People v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 28 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | E058136 |
| Citation | 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 320,226 Cal.App.4th 759 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Guillermo Antonio MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
226 Cal.App.4th 759
172 Cal.Rptr.3d 320
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Guillermo Antonio MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
E058136
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
Filed May 28, 2014
Neil Auwarter, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony Da Silva and Peter Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P.J.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Guillermo Antonio Martinez pled no contest to resisting an executive officer ( Pen.Code, § 69 ).1 In return, defendant was sentenced to county prison for two years (one year suspended) with credit for time served, plus one year of mandatory supervision under various terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant challenges two of his mandatory supervision conditions. For the reasons explained below, we will modify the supervision condition concerning presence in a court building. As modified, we will affirm the order imposing the conditions of supervision, including the challenged gang condition.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On April 24, 2012, after receiving a dispatch call about a disturbance, Fontana police officers drove to a residence in Fontana and contacted defendant's mother. Defendant's mother informed the officers that she took defendant's baseball cap because defendant took her cellular telephone and would not return it to her. Defendant, who was 23 years old at the time, arrived while his mother was talking to the officers.
One of the officers separated defendant from his mother and began questioning him about the events leading to the disturbance. While asking defendant questions, defendant showed the officer his tattoos and said that he no longer "hangs out with the neighborhood." As the officer was looking at defendant's tattoos, defendant lunged at and grabbed the officer's collar, and told the officer "[f]uck you." Defendant then began fighting the officer. Defendant was arrested.
On May 1, 2012, defendant was charged with felony resisting an executive officer in violation of section 69.
On August 23, 2012, defendant pled no contest to the charge.
Defendant informed the probation officer that he was 14 years old when he became a member of the Calle Townsend gang in Orange County and that he was 20 years old when he ended his membership with the gang and moved to San Bernardino County.
The sentencing hearing was held on January 31, 2013. At that time, the trial court indicated that it had read and considered the probation officer's report. Defense counsel objected to the drug terms. The court granted defense counsel's request, over the People's objection, and struck the drug terms. Defense counsel also objected to the gang terms, including term probation condition No. 24. The court denied defense counsel's request, noting that defendant's altercation with the officer began once the officer asked defendant about his gang tattoos. The court thereafter asked the parties if they had "[a]nything else [they] want[ed] to be heard about." Defense counsel responded in the negative, and noted the fines should be reduced to the minimum.
Defendant was thereafter sentenced to county prison for two years (one year suspended) with credit of 38 days for time served, plus one year of mandatory supervision under various terms and conditions as modified.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Report to Local Police Gang Detail Condition
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing probation condition No. 24 requiring him to report to the local police gang unit, because it is unreasonable, there was no evidence he was currently or recently a gang member, and it has no rational relationship to his underlying conviction for resisting an officer.
Specifically, as a condition of supervised release, probation condition No. 24 requires defendant to "Report to the local police agency gang detail with a copy of [his] terms and conditions and show proof to the probation officer within fourteen (14) days from today[']s date or release from custody."
As an initial matter, we note that although supervised release is to be monitored by county probation officers "in accordance with the terms,
conditions, and procedures generally applicable to persons placed on probation" (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B)(i)), "this does not mean placing a defendant on mandatory supervision is the equivalent of granting probation or giving a conditional sentence. Indeed, section 1170, subdivision (h), comes into play only after probation has been denied." ( People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422 [165 Cal.Rptr.3d 383], citing People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 671 [143 Cal.Rptr.3d 742] [" ‘once probation has been denied, felons who are eligible to be sentenced under realignment will serve their terms of imprisonment in local custody rather than state prison’ "].) "Moreover, section 667.5 provides for a one-year enhancement for ‘prior prison terms,’ including a ‘term imposed under the provisions of paragraph (5) of subdivision (h) of [s]ection 1170, wherein a portion of the term is suspended by the court to allow mandatory supervision.’ (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Thus, the Legislature has decided a county jail commitment followed by mandatory supervision imposed under section 1170, subdivision (h), is akin to a state prison commitment; it is not a grant of probation or a conditional sentence." ( Fandinola, supra, at p. 1422, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 383.) Therefore, as the court in Fandinola recently found, "mandatory supervision is more similar to parole than probation." ( Id. at p. 1423, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 383.) We will therefore analyze the validity of the terms of supervised release under standards analogous to the conditions or parallel to those applied to terms of parole.
"In California, parolee status carries distinct disadvantages when compared to the situation of the law-abiding citizen. Even when released from actual confinement, a parolee is still constructively a prisoner subject to correctional authorities. [Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has characterized parole as ‘an established variation on imprisonment’ and a parolee as possessing ‘not ... the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.’ [Citations.] Our own Supreme Court holds a like opinion: ‘Although a parolee is no longer confined in prison his custody status is one which requires ... restrictions which may not be imposed on members of the public generally.’ [Citations.]" (
People v. Lewis (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, 669–670 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 231].)
The fundamental goals of parole are " ‘to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals’ [citation], ‘ "to end criminal careers through the rehabilitation of those convicted of crime" ’ [citation] and to [help them] become self-supporting." ( In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1233, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 168.) In furtherance of these goals, "[t]he state may impose any condition reasonably related to parole supervision." ( Ibid. ) These conditions "must be reasonably related to the compelling state interest of fostering a law-abiding lifestyle in the parolee." ( Id. at p. 1234, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 168.)
The validity and reasonableness of parole conditions is analyzed under the same standard as that developed for probation conditions. ( In re Hudson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [49 Cal.Rptr.3d 74] ; In re Stevens, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ["[t]he criteria for assessing the constitutionality of conditions of probation also applies to conditions of parole"].) "A condition of [parole] will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality....’ [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of [parole] which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." ( People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545], fn. omitted, superseded on another ground by Proposition 8 as stated in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290–292 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938] ; see People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379–380 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1].)
In general, the courts are given broad discretion in fashioning terms of supervised...
To continue reading
Request your trial