United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe

• Decision Date: 20 November 1978
• Docket Number: No. 78 C 1914.,78 C 1914.
• Citation: 460 F. Supp. 1128
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. James M. SANDERS, Petitioner, v. Charles ROWE, Director, Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, and Dennis Wolfe, Warden, Joliet Correctional Center, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

460 F. Supp. 1128

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. James M. SANDERS, Petitioner, v. Charles ROWE, Director, Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, and Dennis Wolfe, Warden, Joliet Correctional Center, Respondents.

No. 78 C 1914.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

November 20, 1978.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State App. Defender, Daniel A. Cummings, Asst. State App. Defender, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., State of Illinois by Michael I. Santow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for respondents.

OPINION

BUA, District Judge.

I.

James M. Sanders filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his March 21, 1977, conviction of two armed robbery charges in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Illinois. Petitioner claims that two confessions¹ which were admitted against him at his trial were obtained in violation of his right to counsel at interrogation sessions, and should have been suppressed pursuant to the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. This issue was timely raised in the trial court and on appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court. Petitioner's conviction at a stipulated bench trial was affirmed on appeal. People v. Sanders, 55 Ill.App.3d 178, 13 Ill.Dec. 186, 370 N.E.2d 1213 (2d Dist. 1977), petition for leave to appeal denied, No. 50387 (March 30, 1978) (unpublished order). The parties agree that petitioner has exhausted all state remedies.

The case is now before the court on respondents' motion to dismiss, and on petitioner's cross motion for summary judgment. The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are based on the record of the state proceedings and the findings made by the circuit court judge. Though the state court's record and findings are ambiguous on many points, this court relies on them here, in holding that the petitioner is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the undisputed facts.² See Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1975) (a district court may properly rely on undisputed state court findings of fact in conducting its independent review of a habeas petitioner's constitutional claims), aff'd, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977). To the extent that there is any genuine issue of material fact herein, it has been resolved in favor of the state. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing has not been necessary.³ See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81-82, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977).

II.

At 1:00 a. m. on January 13, 1977, Officer Charles Bishop of the Rockford Police Department observed three men struggling near the corner of State and Madison Streets in Rockford.⁴ Two of the men fled as Bishop approached, and he chased them. Bishop recognized one of the men as the petitioner. While chasing the men, Bishop passed a parked patrol car containing Rockford Officers Frew and Lindstrom, and he asked them to chase the green Buick in which the pair had fled. Bishop then returned to the third man, Frank Barbero, who was lying on the ground. Barbero told Bishop that the two suspects had attempted to rob him and were armed.

After a chase, Frew and Lindstrom stopped the Buick. In the car were three men: the petitioner, Mark Manley, and Boyce Smelser. The officers searched the car and found a .32 caliber revolver, apparently stained with dried blood, and a "clubtype" instrument.⁵ The suspects were then advised of their rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and taken to the police station. There was conflicting testimony at the preliminary hearing as to whether petitioner was drunk at the time of his arrest. (R. 64-66, 72, 238-39).

At the station, petitioner was again advised of his Miranda rights. He signed a waiver of rights form, then gave a statement denying any participation in the offense. At about 3:00 a. m. he was taken to jail.

Six hours later, at 9:00 a. m., petitioner was interrogated by Rockford Police Detectives Bland and Fegan.⁶ At 9:24, they again read the petitioner his rights and asked if he understood them. He said that he did and, according to the detectives' testimony, said that he wished to speak to an attorney.⁷ The detectives did not, however, cease their interrogation. They took no steps towards providing petitioner with a lawyer.

After petitioner requested a lawyer, the detectives told him that they had a strong case against him and that he would almost certainly be convicted and sentenced to a minimum of four years in prison. They described the substance of their case to him, including the fact that they had obtained an oral statement from Smelser and a written statement from Manley. When the petitioner asked to see Manley's statement, the detectives refused to show it to him. They did fold the paper so he could see Manley's signature. A few minutes later, petitioner agreed to give a statement and signed a written waiver form.⁸ This statement admitted an involvement in the armed robbery of Barbero.

At some point prior to 5:00 p. m. that day, a criminal complaint charging petitioner with armed robbery in the Barbero case was sworn by Detective Bishop and filed in the Winnebago County Circuit Court Clerk's Office.⁹

During the afternoon, petitioner, still in custody, was moved to the Sheriff's office at the Winnebago County Courthouse. At 5:40, Sergeant England and Officers Ferger and Shimaitis of the Winnebago County Sheriff's Department began interrogating the petitioner about a second armed robbery. Petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights and again signed a written waiver form.¹⁰ At about 6:00 p. m., petitioner confessed to the armed robbery of Smith T. Randol on the night of January 12, the same night as the Barbero robbery.¹¹

That evening, Officers Rollins and McGill of the Boone County Sheriff's Department interviewed petitioner at the Winnebago County Sheriff's Office. At about 9:00 p. m., petitioner signed another written waiver of rights form. He then confessed to the armed robbery and aggravated battery of James Collins, also on the evening of the twelfth.¹²

A preliminary hearing was held in the case on January 20, 1977, and a hearing on the motion to suppress was held on March 16, 1977. At the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled against the defendant's motion to suppress. The judge issued no written findings. His ruling from the bench, in part, was that:

I believe they are adult young men who signed these waivers understandingly, knowingly. I believe the statements were signed voluntary. sic I think there are cases that indicate even psychological coercion is wrong, but I don't believe there was sufficient psychological coercion on these two young men to make these statements involuntary.

Therefore, the statements will be admitted. . . .

(R. 282).¹³

On March 21, 1977, the petitioner's case was called for trial. The lawyers announced a plea agreement, under which petitioner would plead guilty to two armed robbery charges, for the Randol and Collins robberies, while the charge of attempted armed robbery of Barbero and the aggravated battery charges would be dismissed. The state agreed to recommend a penalty of four to twelve years imprisonment, to run concurrently on both charges. After the prosecutor summarized the state's version of the events leading up to petitioner's arrest, the judge proceeded to inform the defendant of his rights pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110A, § 402 (1975).

At the conclusion of the admonitions, the petitioner asked whether his entry of a guilty plea would terminate his right to appeal from the trial court's denial of his suppression motion. When told that it would, the defendant seemed surprised, so the court ordered a recess. After the recess, the judge asked the lawyers if they had found a way to preserve petitioner's right to appeal. They said that they had, by agreeing to a stipulated bench trial. The petitioner stipulated to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and the motion to suppress. He also stipulated that the statement of facts made by the prosecutor would be the proof the prosecutor would offer in the case. (R. 18, 29-30). See note 57, infra. After further admonitions and discussion, the judge found the petitioner guilty of the Collins and Randol armed robberies, and entered judgment as agreed to in the plea agreement.

Petitioner appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court. On December 7, 1977, the appellate court affirmed the conviction. People v. Sanders, 55 Ill.App.3d 178, 13 Ill.Dec. 186, 370 N.E.2d 1213 (2d Dist. 1977). In its opinion, the court ruled that the Barbero confession was inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), since the Rockford police officers had failed to honor petitioner's original request for an attorney. It ruled that the admission of the confession was harmless error, however, since the second and third confessions were found to be admissible. These later confessions, the court held, were not tainted by the earlier Miranda violation, since the passage of time, repeated admonitions, and other factors were sufficient to dissipate any taint. 55 Ill. App.3d at 183-84, 13 Ill.Dec. at 190, 370 N.E.2d at 1217. In addition, the court concluded that the use of a stipulated bench trial, while not good practice, was acceptable in this case. 55 Ill.App.3d at 184, 13 Ill.Dec. at 191, 370 N.E.2d at 1218. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petitioner's request for leave to appeal. No. 50387 (March 30, 1978) (unpublished order).

III.

Petitioner asks this court to find that the Randol and Collins confessions were illegally obtained, and that these confessions, as well as the Barbero confession, should have been suppressed at trial. Petitioner claims that he had a right to have co...