People v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 04 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 62856,62856
• Citation: 8 Ill.Dec. 129,365 N.E.2d 367,47 Ill.App.3d 784
• Parties: , 8 Ill.Dec. 129 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ardest MARSHALL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 367

365 N.E.2d 367

47 Ill.App.3d 784, 8 Ill.Dec. 129

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ardest MARSHALL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 62856.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

April 4, 1977.

James Geis, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Steven L. Clark, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty. Cook County, Attn: Laurence J. Bolon, and Larry L. Thompson, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

McGLOON, Justice.

After a jury trial, defendant, Ardest Marshall, was found guilty of the offense of armed robbery. The trial court entered judgment on this verdict and sentenced defendant to 6 to 12 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

Defendant now appeals from this judgment and makes the following three contentions: (1) that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress a lineup identification of the defendant made after a charge had been placed against him and at a time when the defendant was not represented by counsel; (2) that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine a witness when the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who had died was read to the jury; and (3) that the defendant was prejudiced by the admission into evidence, over defense objections, of numerous hearsay identifications of the defendant.

We affirm.

The testimony adduced at trial established that at approximately 9:15 a. m. on November 3, 1972, two men entered a tire company located at 349 West 31st Street in Chicago, Illinois and inquired about purchasing some tires. The two men stayed for 15 minutes, left and returned at approximately 1 p. m. the same day. One of the two men entered the office of Mr. Benjamin Olswang, the proprietor of the tire company, and proceeded to garage area with a gun pointed at Mr. Olswang's head. After rifling through his wallet, the intruders bound Mr. Olswang's hands and told one of Mr. Olswang's employees, Milton Brown, to load some truck tires onto one of the company trucks. As the tires were being loaded, another employee, David Jackson, entered the garage and was tied up at gunpoint. After spending approximately 45 minutes in the tire company, the two men tied up Milton Brown, tore two telephones from the walls, and left with the tires. Further testimony established that several hours after the robbery, two men arrived at the MTS Cartage Co., located at 13505 South Indiana Avenue in a vehicle loaded with truck tires. The two men sold ten tires for $500 to the proprietor, Mr. William Williamson. At trial, Mr. Williamson positively identified the defendant as one of the men who sold him the tires.

At trial, Milton Brown and David Jackson positively identified the defendant as the man with the gun who had committed the robbery. Both further testified that prior to trial they identified defendant from a group of photographs shown to them by a police investigator, Edmund Butz. David Jackson also stated that he had identified defendant in a lineup.

Edmund Butz, an investigator for the Chicago Police Department, testified that on January 17, 1973 he showed a group of photographs to Ben Olswang, Milton Brown and David Jackson and that each of the three men identified defendant's photograph as that of one of the men involved in the robbery. Investigator Butz also testified at trial that on January 30, 1973 he conducted a lineup viewed by Ben Olswang and David Jackson and that both men identified the defendant in the lineup.

During trial, the State, noting that Mr. Olswang had died prior to trial, sought to introduce into evidence Mr. Olswang's testimony at a preliminary hearing. Over defendant's objection, the trial court permitted the State to read Mr. Olswang's preliminary hearing testimony to the jury. The testimony which was read to the jury indicated, inter alia, that Mr. Olswang identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing as one of the men who had committed the robbery.

After hearing all of the above evidence, the jury returned a finding of guilty. The trial court entered judgment on this verdict and sentenced defendant to six to twelve years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

Defendant initially contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the lineup identifications because such identifications were effected after a charge had been placed against the defendant and at a time when the defendant was not represented by counsel. The record reveals that on January 30, 1973 defendant was arrested and identified in a lineup and that during this lineup defendant was not represented by counsel. Approximately one week before this lineup, a complaint for preliminary examination charging defendant with armed robbery and an arrest warrant had been issued.

In Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, 417, the United States Supreme Court held that the requirement of presence of counsel at a lineup extends to "(any) adversary judicial criminal proceedings whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Relying on Kirby, this court in People v. Hinton (1974), 23 Ill.App.3d 369, 319 N.E.2d 313, held that the issuance of a complaint, followed by an arrest warrant and the actual arrest of the defendant was a "formal charge" within the purview of Kirby and required the presence of counsel at the lineup. We similarly believe, in the instant case, at the time of the lineup adverse judicial proceedings had begun and that defendant should have been afforded counsel. However, we disagree with defendant's contention that the absence of counsel at the lineup requires us to reverse the judgment of the trial court. It is well established that the requirement of counsel's presence is based upon consideration of due process and that if all the circumstances surrounding the identification procedure taken together clearly indicate that due process was followed, the absence of counsel at the identification lineup is not fatal to the judgment reached by the trial court. See People v. Hinton (1974), 23 Ill.App.3d 369, 319 N.E.2d 313. Addressing itself to the question of the effect of a lineup identification without the presence of counsel, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1939, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1165 expressed the following views:

"We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is that quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, (455) '(W)hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of...