placement in the detox cell might calm defendant down, because an inmate in the detox cell cannot see any jail officers.

Holm testified that he walked to the cage door, told defendant he was going to be moved, and asked for his cooperation. In response, defendant assumed a crouched fighting stance and told Holm to "come on in" so defendant could "kick his ass." Holm testified that as he opened the cage door, defendant rushed head first into Holm's chest, knocking him backwards, and that as Holm fell he hit defendant's head twice with his fist, fracturing one of his (Holm's) fingers and damaging a ligament in his hand. Mellon and another officer then helped subdue defendant, who was handcuffed and moved to the detox cell without further incident. On cross-examination, Holm denied that he and the other officers, annoyed at defendant's loud and profane yelling and antagonistic verbal threats, had entered the cage to quiet defendant down, by force if necessary.

In the course of his testimony, Mellon stated that he did not receive any indication from defendant's appearance that defendant was under the influence of any drug or was mentally ill. Mellon further testified that defendant did not ask to use the telephone, although Holm, in his testimony, stated that he could not recall whether defendant had asked to make a telephone call.

g. The defense case

Defendant testified in his own behalf at trial. His testimony confirmed much of the prosecution's evidence, but differed from the officers' testimony on the most significant points.

Defendant testified that he lived in adjacent Santa Barbara County but had traveled to Taft in Kern County a few days before his arrest, without notifying his parole officer, assertedly for a last fling before getting married. Defendant stated that he had gone on a methamphetamine binge, had not slept for two days, and had missed a scheduled meeting with his parole officer at which he was to take a drug test. Defendant testified that he had run out of money,...