People v. Marquez
| Decision Date | 01 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98CA0022.,98CA0022. |
| Citation | 983 P.2d 159 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wilfred D. MARQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, John D. Seidel, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Lisa Dixon, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ
Defendant, Wilfred D. Marquez, appeals the trial court's order denying his latest Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief. We affirm and remand with directions.
In 1982, defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of second degree assault for acts committed in 1980. He was also adjudicated an habitual criminal and, according to the amended mittimus, was ultimately sentenced to 33 years in the Department of Corrections plus one year of parole to be consecutive to a federal sentence. Defendant thereafter filed numerous appeals and post-conviction motions not relevant to this appeal.
In 1997, defendant filed this Crim. P. 35(c) motion challenging the reclassification of his parole status and claiming that under § 18-1-105(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.1998, he was entitled to immediate release on mandatory parole.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion, finding that both §§ 17-2-201(5)(a) and 17-2-213, C.R.S.1998, excluded habitual offenders, such as defendant, from the mandatory parole provisions generally applicable to offenders whose crimes were committed between July 1, 1979, and July 1, 1985.
I.
On appeal, defendant contends that §§ 17-2-201(5)(a) and 17-2-213 are ambiguous and should, therefore, be construed in his favor. We disagree.
Our task in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. To determine such intent, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986). When that language is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed as written, without resort to interpretive rules and statutory construction. People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234 (Colo.1994).
If, however, the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions, and its intended scope is unclear, a court may apply other rules of statutory construction to determine which alternative construction is in accordance with the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990).
Furthermore, a statute must be read and considered as a whole, and it should be interpreted so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Thus, if separate clauses within a statute may be reconciled by one construction, but would conflict under a different construction, the construction that results in harmony, rather than inconsistency, should be adopted. People v. District Court, supra. An interpretation that renders a particular clause meaningless, likewise, should be avoided. People v. Terry, supra.
Section 17-2-213, C.R.S.1998, provides that:
Effective July 1, 1979, the provisions of this part 2 relating to the power of the state board of parole to grant parole and to establish the duration of the term of parole shall apply only to persons sentenced for conviction of a felony committed prior to July 1, 1979, persons sentenced for conviction of a misdemeanor, persons sentenced for conviction of a sex offense, as defined in section 16-13-202(5), C.R.S., or a class 1 felony, and persons sentenced as habitual criminals pursuant to section 16-13-101, C.R.S. Parole for persons sentenced for conviction of a class 2, class 3, class 4, or class 5 felony committed on or after July 1, 1979, shall be as provided in section 18-1-105, C.R.S., and article 22.5 of this title. (emphasis added)
Defendant maintains that the first portion of this statute is in conflict with the second portion. More specifically, he maintains that the first portion exempts all habitual criminals from the mandatory parole provisions, while the second portion does not. Indeed, he argues, the second portion specifically subjects all persons, including habitual criminals such as himself, who are convicted of a class 2, class 3, class 4, or class 5 felony committed on or after July 1, 1979, to mandatory parole. Defendant, therefore, claims he is entitled, under the rule of lenity and the second portion of § 17-2-213, to mandatory parole. We are not persuaded.
In our view, the plain language of § 17-2-213 provides that all persons sentenced as habitual criminals under § 16-13-101, C.R.S. 1998, will be subject to discretionary parole, regardless of when their current offenses were committed or how those offenses are classified.
Even if we agreed with defendant that the statute contains conflicting provisions and is, therefore, ambiguous, our interpretation would not change. It has the advantage of harmonizing the alleged conflicting provisions. See People v. District Court, supra. Moreover, defendant's interpretation would effectively render the clause, "and persons sentenced as habitual criminals pursuant to section 16-13-101, C.R.S.," meaningless. See People v. Terry, supra.
Our interpretation is supported by the fact that sentences imposed under the habitual criminal statute supersede sentences statutorily mandated for specific crimes. See People v. Anderson, 43 Colo.App. 178, 605 P.2d 60 (1979).
Section 17-2-201(5)(a), C.R.S.1998, provides:
As to any person sentenced for conviction of a felony committed prior to July 1, 1979, or of a misdemeanor and as to any person sentenced for conviction of an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior or for which the factual basis involved an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 18-3-412.5(1), C.R.S., committed prior to July 1, 1996, or a class 1 felony and as to any person sentenced as a habitual criminal pursuant to section 16-13-101, C.R.S., the board has the sole power to grant or refuse to grant parole and to fix the condition thereof and has full discretion to set the duration of the term of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Planned Parenthood, Rocky Mountains Serv. V. Owens
...376 (Colo.1990) ("[C]onstructions that would render meaningless a part of the statute should be avoided."); see also People v. Marquez, 983 P.2d 159, (Colo.App. 1999) (same). Accordingly, I conclude that an in pari materia interpretation cannot save the constitutionality of the In sum, I co......
-
People v. Green
...of imprisonment and mandatory parole time resulted in a total sentence that exceeded the terms of his plea agreement); People v. Marquez, 983 P.2d 159 (Colo.App.1999)(Crim.P.35(c) motion challenged reclassification of defendant's parole status); People v. Mayes, 981 P.2d 1106 (Colo.App.1999......
-
People v. Cooper, 98CA1614.
...to the intent of the General Assembly, and if the statutory language is clear, the statute must be construed as written. People v. Marquez, 983 P.2d 159 (Colo.App.1999). The language at issue here is, "but in no event shall the term of parole exceed the maximum sentence imposed upon the inm......
-
People v. Falls, 00CA2169.
...Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (Colo.2001). Clear and unambiguous statutory language must be construed as written. People v. Marquez, 983 P.2d 159 (Colo.App.1999). Statutory schemes must be considered as a whole, and harmonious effect must be given to all parts thereof. Martin v. People, sup......