People v. Martin

• Decision Date: 05 October 1954
• Docket Number: Cr. 1003
• Citation: 274 P.2d 509,127 Cal.App.2d 777
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles Wilkie MARTIN, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 509

274 P.2d 509

127 Cal.App.2d 777

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles Wilkie MARTIN, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 1003.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

Oct. 5, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1954.

Robert N. Reynolds, San Diego, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

GRIFFIN, Justice.

Defendant was charged with and convicted by a jury of the crime of forgery of a fictitious name. The jury also found that defendant had suffered five prior felony convictions and served time therefor in prison. At the trial defendant refused the services of his counsel and proceeded with his counsel acting only in an advisory capacity. On appeal the same counsel was appointed by this court to represent the defendant.

His first claim is that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, mainly upon the ground that the check involved was not, in fact, fictitious, and that there was not sufficient evidence to show the defendant knew the name of the payee was fictitious.

A resume of the facts indicates that on October 16, 1953, defendant was a patron of the El Cortez Hotel bar room, and had about $400 in front of him. He asked the clerk to cash a travelers' check (American Express Company) for $50, which he took from a booklet of similar checks. The hotel company stamped its name in as payee and the defendant, under the name of Vern Swindler, countersigned the check in the space provided and received the $50. The group of checks, including the one here involved, were signed 'Vern Swindler' at the top of each check, as being the purchaser thereof. The check was deposited in due course and was later located in the bank clearing of the American Express Company by an employee searching for stolen travelers' cheques. It was identified as one of several stolen from a Mr Stang, in Seattle, Washington, agent of the express company. From this theft about $3,400 in travelers' checks, as well as $900 in cash, were taken. Stang testified that he did not sell any such checks to 'Vern Swindler' or the defendant Martin, and identified the stolen checks by number.

Defendant was apprehended at Green's Cafe and Bar on October 17th, and was searched. He was found in possession of a passport in the name of Charles Wilkie Martin, and a press card containing the name 'Vern Swindler'. A book of travelers' checks was found in his possession similar to the check passed at the El Cortez Hotel. He was taken to the police station and was there seen endeavoring to hide the book of travelers' checks under the seat of the automobile as he was about to leave it. He told several conflicting stories as to where he obtained them. One was that he bought them because he was going to Mexico. A check was made of the city directory, registration of voters, and other places to see if the name of 'Vern Swindler' could be found in the city of San Diego, but it could not be located. Later, defendant told the officers he had stolen the checks from someone in Las Vegas, Nevada. He said he did not remember cashing the check at the El Cortez Hotel.

A navy storekeeper, Mr. Laverty, testified he met defendant at Green's Cafe in the men's room, and he was counting a considerable sum of money; that he advised the defendant to leave the premises because several people were watching him count that money, and that defendant informed him that money meant nothing to him; that he had recently stolen $6,000 and did not care if he lost it; that he had thrown away a couple of thousand dollars that day; that he was able to obtain some more and he was preparing to leave the country; that defendant showed him a passport and stated that he wanted to make one more big haul before he left and invited the navy man to line up something for him and he would split 50-50 with him. The navy man then called the officers.

Testimony was then taken to establish the fact of the prior convictions. Defendant did not testify at the trial. His counsel made numerous objections for him during the trial and argued the case to the jury.

A mere recitation of the evidence indicates, at least, a prima facie showing that the alleged purchaser of the travelers' checks, i. e., 'Vern Swindler', was a fictitious person or name, and that defendant signed and forged this fictitious name to the check for the purpose of securing money thereon, with knowledge of these facts. Defendant offered no testimony to refute this showing. The evidence fully supports the verdict of 'guilty' of 'forgery of a fictitious name'.

A more technical question is presented by defendant's claim, which was also made at the time of trial, that the information charged the defendant with the crime of 'forgery of fictitious name (P.C. 476) committed as follows:'; that he did feloniously make, utter, publish and pass a certain check, an order in writing for the payment of money which purported, on its face, to be countersigned by a certain person and individual named 'Vern Swindler', when in truth and in fact said check was false and fictitious to the knowledge of defendant and there was not then and there, or at all, any such person. (It sets forth in haec verba the travelers' check involved.) It then charges that defendant, having said check in his possession, did then and there feloniously utter, publish and pass the same as true and genuine, with intent to cheat and defraud the El Cortez Hotel, a corporation, and others; that said check was false and fictitious to the knowledge of the defendant, and that there was not then and there any such person or individual as Vern Swindler. It is contended that the crime of forgery of a fictitious name is not encompassed within the meaning of section 476 of the Penal Code, but under the evidence defendant should have been charged under section 470 of the Penal Code (forgery), and accordingly the verdict rendered thereon was null and void and acted as an acquittal of the offense charged, citing such cases as People v. Arnarez, 68 Cal.App. 645, 230 P. 193; People v. Arnett, 129 Cal 306, 61 P. 930; People v. Curtis, 76 Cal. 57, 17 P. 941; People v. Smith, 136 Cal. 207, 68 P. 702; People v. Eppinger, 105 Cal. 36, 39, 38 P. 538; and People v. Prather, 23 Cal.App. 721, 726, 139 P. 664.

The attorney general concedes that the facts in this case do not constitute the offense denounced by Penal Code section 476 because it was established that the payor of the travelers' check, the American Express Company, was not a fictitious company, but was in existence at the time and that it was the payee, Vern Swindler, who proved to be the fictitious person. It is argued, however, that the allegations contained in the amended complaint sufficiently set forth the facts constituting the offense charged and apprised the defendant that he was guilty of violation of section 470 of the Penal Code although the information refers to section '476 P.C.', and that the evidence produced fully justifies defendant's conviction of the crime of 'forgery of a fictitious name', as charged, and as found by the verdict of the jury, citing People v. Adair, 3 Cal.App.2d 323, 325, 59 P.2d 274, in which case the defendant was charged with 'forgery of a fictitious name' and appellant there contended there was no such crime denounced by law. It was held that the specific acts were pleaded with sufficient clearness and the designation given the claimed offense was immaterial. It was likewise held that whether the signatures in question were forgeries of the name of existing persons or whether they were names of fictitious persons was immaterial, citing cases.

There is some confusion in the record. Some of his argument to the jury indicates that the prosecutor was relying upon section 476 of the Penal Code. Apparently the trial judge was somewhat confused himself in this respect, for he said to the jury:

'Now, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, something has been said about the defendant being charged under the wrong section of the Penal Code. I am not saying one way or another whether this defendant committed this offense or not. That is not up to me. But the only thing I can say is that if, according to the evidence, the charge is under Penal Code Section 476 and it is a proper action, so I don't want you folks to go out in the jury room and say it should have been charged under some other section, because that is no concern of yours. Your only concern is whether or not this man committed this particular offense.'

However, the trial court instructed the jury in the language of section 470 of the Penal Code relating to forgery of the name of a fictitious person, and apparently gave no instruction in the language of section 476 of the Penal Code.

The jury found the defendant guilty of committing the acts charged, 'forgery of fictitious name'. It does appear that defendant was sufficiently apprised of the nature of the charge against him, and it does not appear that the defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous designation 'Sec. 476 PC' instead of Penal Code section 470 in the amended information.

Complaint is made of the testimony of the navy storekeeper, Laverty, concerning a conversation he said he...