People v. Mark C. (In re Mark C.)

• Decision Date: 28 January 2016
• Docket Number: A144875
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE MARK C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark C., Defendant and Appellant.

244 Cal.App.4th 520

197 Cal.Rptr.3d 865

IN RE MARK C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.The People, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Mark C., Defendant and Appellant.

A144875

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Filed January 28, 2016

Peter B. Meadow By appointment of the Court of Appeal, Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent People.

Miller, J.Defendant Mark C. was the subject of a wardship petition filed by the district attorney pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a),¹ alleging that he possessed a knife with a blade longer than two and one-half inches on school grounds, in violation of Penal Code section 626.10.

Mark requested informal supervision under section 654.2, although his offense made him presumptively ineligible under section 654.3. The juvenile court denied Mark's request after a hearing.

At a subsequent hearing, Mark admitted the allegations in the petition and the juvenile court imposed conditions of probation, including a requirement that he submit to warrantless searches of his "electronics including passwords" (electronics search condition).

On appeal, Mark raises three issues: the juvenile court erred in not placing him under informal supervision; the juvenile court erred in imposing the electronics search condition; and several of the other probation conditions imposed by the juvenile court, including conditions that prohibit him from possessing weapons and narcotics, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and "lack proof of scienter," and must therefore be modified.

We conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing the electronics search condition, and we modify the probation condition to strike the language at issue. In all other respects, we affirm the juvenile court's dispositional order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We draw our brief statement of the facts from reports prepared by the police and the Alameda County Probation Department. On the afternoon of November 17, 2014, defendant Mark C., then 14 years old, was being escorted to the office of his high school's assistant principal in connection with a fight that had taken place during the lunch period. When a campus supervisor reported that she saw a suspicious bulge near Mark's waistband, a police officer pat searched him and retrieved a folding pocket knife with a blade two and three-fourths inches long. A search of Mark's backpack revealed a canister of pepper spray, which is considered contraband at the school. Mark told the police that he carried the items for self defense, and that some people disliked and provoked him.

Mark was arrested, and in February 2015 the district attorney filed a wardship petition pursuant to section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that Mark possessed a knife with a blade longer than two and one-half inches on school grounds, in violation of Penal Code section 626.10.

At Mark's request, the matter was referred to the probation department for consideration of informal supervision pursuant to section 654.2. At a hearing in March, the juvenile court received the probation department's report, which concluded that Mark was suitable for informal supervision, even though his alleged violation of Penal Code section 626.10 made him presumptively ineligible under section 654.3. Mark argued that informal supervision was appropriate because he had "the benefit of a stable family home, with both his mother and stepfather being very supporting of him and fully willing to cooperate with probation services"; and because there had already been intervention and he had "made a turnaround." Mark also argued that he was doing better in school, although his grades from the most recent semester were poor. The juvenile court found that the case was not suitable for informal supervision, stating that "bringing a knife and pepper spray to school is a very, very serious offense or are serious offenses.... [W]e're going to need a standard probation for the situation, ... not a 654.2 given the seriousness of the weapons he brought to school."

At a subsequent hearing in April, Mark admitted the allegations in the petition and was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court. The juvenile court committed Mark to the care, custody and control of the probation department, ordered him to live with his mother, and imposed terms of probation,² including the electronics search condition. The terms also include other conditions, several of which Mark contests: a weapons condition, stating that defendant cannot "possess, own, or handle any firearm, knife, weapon, fireworks, explosives or chemicals that can produce explosives, including matches and lighters ... [p]epper spray or any other deadly or dangerous weapon"; a drug condition, stating that defendant cannot "use or possess narcotics, drugs, other controlled substances, related paraphernalia or poisons unless prescribed by a physician"; a school presence condition, limiting defendant's presence on the campus or grounds of any school; a curfew, requiring defendant to "[m]aintain curfew set by parent/guardian"; an association condition, prohibiting defendant from associating with "anyone you know to use, deal or possess illegal drugs"; an obedience condition, requiring defendant to "[o]bey parent(s) or guardian(s)"; and an alcohol condition, stating that defendant cannot "use or possess alcoholic beverages."

Mark objected to the search condition at the time it was imposed, but did not object to the other conditions. This appeal timely followed.

DISCUSSION

We first address Mark's challenge to the juvenile court's denial of his request for informal supervision, and then turn to his challenges to the probation conditions.

A. The Juvenile Court's Denial of Mark's Request for Informal Supervision

1. Applicable Law

Section 654.2, subdivision (a), provides that "[i]f a petition has been filed by the prosecuting attorney to declare a minor a ward of the court under Section 602, the court may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court and with the consent of the minor and the minor's parents or guardian, continue any hearing on a petition for six months and order the minor to participate in a program of supervision as set forth in Section 654." Such a program of supervision is commonly known as "informal probation" or "informal supervision." The statutory scheme specifically excludes from eligibility a minor who is alleged to have violated section 626.10 of the Penal Code, as Mark was alleged to have done, "except in an unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served and the court specifies on the record the reasons for its decision." (§ 654.3, subd. (c).) The juvenile court must make its own determination of a minor's suitability for informal supervision, independent of the probation officer, and must consider all relevant evidence in making that determination. (In re Armondo A. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1189–1191, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 (Armondo A. ).)

We review the juvenile court's order denying informal supervision for abuse of discretion. (Armondo A., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1189–1190, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 101.) We reverse only if the juvenile court "has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination." (In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871, 881, 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 423.) We do not "reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court." (Ibid. )

2. Analysis

Because Mark was alleged to have violated Penal Code section 626.10, he is "presumptively ineligible" for informal supervision under section 654.3. (See Kody P. v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1033, fn. 2, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 763.) The presumption is overcome only in an "unusual case where the interests of justice would be best served and the court specifies on the record the reasons for its decision." (§ 654.3, subd. (c).)

Mark, however, does not attempt to characterize his case as unusual in any respect, but rather contends that the trial court erred in denying informal supervision for other reasons: there was no reason to doubt his claim that the items were carried for self-defense; the informal supervision program is sufficient to monitor his behavior and allow the standard probation conditions to be applied; he had already begun improving his behavior at home and performance at school; it was "unreasonable" to "brand" him "as a delinquent" for his first contact with the juvenile justice system; and a criminal record could harm him "in the longer term." Mark cites no evidence or authority to support a finding that his case is unusual on any of those grounds, and he points to nothing in the record that suggests the juvenile court abused its discretion in reaching its conclusion.

The record reflects that the juvenile court read and considered the probation department's report, and heard and considered arguments of counsel. (See Armondo A., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ["[d]ue process ... requires the juvenile court to consider all relevant evidence in exercising its discretion"].) Because the juvenile court did not adopt the probation department's recommendation, it is clear that the juvenile court made its own independent determination of Mark's suitability for informal supervision independent of the probation department, as the law requires. (Id. at p. 1190, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 101.) Although the probation department recommended informal supervision, the juvenile court disagreed with its conclusion, and explained why: "bringing a knife and pepper spray to school is a very, very serious offense." The juvenile court heard and understood the argument that...