People v. Martin

• Decision Date: 21 June 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 4-15-0021,4-15-0021
• Citation: 80 N.E.3d 94,2017 IL App (4th) 150021
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Trance N. MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2017 IL App (4th) 150021

80 N.E.3d 94

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Trance N. MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-15-0021

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

June 21, 2017

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Michael Gomez, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Luke McNeill, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Trance N. Martin, appeals his September 2014 conviction of aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of section 11-501(d)(1)(H) of the Illinois Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(H) (West 2014)). On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court committed plain error by admitting improper lay opinion testimony and (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) object to Illinois State Police Trooper Tyler Vandeventer's testimony on improper lay opinion grounds and (b) preserve the relevance objection to Trooper Vandeventer's testimony in his posttrial motion to reconsider his sentence. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In January 2014, defendant was charged by information with aggravated DUI in violation of section 11-501(d)(1)(H) of the Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(H) (West 2014)). In September 2014, a jury found defendant guilty. In November 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years in prison. Because defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and our analysis does not require us to consider the totality of the evidence, we limit our statement of facts to those necessary to resolve defendant's issues on appeal.

¶ 4 At defendant's September 2014 jury trial, Trooper Vandeventer gave the following testimony. In January 2014, Trooper Vandeventer was dispatched to a vehicle off the road on Interstate 74 in Champaign County, Illinois. Upon arriving at the scene, Trooper Vandeventer discovered a black car in the ditch and two men standing outside the vehicle. Trooper Vandeventer approached the men, who identified themselves as Trance Martin (defendant) and Gaston Woodland. Trooper Vandeventer asked if the men were all right, and they responded they were. Trooper Vandeventer then asked who had been driving the vehicle, and defendant stated his wife, Virginia Latimore-Martin, had been driving. Defendant explained his wife accepted a ride from someone on the interstate to get a tow truck. Woodland initially agreed with this account and stated he had been seated in the back passenger seat. It had snowed earlier in the day, but Trooper Vandeventer noted there were no footprints in the snow walking away from the vehicle or walking along the interstate. Trooper Vandeventer also noted a strong smell of alcohol on defendant's breath.

¶ 5 Trooper Vandeventer returned to his squad car to run a check on defendant's and Woodland's licenses and discovered defendant's license had been revoked. Trooper Vandeventer reapproached the men and again asked who had been driving the vehicle. Woodland then indicated defendant had been driving and he had been sitting in the front passenger seat, not the back. Illinois State Police Trooper Matthew Hedges then arrived on the scene and took over the investigation because Trooper Vandeventer had been dispatched to another crash scene. After establishing the above facts, Trooper Vandeventer gave the following testimony:

"Q. And based on your training and experience and everything you learned at the scene, obviously Trooper Hedges arrested the defendant for driving while license revoked. Who did you think was driving?

[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

A. I believe [defendant] was driving.

Q. How did you come to that conclusion?

A. Just his story didn't seem to make sense to me, and the fact that I don't know why he would send his wife to get help with some stranger off the interstate. And it just, with what Mr. Woodland said, also the fact that he was actually sitting in the front passenger seat, made me not believe [defendant]."

¶ 6 Trooper Hedges testified to the following facts. When he arrived on the scene, he observed Trooper Vandeventer talking to two men. Trooper Hedges approached, and Trooper Vandeventer indicated he believed defendant had been driving. Trooper Hedges noticed defendant appeared disoriented, his eyes were red and glassed-over, and his breath smelled of alcohol. Trooper Hedges asked defendant how many alcoholic beverages he had consumed, and defendant responded he had consumed "four beers approximately." Defendant reiterated his statement his wife had been driving the vehicle and left for help with someone driving down the interstate. Trooper Hedges administered a field sobriety test, but the test was inconclusive. Trooper Hedges arrested defendant for driving with a revoked license. Trooper Hedges transported defendant to the jail and administered the "walk-and-turn" field sobriety test and the "one-legged stand" field sobriety test, both of which indicated defendant was impaired. Defendant was then charged with DUI.

¶ 7 Woodland testified he and defendant had been at a friend's house on the day of the accident. Defendant drove Woodland to the friend's house, and the two stayed there for about an hour and a half. While they were there, they drank "a lot" of alcoholic beverages, according to Woodland. They later left the house, and defendant drove. While defendant was driving, he slid off the road. Woodland stated Virginia Latimore-Martin was not with them on the date of the accident.

¶ 8 Defendant testified in his defense and reiterated his statement his wife had been driving the vehicle and left the scene after the accident to get help. William Grier, who had also been at the gathering with defendant and Woodland, testified he saw Virginia Latimore-Martin pick defendant and Woodland up from the house. Virginia Latimore-Martin testified she drove defendant to the friend's house on the day of the accident and then picked defendant and Woodland up later in the evening. She testified she was driving the vehicle when it slid off the road. According to Latimore-Martin, defendant and Woodland bickered about how to handle the situation after the car had slid off the road, so she walked up the road. While she was walking, a woman stopped and asked if she needed help. Latimore-Martin testified she asked for a ride to a towing company, and the woman complied with the request. Latimore-Martin testified she called defendant on his cellular phone when she got to the towing company, and Trooper Vandeventer answered defendant's phone and stated defendant had been arrested for DUI. She testified she did not tell Trooper Vandeventer she had been the driver but, rather, asked what would happen to her car.

¶ 9 The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced defendant to three years in prison. Defendant timely filed a posttrial motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied.

¶ 10 This appeal followed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court committed plain error by admitting improper lay opinion testimony and (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) object to Illinois State Police Trooper Tyler Vandeventer's testimony on improper lay opinion grounds and (b) preserve the relevance objection to Trooper Vandeventer's testimony in his posttrial motion to reconsider his sentence.

¶ 13 A. Plain Error

¶ 14 Defendant concedes he forfeited his argument the trial court erred by overruling his objection to Trooper Vandeventer's testimony, but he requests plain-error review, arguing the evidence at trial was closely balanced. The State maintains the issue is forfeited because the testimony was proper lay opinion testimony and any error was harmless. We review a court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v. Lerma , 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 23, 400 Ill.Dec. 20, 47 N.E.3d 985. "An abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court's decision is ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.’ " Id. (quoting People v. Rivera , 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 369 Ill.Dec. 321, 986 N.E.2d 634 ).

¶ 15 Initially, we note the proper inquiry when considering a forfeited claim is whether plain error occurred, not whether harmless error occurred. People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363, 272 Ill.Dec. 185, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (2003). The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to bypass forfeiture rules and consider a clear or obvious error that occurred during the trial. People v. Shaw , 2016 IL App (4th) 150444, ¶ 69, 402 Ill.Dec. 807, 52 N.E.3d 728 ; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court."). The plain-error doctrine may be invoked where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error deprived the defendant of a fair hearing.

People v. Baker , 341 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1090, 276 Ill.Dec. 458, 794 N.E.2d 353, 359 (2003). "As a matter of convention, our court typically undertakes plain-error analysis by first determining whether error occurred at all." People v. Sargent , 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189, 346 Ill.Dec. 441, 940 N.E.2d 1045, 1059 (2010).

¶ 16 As defendant notes, "[w]hen a party has stated no basis for an objection and the trial court has [overruled] the objection but provided no reason for its ruling, this court presumes that the trial court ruled on the grounds of relevancy." People v. Boston , 2016 IL App (1st) 133497, ¶ 61, 403 Ill.Dec. 557, 54 N.E.3d 217 ; see also Po tt e r v. Potter , 41 Ill. 80, 84 (1866) ("The objection, however, was general, and we must presume it was intended to apply to its relevancy to the issue."). Here, defense counsel stated no basis for the...