People v. Marentez, B206971 (Cal. App. 2/23/2010)
| Decision Date | 23 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | B206971. |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL RUDY MARENTEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. ZM002909, Joan Comparet-Cassani, Judge. Affirmed in part; modified in part; remanded in part.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Following a jury trial, appellant Paul Rudy Marentez was adjudged to be a sexually violent predator within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 6600, et seq. (the Sexually Violent Predator Act, hereafter "SVPA.") The trial court ordered appellant to be committed to the Department of Mental Health for a period not to exceed two years.
Appellant appeals from the trial court's judgment and order, contending that the Department of Mental Health used "underground" regulations to illegally commit him as a Sexually Violent Predator (hereafter "SVP") and his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to make a pre-trial challenge to the validity of the SVP petition. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a 1980 charge of which he was acquitted; permitting the prosecution to present evidence of the SVP treatment program at state hospitals but barring appellant from presenting evidence that those programs were flawed; and making numerous rulings which interfered with his ability to present his case and deprived him of a fair trial. Appellant further contends that the current version of the SVPA is unconstitutional because it caused him to be committed in violation of his equal protection, due process, ex post facto and double jeopardy rights. Respondent contends that the trial court's imposition of a two-year commitment was unauthorized and must be corrected to an indeterminate term. We agree with respondent that appellant's term must be corrected to the legally mandated indeterminate term. In accordance with the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, we remand this matter for a hearing on appellant's equal protection claim. The court's judgment and order are affirmed in all other respects.
In 1980, appellant was charged with committing a lewd act on a child in violation of Penal Code section 288, but was acquitted in a court trial. The victim was a five-year-old girl, Veronica E. In a 1988 police interview with Long Beach Police Detective Nelson and in a 2007 interview with prosecution expert Dr. Malinek, appellant admitted wrongdoing and misconduct in 1980. Accordingly, details of the 1980 crime were relied on by the prosecution experts in forming their opinions and were conveyed to the jury.
In 1988, appellant was convicted of one count of committing a lewd act on a child in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). The victim in that case was a three-year-old boy, Marvin M. In 1993, he was convicted of two counts of committing a lewd act on a child. The victim in that case was a six-year-old boy, Matthew B. These were appellant's two qualifying convictions for purposes of the SVPA.
The details of the three offenses were presented primarily through the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. Jack Vognsen. Dr. Vognsen, a psychologist, first interviewed appellant in 1998.
In addition to his evaluation of appellant, Dr. Vognsen reviewed the Department of Corrections Penal Code section 969, subdivision (b), packet, relating to appellant's 1988 lewd act conviction (case number A041071), as well as the police reports. Dr. Vognsen also read the 47-page transcript of the police interview in that case. During the interview between appellant and Detective Nelson of the Long Beach Police Department, they spoke about the details of the incident and whether appellant would plead to the offense.
Dr. Vognsen also spoke with appellant about his 1988 lewd act conviction. Appellant told Dr. Vognsen that he had been on a cocaine binge and was using alcohol at the time of the incident, and that he could not recall the incident. Appellant also said he pled guilty in that case. Appellant admitted to Dr. Vognsen that he committed the 1988 crime and his admissions became "clearer" over the years that Dr. Vognsen saw appellant.
Dr. Vognsen gave the following description of the 1988 incident: On August 7, 1988, appellant approached Marvin M., a three-year-old boy, and lured him into a church bathroom by promising him candy. Inside the bathroom, appellant orally copulated Marvin and asked Marvin to orally copulate him. Marvin's mother became concerned when she lost sight of him. The mother found Marvin exiting the bathroom, and appellant was tying Marvin's shoelaces. Marvin was anxious and told his mother what happened. The mother went home and called the church to determine appellant's identity. The mother learned of the name of appellant's father and she contacted him and the police. According to the police report Dr. Vognsen reviewed, Marvin's mother told the police that appellant called her twice to warn her against calling the police. According to the mother, Marvin told her that the man pulled down his pants and sucked on his "rungita," which in Spanish means "penis." Marvin also said the man asked him to suck on his penis, and that when Marvin refused, they came out of the bathroom after hearing Marvin's mother calling for him.
Dr. Vognsen also testified about the 1980 incident involving Veronica, a five-year-old girl. On May 16, 1980, Veronica's mother took Veronica and her sister to a shoe store, where appellant was working as a shoe salesman. None of the shoes fit Veronica, so appellant asked the mother if he could take Veronica to the back of the store where there were free shoes. The mother agreed. Appellant led Veronica to the back of the store and into a bathroom. Appellant placed her on a chair, took off her panties, and placed his finger inside her vagina. He also orally copulated her vagina, and they left the bathroom. After Veronica and her mother left the store, Veronica told her mother the man did something "bad" to her, and she described what happened. Veronica's mother called the police. Appellant was interviewed and he denied anything happened. Veronica was examined by a doctor. The doctor found no evidence of penetration, but observed that the vaginal opening was slightly reddened which could be consistent with the offenses she described. Dr. Vognsen opined that Veronica's testimony during the preliminary hearing was very consistent with what she told the police. A court trial was held, and appellant was acquitted of this incident based upon insufficient evidence. In his interviews with Dr. Vognsen, appellant denied molesting the girl.
Dr. Vognsen also reviewed the Department of Corrections Penal Code section 969, subdivision (b), packet, relating to appellant's 1994 conviction (case number NA019542). Dr. Vognsen also reviewed the two related police reports, and he considered them in his evaluations of appellant from 1998 through 2007.
Dr. Vognsen gave the following description of the facts underlying appellant's 1994 conviction: In 1993, appellant began dating Matthew's mother. They stayed together in his apartment for two or three months. On one occasion when appellant and the boy visited a swimming pool, appellant removed Matthew's pants and fondled his penis while they were in the bathroom. Appellant also had Matthew fondle appellant's penis. On a second occasion at a YMCA bathroom, appellant handled Matthew's penis while applying soap to Matthew. Appellant then made Matthew handle appellant's erect penis. In speaking with Dr. Vognsen, appellant denied molesting the boy.
Dr. Vognsen found appellant's involvement with the care of children relevant in determining whether appellant established the relationship with Matthew's mother to victimize the children. Dr. Vognsen also found it significant that appellant had already been sanctioned by his parole officer for being around children, yet he nevertheless decided to involve himself with a woman who had two small children. When Dr. Vognsen questioned appellant about the 1994 case, appellant replied that he was suffering because his wife took his children away and moved to Pennsylvania. Appellant also said that when he was around children, he felt alive and young again. Dr. Vognsen opined that appellant's excuse was not credible, and that his attitude toward children was not uncommon among people who had sex with children. Dr. Vognsen opined the reason why appellant violated his parole was because of his sexual attraction to children. He also opined appellant believed he could do whatever he wanted, and that appellant could not be relied upon to follow rules.
Dr. Vognsen performed various tests on appellant to assess his general cognitive ability. Dr. Vognsen opined appellant performed adequately on the tests and that he was able to communicate in a straightforward way. Dr. Vognsen also performed an ink blot (Rorschach) test on appellant. As a result of this test, Dr. Vognsen opined appellant's use of logic was peculiar in that he skipped from one type of thought to another unrelated type of thought.
Dr. Vognsen diagnosed appellant with several mental disorders, including antisocial personality disorder, substance abuse disorders, and pedophilia. To be diagnosed with pedophilia, the first criteria requires evidence of either sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors that involve sexual activity with a prepubescent child. The second criteria requires active...
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